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     This dissertation analyzes the role of Richard Posner, one of the most prolific and innovative 
legal thinkers over the past forty years, as a judicial entrepreneur in his efforts to persuade the 
legal academy and judiciary to incorporate economic principles into the judicial decision making 
process in market and non-market areas of the law and legal discourse and thereby to re-examine 
the role of the judge.  Though political scientists have explored the entrepreneurial activities of 
policy makers and political actors, they have given little attention to the role of judges as judicial 
entrepreneurs.  This dissertation develops a comprehensive theoretical understanding of judicial 
entrepreneurship, analyzes Posner’s entrepreneurial characteristics and strategies, and assesses 
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“I am a judge as well as an academic; and I believe more deeply than other judges and 
academics . . .  that the social sciences in general and economics in particular should inform 
both the study and the administration of law.”
1
  Richard A. Posner 
 
Chapter I.  Introduction  
     Over the last forty years, perhaps no jurist or scholar has written as extensively on judicial 
decision making as has Richard A. Posner, a federal judge sitting on the 7
th
 Circuit Court of 
Appeals, a law professor at the University of Chicago, and a public intellectual.  Posner is a 
polymath, who has addressed numerous legal and non-legal topics, ranging from aging, antitrust, 
the role of public intellectuals, and law and literature to legal pragmatism, sex, terrorism, and 
most recently, economic and financial regulatory failures.  He is, to this day, the nation’s most 
cited jurist and legal authority.
2
  But Posner is not simply a prolific writer of over fifty books and 
literally hundreds of articles, and chapters, plus over 2,250 judicial opinions;
3
 he is also a judicial 
and public intellectual, who, as an entrepreneur, has advocated the use of certain analytical tools, 
particularly, economic analysis of the law, in which economic principles such as efficiency, 
wealth maximization and rational self-interest, are utilized in the judicial decision making 
process.  Some of his ideas are original, but many are innovative interpretations of existing or 
recycled ideas with a contemporary application to the law on which he has put his mark. 
                                                          
1
 Richard A. Posner, Law and Legal Theory in the UK and USA (Oxford:  Oxford University 
Press, 1996), vii. 
2
 Robert F. Blomquist, The Quotable Judge Posner:  Selections from Twenty-Five Years of 





     As one of the founders of the Economic Analysis of the Law Movement (EAL) that 
developed at Yale and the University of Chicago law schools, Posner produced the first 
comprehensive treatise on the economics of law, Economic Analysis of Law (1972),
4
 in which he 
argued that there was an inherent preexisting economic paradigm in traditional common law 
judicial decision making.
5
  By appealing to people’s rational self-interest, judges could promote 
economic principles of efficiency and wealth maximization in their judicial decision making and 
apply market principles to nonmarket areas of the law.  Since the publication of Economic 
Analysis of Law and The Economics of Justice
6
 in 1981, intended for a broader non-legal 
audience, the application of law and economics, coupled with a pragmatic framework, has been 
the hallmark of Posner’s approach to “the study and administration of the law.”
7
 
      Posner did not invent the idea of applying economic analysis to judicial decision making, nor 
did he ever claim that he did - that intellectual path had been well trod in American legal 
history,
8
 and economic and legal scholars led the contemporary revival, with such seminal works 
as Gary Becker’s The Economics of Discrimination,
9
 Ronald Coase’s “The Problem of Social 
                                                          
4
 Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (New York:  Little, Brown and Company, 1972). 
5
 Ibid., 98. 
6
 Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981). 
7
 Posner, Law and Legal Theory in the UK and USA, vii. 
8
 Neil Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence (Oxford:  Clarendon Press/Oxford 
University Press, 1995), 308.   
9






 and Guido Calabresi’s “Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts.”
11
  
Posner had no formal economic training, and prior to law school, had been an English literature 
major.  But what he did very well was to take a preexisting legal idea, economic analysis of the 
law, and make it his own.  On and off the bench, through his innovative interpretations and 
judicial entrepreneurial efforts, he worked to make EAL into a mainstream, albeit controversial, 
legal doctrine, to the point where law and economics became synonymous with Posner.  Richard 
Posner is a judicial entrepreneur. 
     What is a judicial entrepreneur?  To address this question we must first inquire as to the 
nature of entrepreneurship generally.  Although there is no consensus as to how to define an 
entrepreneur,
12
 the Austrian economist, Joseph Schumpeter (1883-1950), probably best captures 
the entrepreneur as “the pivot on which everything turns”
13
 who facilitates “innovation” and 
“creative destruction.”
14
  The theory of “creative destruction” is that “technical change and 
                                                          
10
 Ronald H. Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost,” Journal of Law and Economics 3, no. 1 
(October 1960): 1-44. 
11
 Guido Calabresi, “Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts,” The Yale Law 
Journal 70, no. 4 (March 1961): 499. 
12
 The Concise Oxford English Dictionary provides a rather skeletal definition of an entrepreneur 
as “a person who sets up a business, taking on financial risks in the hope of profit.” Concise 
Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2004), 476-477.  An economics 
textbook defines an entrepreneur as “a person who has an idea for a business and coordinates the 
production and sale of goods and services, taking risks in the process.”  The “idea” may be 
original or borrowed.  Arthur O’Sullivan and Steven Sheffrin, Economics:  Principles and Tools 
(New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1998), 229. 
13
 Joseph A. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis (New York:  Oxford University Press, 
1954), 555.  
14
  See Joseph A. Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry into Profits, 
Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle (Virginia: Transaction Publishers, 1982).  For 
an excellent analysis of Schumpeter’s life and scholarly work, see Thomas K. McGraw, Prophet 
of Innovation: Joseph Schumpeter and Creative Destruction (Cambridge:  Belknap Press, 2007). 
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business cycles are the result of creative innovations, which cluster together and renovate 
economic life.”
15
  But it is the term that Schumpeter coined, “Unternehmergeist,” translated as 
the “entrepreneur spirit,” that truly reflects Posner’s drive as a judicial entrepreneur.  Posner has 
the drive, temperament, legal and academic pedigree, and skills to take existing legal ideas, 
innovate and repackage them, and make them his own and new again.  By advocating an 
economic interpretation of the law, he has helped to bring about significant “discontinuity”
16
 in 
the existing paradigm of judicial decision making and legal discourse.  Posner is also an 
Unternehmergeist because he does not limit his advocacy to his judicial opinions, but has also 
been an extraordinarily productive public intellectual,
17
 consistently promoting his ideas to the 
legal and non-legal community in a variety of disciplines and on a variety of topics. 
     The management authority, Peter Drucker (1909-2005), has stressed that it not necessary for 
entrepreneurs to create ideas, but they must be willing to run with new or old ideas when 
opportunities are presented.
18
  In Posner’s case, the rise of neoliberal economic thought and the 
decline of Keynesian economic theories presented the right climate for a new approach to the 
                                                          
15
 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York:  Harper Perennial, 
1947), 81-86.  “Economic instability is for [Schumpeter] the effect of fully human actions, the 
motives of which include not only the making of profits, but the sense of creativeness, love of 
risk, ambition, etc.”  Adrien C. Taymans, “Marx’s Theory of the Entrepreneur,” American 
Journal of Economics and Sociology 11, no. 1 (October 1951): 75-90, 79.    
16
 Ivan Bull and Gary E. Willard, “Towards a Theory of Entrepreneurship,” Journal of Business 
Venturing 8, no. 3 (May 1993): 181-294. 
17
 See Richard A. Posner, Public Intellectuals: A Study in Decline (Cambridge:  Harvard 
University Press, 2004). 
18
 Peter Drucker, The Essential Drucker (New York:  Harper Collins, 2001), 165-166. 
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economic analysis of the law.
19
  In this dissertation, I will create and utilize a broader operational 
definition of a judicial entrepreneur, which incorporates classical market-based Schumpeterian 
entrepreneurial elements and modern neoliberal entrepreneurial elements, primarily Drucker’s 
entrepreneurial conception of the knowledge-based entrepreneur and creative innovation, within 
the theoretical context of the existing judicial entrepreneurial literature, as well as entrepreneurial 
models developed in non-market fields, such as public policy and political science. 
     “Every idea is an incitement, given the speaker’s enthusiasm for the result,”
20
 and this is a 
dissertation about an idea, the economic analysis of law, and how Posner’s enthusiasm for it has 
incited change in existing intellectual paradigms.  Some ideas have traction and others do not, 
and having written so extensively and advocated for the use of economic analysis in judicial 
decision making, Posner raises the central research question of this dissertation:  How effective 
has he been in inducing federal appellate judges to incorporate economic principles into the 
interpretation and analysis of market and nonmarket areas of the law?  In this, has he compelled 
judges to rethink the very role of a judge?  My principal focus will be on what the Posner case 
tells us about judicial entrepreneurship, an intellectually important topic that has been oddly 
neglected in the literature.  The value of my dissertation and the contribution it will make to the 
                                                          
19
 “Around 1980, the governing-ideology pendulum unexpectedly swung the other away [from 
New Deal Keynesian economics].  Advocates of free markets, individualism, and elimination of 
government regulation recaptured political and intellectual control in America, England, and, 
within a decade, most of the first world countries.  Chicago School Law and Economics 
controlled the agenda… this most recent era of free market ideological dominance has seen a 
rekindling of the cult of the entrepreneur primarily in the form of the modern CEO.”  Charles 
R.T. O’Kelley, “Robert Clark’s Corporate Law:  Twenty Years of Change: The Entrepreneur and 
the Theory of the Modern Corporation,” The Iowa Journal of Corporation Law 31, no. 753 
(Spring 2006): 755. 
20




political science and legal literature will be the development of a better theoretical understanding 
of the judicial entrepreneur and the influence of new theoretical frameworks and analytical tools 
on judicial decision making. 
     The research will be situated within several theoretical contexts, specifically, market and non-
market entrepreneurialism, judicial entrepreneurship, economic analysis of the law, statutory 
interpretation, and the legal subject matters of antitrust and criminal law.  Three research 
methodologies will be utilized in the dissertation to infer Posner’s influence and to evaluate and 
develop a working model for the judicial entrepreneur:  a quantitative citation analysis; a 
qualitative case law analysis; and, a comparative case study analysis.  A quantitative citation 
analysis will be conducted to evaluate the frequency of citations to Posner’s law review articles, 
legal publications, and case law opinions.  To strengthen the inferential data from the 
quantitative citation analysis, a qualitative research analysis of Posner’s case law will be 
conducted to determine the impact of Posner’s entrepreneurial activity on federal appellate 
judicial decisions, in particular, a comparative analysis of his opinions in a traditional market 
area of the law, antitrust, as compared to a non-market area of the law, criminal, to determine 
influence and the incorporation of economic principles into the legal reasoning of his opinions.  
And finally, a comparative case study analysis will be conducted comparing two other judicial 
entrepreneurs, Felix Frankfurter, who was not a successful judicial entrepreneur, and Antonin 
Scalia, who is a successful judicial entrepreneur, to further evaluate Posner’s success as a judicial 
entrepreneur, and to test, evaluate, and offer improvements to the model of the judicial 
entrepreneur created in the dissertation. 
7 
 
     As a judicial entrepreneur, what makes Posner distinctive and worthy of a detailed study is 
that he explicitly, not merely implicitly, seeks to influence other judges, the legal community, 
and the general public by incorporating economic principles in nonmarket areas of the law.  Has 
he been successful?  I expect that my research will show that Posner has been more successful in 
his advocacy for the use of economic analysis of the law in the judicial decision making process 
in market oriented areas of the law, such as antitrust, than in nonmarket areas of the law, such as 
criminal law, because such areas of the law are less amenable to utilizing economic principles for 
resolution, but that overall, he has been an extremely successful judicial entrepreneur and public 
intellectual in promoting his ideas on economic analysis of the law, generally.  It has been four 
decades since Posner published the first treatise on law and economics, and his activities as a 
judicial entrepreneur warrant an assessment. 
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Chapter II.  Entrepreneurialism I:  Market Models 
A. Introduction 
 
     To understand and appreciate the need for the development of a model to better understand 
the character and activities of a judicial entrepreneur, it may be useful to focus on 
entrepreneurship, generally, and more specifically on the historical development of the concept 
and how it applies to contemporary usage, in particular, to judicial entrepreneurs.  The term 
seems to have originated in thirteenth century France as a derivative of the verb “entreprendre,” 
meaning “to do something” or “to undertake,” and by the sixteenth century, the noun form, 
“entrepreneur,” had come into usage to denote someone undertaking a commercial venture.
 21
  
For most, the entrepreneur is usually associated with someone initiating a commercial endeavor, 
reflecting the historical development of the  market model theories of the entrepreneur traced 
back to the economist, Richard Cantillon, who first developed theories on entrepreneurialism, 
which were later elaborated on by the economists, Jean Baptiste Say and John Stuart Mill, all of 
whom stressed the role of the entrepreneur as the individual who assumed the risk and 
uncertainty of a business enterprise. 
22
  This simple idea that an entrepreneur is an individual 
who is a risk taker, fundamental to the concept of the entrepreneur, was the first step in laying 
down the foundation for how the individual’s role in economic and social change could be 
conceived and developed to be applied to market and non-market activities. 
 
                                                          
21
 Joshua C. Hall and Russell Sobel, “Public Policy and Entrepreneurship,” The Center for 
Applied Economics, The University of Kansas School of Business, Technical Report 06-0717, 
(July 2006):  4. 




B.  Schumpeterian Theories of Entrepreneurship: 
The Unternehmergeist, 
Creative Destruction and Timing 
 
     The first contemporary economist truly to develop a theory of entrepreneurs, their role in 
economic modeling, and influence on capitalistic change was Schumpeter.  His primary focus, 
how firms operated and the role innovation and creative destruction played in the process of 
economic development.  For him, the disruptive qualities of the entrepreneur invigorated 
capitalism, challenging and changing the status quo, in what he termed “creative destruction.”
23
 
Thus, the Schumpeterian entrepreneur may be identified by the effects of his actions, as well as 
by their motivations.  As a legal analogy, in the criminal law, a crime requires two elements, a 
mental state or mens rea and an act or actus rea.  Like the elements of a crime, any workable 
definition of an entrepreneur must also include the elements necessary for the mens rea and an 
actus rea to fully capture the characteristics of the entrepreneur.  Most contemporary anecdotal 
conceptions of the entrepreneur incorporate some elements of the mens and actus rea. 
     In respect to the mens rea of the entrepreneur, one of Schumpeter’s most important, but least 
understood, contributions to the entrepreneurial literature is the idea of the 
“Unternehmergeist,”
24
 translated as the “entrepreneurial spirit;” the entrepreneur is the “man of 
action.”
25
  Schumpeter writes: 
                                                          
23
 Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 84. 
24
 Translation:  http://dictionary.reverso.net/german-english/Unternehmergeist 
25
 Markus C. Becker, Thorbjorn Knudsen, and Richard Swedberg, The Entrepreneur: Classic 
Texts by Joseph A. Schumpeter, (Stanford:  Stanford Business Books, 2011), 101.  Excerpt from 
10 
 
Here comes another element of great importance.  Our man of action does not just follow 
given demand, or demand that is to be expected immediately.  He forces his products 
onto the market…  To introduce a product on the market, people need to be persuaded 
and sometimes even forced to use it.
26
 
Schumpeter was probably familiar with the writings of Friedrich Nietzsche and his concept of 
the Ubermensch,
27
and seems to be drawing a fine line between the Ubermensch and the 
Unternehmergeist, when he describes the will behind the entrepreneur’s drive, as 
Then there is the will to conquer; the impulse to fight, to prove oneself superior to others, 
to succeed for the sake, not of the fruits of success, but of success itself.  From this 
aspect, economic action becomes akin to sport…  Again we should find countless 
nuances, some of which, like social ambition, shade into the first group of motives.  And 
again we are faced with a motivation characteristically different from that of “satisfaction 




     It is the individual who is the driving force of change in the economic marketplace, or in the 
marketplace of ideas, driven necessarily by pecuniary gain, but for personal reasons, as well.  As 
compared to the historical producer, the shopkeeper, the entrepreneur is different because there is 
his inherent drive for “success itself.” 
29
  The energy of the individual in a capitalist society is 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Schumpeter’s The Theory of Economic Development (1911), Chapter:  Fundamental 




 The economic historian and author of Prophet of Innovation: Joseph Schumpeter and Creative 
Destruction, Thomas M. McCraw, has noted that, “The Schumpeterian entrepreneur has some 
characteristics in common with Max Weber’s “charismatic” leader but falls short of the 
“superman” portrayed by Friedrich Nietzsche.”  McCraw, Prophet of Innovation, 71. 
28
 Becker and Swedberg, The Entrepreneur: Classic Texts of Joseph A. Schumpter, 71.  Excerpt 
from Schumpeter’s The Theory of Economic Development (1934), Chapter:  Fundamental 
Phenomenon of Economic Development. 
29
 There are similarities between Schumpeter’s idea of the Unternehmergeist, Nietzsche’s 
Ubermensch, and the character Howard Roark in Ayn Rand’s novel The Fountainhead and John 
Galt in Atlas Shrugged - there is an entrepreneurial character profile developed during this period 
which continues to permeate popular culture today.  
11 
 
profound and fosters change.  With the mens rea, there is the complimentary actus rea; the role 
of the entrepreneur in an economic system was to provide creative destruction through the 
application of new innovations.  Here, Schumpeter wrote of innovation as the “introduction of a 
new good – that is, one with which consumers are not yet familiar;” the “introduction of a new 
method of production;” and, “the opening of a new market.”
30
   Though Schumpeter was 
thinking in terms of tangibles, the same categorization could apply to ideas, of which the 
economic analysis of the law is no exception.  The legal market trades in ideas. 
     Another element, albeit less recognized, is the role of timing, which is crucial to the success 
or failure of the entrepreneur.  Schumpeter recognizes the role of timing,
31
 which affects the 
success or failure of the entrepreneur.  Schumpeter’s own entrepreneurialism, advocating for his 
ideas and theories on capitalism, innovation, and entrepreneurialism, was itself fundamentally 
thwarted by timing:  war, depression and other economic realities undermined the reception 
given his entrepreneurial theory,
32
 instead proving ideal timing for Keynesian economics.  
Timing, and in some respects, the appreciation of the “zeitgeist” of the era, are also fundamental 
elements of entrepreneurial activity.   
     Thomas Kuhn, in his seminal work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962),
33
 
discusses the role of revolutions, scientific and intellectual, and how they change the 
                                                          
30
 Becker and Swedberg, The Entrepreneur: Classic Texts of Joseph A. Schumpter, 50. 
31
 McCraw, Prophet of Innovation, 269.  McCraw notes, “Much of the success enjoyed by 
individual entrepreneurs came down to their talent for seizing the opportunities of the moment.” 
32
 Ibid., 77.  McCraw notes that “The Theory of Economic Development is an exemplary book, 
but the timing of its appearance was inopportune.  Soon the First World War completely diverted 
readers’ attention form peacetime economic development.”  
33




professional’s world view, reset the paradigm, and force people to look at problems from a new 
and different perspective.  Kuhn argued that scientific understanding did not develop gradually 
over time, but developed through periodic and turbulent paradigm shifts: 
The transition from a paradigm in crisis to a new one from which a new tradition of 
normal science can emerge is far from a cumulative process, one achieved by an 
articulation or extension of the old paradigm.  Rather it is a reconstruction of the field 
from new fundamentals, a reconstruction that changes some of the field’s most 
elementary theoretical generalizations as well as many of its paradigm methods and 
applications.  During the transition period there will be a large but never complete 
overlap between the problems that can be solved by the old and by the new paradigm.  
But there will also be a decisive difference in the modes of solution.  When the transition 





Kuhn notes further:  
[w]hen paradigms change, the world itself changes with them.  Led by the new paradigm, 
scientists adopt new instruments and look in new places.  Even more important, during 
revolutions scientists see new and different things when looking with familiar 
instruments in places they have looked before.  It is rather as if the professional 
community had been suddenly transported to another planet where familiar objects are 
seen in a different light and are joined by unfamiliar ones as well.
35
   
 
These ideas could also be applied to politics and the law, although, the theories of “punctuated 
equilibria,” borrowed from evolutionary biology and applied to public policy by Frank R. 
Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones,
36
 may be a more apt concept in describing the periodic 
changes in a variety of fields, including law.   
                                                          
34
 Ibid., at 85. 
35
 Ibid., at 111. 
36
 Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, Agendas and Instability in American Politics 
(Chicago:  The University of Chicago Press, 1993). 
13 
 
     Revolutions are not always obvious to most observers; some revolutions are rather “invisible” 
to most contemporary observers.
37
  But paradigmatic changes require professionals to view their 
world differently after the revolution.  In capitalism, Schumpeter would posit, it is “creative 
destruction” and innovation that foster Kuhn’s revolutions, but Schumpeter would ask: who is 
responsible for the revolution?  It is the entrepreneur.
38
  Due to its disruptive nature, 
entrepreneurship is, in itself, a “subversive activity” because it “disrupts accepted ways of doing 
things, and alters traditional patterns of behavior,” therefore giving rise to the Schumpeterian 
idea that innovation creates a process of “creative destruction”
39
 by fostering new paradigms. 
  
                                                          
37
 Ibid., 136. 
38
  Schumpeter was born the same year as Keynes, and had a lifelong antagonism to Keynesian 
economics, but the great irony is that “it takes a new theory to kill an old theory,” and 
Schumpeter refused to accept the innovative theoretical changes of Keynes and also the 
“scientific revolution” of Keynesianism.  Kate Crowley, The Collected Scientific Papers of Paul 
A. Samuelson Vol. 4 (Cambridge:  MIT Press, 1986), 177.  
39
 “Entrepreneurship is a subversive activity.  It upsets the status quo, disrupts accepted ways of 
doing things, and alters traditional patterns of behavior.  It is, at heart, a change process that 
undermines current market conditions by introducing something new or different in response to 
perceived needs.  It is sometimes chaotic, often unpredictable.  Because of the dynamic nature of 
entrepreneurship and because of the entrepreneur’s ability to initiate change and create value, 
economist Joseph Schumpeter’s concept of “creative destruction” is an apt description of the 
process.” Raymond Smilor, “Entrepreneurship:  Reflections on a Subversive Activity,” Journal 
of Business Venturing 12, no. 5 (September 1997): 1.  
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C.  Contemporary Entrepreneurs in the Knowledge Marketplace: 
Drucker - Creative Imitation and  
Knowledge Based Innovation 
 
 
     Peter Drucker developed a contemporary and comprehensive understanding of 
entrepreneurialism, which has been utilized extensively in the market models of 
entrepreneurialism literature.  Where Schumpeter lays the intellectual foundation for 
contemporary entrepreneurialism with his concepts of Unternehmergeist, creative destruction, 
and timing,  Drucker develops these themes with contemporary theories, particularly in the area 
of innovation and entrepreneurship, with such concepts as creative imitation, knowledge based 
innovation, specialty skills strategy, and convergence, as well by creating multiple paradigms to 
explain and understand categories of entrepreneurs, entrepreneurial strategies, and how to 
measure successful innovation.  Drucker’s ideas are important because they address a number of 
the missing elements in a contemporary understanding of knowledge based innovation and 
entrepreneurialism, and will prove useful in the development of a comprehensive understanding 
of the judicial entrepreneur. 
     Drucker is perhaps the most important writer on entrepreneurism at the end of the 20
th
 and 
beginning of the 21st century.  Like Schumpeter, he was born and raised in Vienna, but received 
his education in both Austria and England, 
40
 but it was in the United States that he felt most at 
home
41
 where he became a prolific writer on business management.  He was profoundly 
influenced by Schumpeter’s ideas on innovation, entrepreneurship, and capitalism.  With the 
publication of his famous book, Innovation and Entrepreneurship (1985), as well as other 
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significant writings, Drucker outlines a contemporary understanding of the entrepreneur, with an 
emphasis on corporations that is also applicable to numerous other situations and environments.  
Drucker incorporated many of Schumpeter’s theories and applied them to the practical 
management of large corporations, such as General Electric, making concepts like “innovation” 
and “entrepreneurship” part of the lingua franca of contemporary business, particularly 
management practices. 
     For many, the idea of the entrepreneur continues to be associated with creating something 
new and original, but Drucker argued that originality is actually not the font of 
entrepreneurialism, and that innovation should not be mistaken or confused with originality.  
Instead, the entrepreneur was more likely to take other people’s ideas, make them his own, and 
“exploits the success of others.”
42
  One of the entrepreneurial strategies that Drucker develops to 
explain how innovation tends not to be original, but rather a re-creation of an existing idea or 
product is through the concept of “creative imitation:” 
The creative innovator exploits the success of others.  Creative imitation in not 
“innovation” in the sense in which the term is most commonly understood.  The creative 
imitator does not invent a product or service; he perfects and positions it.  In the form in 
which it has been introduced, it lacks something.  It may be additional product features.  
It may be segmentation of product or services so that slightly different versions fit 
slightly different markets.  It might be proper positioning of the product in the market.  
Or creative imitation supplies something that is still lacking.
43
   
Drucker defines innovation as “the specific instrument of entrepreneurship.”
44
  The definition 
may be broken down into two parts:  innovation and opportunity.  Drucker recognizes that 
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entrepreneurship was “by no means confined solely to economic institutions,” and proceeds to 
use the development of the university as a prime example of entrepreneurial activities in a non-
economic environment in which innovation is used.
45
  The same is true for the law.   
     In particular, Drucker creates one category of innovation, “knowledge-based innovation,”
46
 
which is applicable and very helpful in understanding judicial entrepreneurs.  He considers 
“knowledge-based entrepreneurs” to be the super-stars of entrepreneurship, which is not simply 
limited to what is traditionally perceived as “scientific or technical” innovations, but also 
applicable to “social innovations based on knowledge that can have equal or even greater 
impact.”
47
  Knowledge-based innovations are developed over time, and it is not until a number of 
factors are present, including timing and opportunity, that knowledge-based innovation comes to 
fruition. 
     Drucker continues to develop his theory of knowledge based entrepreneurs by stressing the 
importance of “convergence” (or timing) of several different ideas, historical timing or 
confluence of other elements.  He notes that one of the “second characteristics of knowledge-
based innovations – and a truly unique one – is that they are almost never based on one factor but 
on the convergence of several different kinds of knowledge, not all them scientific or 
technological.”
48
  This is an important determinant as to whether an entrepreneur is successful.  
Drucker continues to develop the theory of convergence by recognizing the entrepreneurial 
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“Specialty Skills Strategy,” in which “timing is the essence of establishing a specialty skills 
niche.  It has to be done at the very beginning of a new industry, a new custom, a new market, a 
new trend,”
49
 and at the beginning of new legal idea, too.  As well, timing continues to be an 
important point:  “In the early stages of a major new development, the specialty skill niche offers 
an exceptional opportunity.”
50
  So a key skill for the entrepreneur is to understand whether the 
time is right.  It’s often not obvious, in fact, which is one reason they do not always succeed. 
     The history of jurisprudence in America may be characterized as a pattern of consistent 
opportunity and innovation within a limited framework of certain traditional legal theories and 
concepts.  The legal historian, Neil Duxbury addresses the pattern of American legal thought:  
American jurisprudence since 1870 is characterized not by the pendulum swing view of 
history but by complex patterns of ideas.  Jurisprudential ideas are rarely born; equally 
rarely do they die.
51
 
What does it mean to characterize American jurisprudence in terms of patterns of ideas?  
The pendulum swing vision of American jurisprudential history is premised on a fairly 
simple pattern.  Formalism and realism perpetually supersede one another; as one dies, 
the other is born or is reborn.
52
 
Duxbury considers the pattern of legal theories that develop in America to be more 
complex than a simple duality between formalism and realism, but it helps to explain Drucker’s 
concepts of innovation, opportunity, and in particular, convergence.  The success of knowledge 
based innovation, according to Drucker, depends on several elements. First, it: 
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[R]equires careful analysis of all the necessary factors, whether knowledge itself, or 
social, economic, or perceptual factors.  The analysis must identify what factors are not 
yet available, so that the entrepreneur can decide whether these missing factors can be 
produced – or whether the innovation had better be postponed as not yet feasible.
53
   
The entrepreneur must understand what factors are necessary, also often not obvious.  This 
would also apply to innovations, which are intellectual ideas or paradigms.  Second, the 
“innovation must proceed from a clear focus on strategic position.  “It cannot be introduced 
tentatively.”
54
  Knowledge-based “innovation creates excitement,”
55
 and the field fills up 
quickly. 
     Drucker recognizes that there are certain “unique risks” to knowledge-based innovation, such 
as “innate unpredictability,” caused by the “long lead times and convergences – these give 
knowledge based innovations their peculiar rhythm.
 56
  For a long time, there is awareness of an 
innovation about to happen – but it may not happen.  Then, suddenly, there is a near-explosion, 
followed by a few short years of tremendous excitement, tremendous start-up activity, 
tremendous publicity.”
57
  Drucker’s observation is similar to Kuhn’s arguments regarding 
changing paradigms and to Baumgartner and Jones’ punctuated equilibrium.  Knowledge-based 
innovation, particularly at present, has become even more volatile and unpredictable, due to the 
pace at which information is disseminated, technology is developed, and ideas change.  
Drucker’s theories go a long way to explain the cyclical nature of legal theories and the success 
of EAL’s prominence in contemporary legal discourse.   
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     Drucker also sets forth four, rather colloquial, entrepreneurial strategies necessary for the 
successful adoption of an innovative idea, which “are not mutually exclusive” and may not apply 
to all situations: 
1.  “Being fustest with the mostest.” 
2. “Hitting them where they ain’t.” 
3. “Finding and occupying a specialized “ecological niche.” 
4. “Changing the economic characteristics of a product, a market, or an industry.”58 
     The four entrepreneurial strategies are rather self-explanatory and in some respects common 
sense: being first with an idea or innovation is important, but Drucker recognizes that first “aims 
from the start at a permanent leadership position,”
59
 not simply to control, but to dominate the 
market.  The second strategy, “Hitting them where they ain’t,” Drucker called “creative 
imitation” and “entrepreneurial judo,” which are attempts at market leadership by seeing an 
opening, a need, and exploiting them.
60
  The idea of “finding and occupying a specialized 
ecological niche” is about creating a situation in which entrepreneurs are “immune to 
competition and unlikely to be challenged.”
61
  The important entrepreneurial idea that develops 
from this point is the idea of the “specialty skills strategy,” in which “timing is the essence in 
establishing a specialty skills niche.  It has to be done at the very beginning of a new industry, a 
new custom, a new market, a new trend.”
62
  And the final strategy, “Changing the economic 
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characteristics of a product, a market, or an industry,” addresses the products or services that 
“have been around a long time,” but “converts this old, established product or service into 
something new.  It changes its utility, its value, and its economic characteristics.  While 
physically there is no change, economically there is something different and new. 
     Even though Drucker was more concerned with the concept of “entrepreneurial management” 
within the corporate framework, he also believed the principles were consistently the same 
regardless of the organizational structure – private or public – and the necessary role of creative 
innovation.  The market-based literature on entrepreneurialism is very well developed and 
provides much of the framework for better understanding the character and strategies of the 
judicial entrepreneur and other non-market entrepreneurial actors.  Based on the research and 
writing of Schumpeter and Drucker’s interpretation of the entrepreneur, important elements for 
the character and strategies of the judicial entrepreneurial model to be developed may be 
borrowed from their literature including the conceptual idea of the entrepreneurial character, the 
Unternehmergeist;  the importance of creative destruction, timing, convergence, and the 




Chapter III – Entrepreneurialism II:  Non-Market Models 
A. Introduction 
 
     Market oriented models of the entrepreneur are useful in helping to create a working 
definition of a judicial entrepreneur, but when applied to non-market environments, such as the 
law, legal community, and courts, challenges may arise because other important considerations, 
such as justice and the rule of law, must be taken into consideration.  Generally, in market 
oriented environments, economic principles of profit and loss dominate the decision making 
process, whereas in the public sector, other principles may dominate.  This is not to say that the 
law and public policy do not address economic issues; on the contrary, they frequently engage 
powerful economic interests and generate major economic consequences, but other principles, 
beyond profit, will be considered the ultimate goal.  Still, many of the principles in the market 
models of entrepreneurialism do have application to the public sphere.  Elections change political 
players; political ideology influences policy changes; and, as in the market place, entrepreneurs 
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B. Non-Market Models of Entrepreneurs: 
       The Political and Policy Context 
 
     In the political science literature, particularly the policy literature, significant attention has 
been paid to the entrepreneur in politics and the policy process beyond the simple concept as an 
agent of change.   Considerable research was done in the 1970s and 1980s, “the era of the 
entrepreneur,” but there still is no consensus as to the definition of “policy entrepreneur” or even 
whether the term is an appropriate description for policy actors.
64
  Indeed, much of the literature 
seems to reprint the same definition or references to established works, without adding any 
significant contribution to understanding or creating a more comprehensive definition of the 
entrepreneur in the non-market policy or political fields.   
     One scholar has summed up his scholarly review by defining policy entrepreneurs as “persons 
willing to use their own personal resources of expertise, persistence, and skill to achieve certain 
policy policies they favor,”
65
 with two “especially important” characteristics:  “expertise and 
persistence.”
66
  David Pozen has noted four common characteristics in the policy literature 
attributed to the policy entrepreneur:  “innovation;” “mobilization” of support; “diligence” or 
perseverance; and, “strategic timing.”
67
  John Kingdon has developed perhaps the most 
comprehensive model of the policy entrepreneur in his classic work on public policy, Agendas, 
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Alternatives, and Public Policies, which is considered a primary reference for the policy 
literature.  Here, he outlined three important entrepreneurial qualities:  the entrepreneur must 
have a claim “to a hearing,” such as being an expert or being in an “authoritative decision-
making position; he must possess strong “negotiating skills” and “political savvy;” and, most 
important, he must be persistent.
68
   
     In conjunction with his theories on policy development, Kingdon adds another principle for 
analyzing the policy entrepreneur, arguing that policy entrepreneurs must develop their ideas, 
expertise, and proposals well in advance of the time a policy “window” opens and an opportunity 
presents itself for the entrepreneur.
69
  Although Kingdon’s theories were intended for policy 
makers in the political arena, the qualities and strategies of the entrepreneur for seizing and/or 
creating opportunities may be applied to judges and the judicial decision making process, as 
well.  Much of the economic literature also addresses the issue of opportunity and timing.  
Judges cannot predict the timing or nature of a case, but a case may represent a “window” of 
opportunity for a judge to apply a novel theoretical approach to judicial decision making (e.g., 
Brown), or a judge may create a “window” by redefining the legal issue or question before the 
court so as to allow it to address certain jurisprudential goals (e.g., Citizens United).  
Unfortunately, Kingdon’s outline of a policy entrepreneur that summarizes a policy entrepreneur 
who is persistent, an expert, and has the political savvy to exploit policy “windows” is 
insufficient alone to define a judicial entrepreneur, though it remains helpful in the creation of a 
working paradigm to better understand the role. 
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     One attempt to synthesize the market based economic analysis of entrepreneurialism with the 
public policy literature was Mark Schneider and Paul Teske’s article, “Toward a Theory of the 
Political Entrepreneur:  Evidence From Local Government.”  Their entrepreneurial model is 
somewhat similar to the approach taken in this dissertation to create a model for the judicial 
entrepreneur, in that they “synthesize aspects of an economic approach to entrepreneurship, with 
concepts used in political science and apply the results to local government;”
70
 unfortunately, 
their model fails to include a number of principles, particularly those of Drucker to explain 
knowledge-based innovation, but their work does recognize the importance of including market 
based principles in the development of a public policy theory of entrepreneurialism.   
     David Osbourne and Ted Gaebler attempted to utilize market oriented principles of 
entrepreneurialism and apply them to public policy through their book, Reinventing Government:  
How the Entrepreneurial Spirit Is Transforming the Public Sector (1992).  Utilizing the 
definition created by J.B. Say, the French economist, of an entrepreneur who “shifts economic 
resources out of an area of lower and into an area of higher productivity and greater yield,” they 
posit an entrepreneurial model that may be applied to “public sector institutions that habitually… 
use their resources in new ways to heighten both their efficiency and their effectiveness.”
71
  And 
Reinventing Government is helpful in addressing one of the misconceptions of 
entrepreneurialism, that entrepreneurs are risk takers, noting that “as careful studies demonstrate, 
                                                          
70
 Mark Schneider and Paul Teske, “Toward a Theory of the Political Entrepreneur:  Evidence 
from Local Government,” American Political Science Review 86, no. 3 (September 1992): 737. 
71 Ted Gaebler and David Osborne, Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is 
Transforming the Public Sector (New York:  Penguin Group, 1992), xix. 
25 
 
entrepreneurs do not seek risks, they seek opportunities.”
72
  What differentiates the entrepreneur 
is actually a more opportunistic nature that sees opportunities through intentional innovation.  
After reviewing the public policy literature on entrepreneurialism, it continues to remain 
relatively piecemeal and inadequate for the purposes of creating a comprehensive definition of 
judicial entrepreneur. 
C. Non-Market Models of Entrepreneurs: 
Judicial Entrepreneurs 
 
     The existing literature on judicial entrepreneurs is extremely slim, with only two scholars 
having done any significant research in the area.  Wayne McIntosh and Cynthia Cates developed 
a rudimentary definition of a judicial entrepreneur in their book, Judicial Entrepreneur:  The 
Role of the Judge in the Marketplace of Ideas (1997),
73
 and in a related article, “Retail 
Jurisprudence:  The Judge as Entrepreneur in the Marketplace of Ideas” (1995).
74
 Even McIntosh 
and Cates recognize the paucity of literature on the subject, observing that, “with rare exceptions, 
the notion of judicial entrepreneurship is conspicuously absent in the legal and political science 
literature.”
75
  The authors attempt to explain the deficiency by noting the “longstanding legal 
tradition warning judges of the dangers of policy entrepreneurship…  Judges, after all, are 
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supposed to remain “passive” and “neutral,”
76
 and not entrepreneurial in their actions.  This 
argument is insufficient to explain the paucity of research in the area of judicial 
entrepreneurship, particularly when the literature on judicial decision making demonstrates that 
judges are neither passive nor neutral. 
     McIntosh and Cates’ book focuses on four judges viewed from the perspective of “sellers” in 
the “marketplace of ideas,” who have assumed the risk of promoting a specific jurisprudential 
idea.  Asserting the primacy of the risk, they have as its subtitle Supreme Court Justice’s Oliver 
Wendell Holmes’ “metaphor of a “marketplace of ideas,” which created the enduring image of 
ideological goods vying for supremacy in a democratic marketplace.”
77
  Through case analysis, 
they review the decision making of four appellate judges by examining their written opinions:  
Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, whom they refer to as “The Consummate Entrepreneur”; 
U.S. Second Circuit judge Jerome Frank, whom they identify with the “Hard Sell”; Hans Linde, 
a lesser known Oregon Supreme Court judge, who “Trade[s] in Legal Ideas”; and, Supreme 
Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, whom they view from the vantage point of the “Soft 
Sell.”
78
  The purpose of evaluating the four judges is to “begin to develop the notion of judicial 
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     They make several contributions to the research on judicial entrepreneurship, specifically, by 
distinguishing between the role of judicial entrepreneur and of judicial activist, noting that 
“judicial activism can mean all things to all people.”
80
  They point out that an appellate judge’s 
primary role is to write opinions in the normal course of his responsibilities, therefore it raises 
the question, if an appellate judge’s responsibility is to write opinions and rationalize their legal 
interpretation is already expected of them, then what distinguishes the opinion writing of a 
judicial entrepreneur from that of a regular appellate judge doing what is expected of him in his 
capacity as a judge?
 81
  Opinion writing is the normal course of their business and all judges have 
particular viewpoints on different legal questions.  Are all appellate judges, in one way or 
another, judicial entrepreneurs?  It will be argued that a judicial entrepreneur must do more than 
simply write appellate opinions, but must actively promote a legal idea through other means, too, 
including, but not limited to, extra-judicial writings aimed at both the legal academy and the 
general public.  The judicial opinion may be the primary tool, but in some respects, it is also 
quite limiting because an opinion addresses the details of a particular case, and including 
tangential information and arguments is frowned upon and usually avoided by the opinion writer. 
     McIntosh and Cates consider entrepreneurship only within the institutional framework of 
courts and the justices’ opinions on particular cases, and do not address the judicial 
entrepreneur’s use of extra-judicial writings as a strategic tool for the judge to advocate for and 
disseminate the judicial entrepreneur’s ideas.  Their definition of judicial entrepreneur does 
address the “written word” but within limited parameters: 
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one who is alert to the opportunity for innovation, who is willing to invest the resources 
and assume the risks necessary to offer and develop a genuinely unique legal concept, 
and who must strategically employ the written word to undertake change.
82
  
     They continue to elaborate on their definition by noting that they will evaluate the judges 
using the “case method” by limiting themselves to evaluating opinions.
83
  In the battle for ideas, 
the “written word” is the primary vehicle for undertaking change, but judicial entrepreneurs are 
not limited simply to opinions.  The emphasis on appellate decisions fails to recognize the role 
that law reviews and treatises play in the development of legal ideas and their dissemination into 
the larger legal discourse that takes place in the legal academy and the larger legal community.  
Appellate opinions are extremely important and an effective way to gauge a judges judicial 
philosophy, but they also represent what judges normally do on a day to day basis:  they are 
expected to write opinions as part of their position.   
     What judges are not expected to do, and in some respects are discouraged from doing, is 
candidly discussing the judicial decision making process, its faults, and alternative methods for 
deciding cases that may challenge conventional practice.  This is an important factor when 
considering what differentiates a judicial entrepreneur from an appellate judge acting within the 
scope of his normal duties.  In some respects, a judge is addressing multiple audiences in their 
opinion.  First and foremost, his opinion is addressing the parties in the dispute and the questions 
they have asked the court to decide, but the litigants are not the only people that judges have in 
mind when they’re writing their opinions.  Judges are also writing with the possible precedential 
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value of his opinion.  The opinion is therefore directed at other judges and courts, the legal 
community, the legal academy, and ultimately, to the general public.  Legal opinions serve many 
purposes for different people and the judicial entrepreneur understands how to utilize the opinion 
as one of many strategic tools to advocate for his ideas. 
     A broader definition is required to capture the judicial entrepreneur.  A judicial entrepreneur’s 
activities extend well beyond his written judicial opinions.  Additionally, even though they rely 
on some of Schumpeter and Kirzner’s ideas on entrepreneurialism, they disregard Drucker 
entirely, particularly his work on creative imitation and knowledge-based innovation, another 
example of the lack of market oriented entrepreneurial literature in the social science context.  
When reviewing the policy literature, they utilize Schneider and Teske, and Mintrom’s definition 
of public entrepreneur:   
[All] entrepreneurs must perform three functions.  First and foremost, entrepreneurs 
discover unfilled needs and select appropriate prescriptions for how those needs may be 
met – that is, they must be alert to opportunities.  Second, as they seize these 
opportunities, entrepreneurs bear the reputational, emotional, and frequently, the financial 
risk involved in pursuing a course of action with uncertain consequences.  Finally, 
entrepreneurs must assemble and coordinate teams or networks of individuals and 




     Although helpful, the Schneider, Teske, and Mintrom definition is general in its scope and 
inadequate for understanding the role of the judicial entrepreneur, and Posner in particular, by 
relying on three basic principles of entrepreneurialism:  being alert to opportunities; willing to 
assume risk; and, undertaking change.   
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Unfortunately, there is very little legal or political science scholarship in respects to the topic 
of judicial entrepreneurship and its role in the development of jurisprudence.  Conducting a 
simple search of the term, “Judicial Entrepreneur” in the LexisNexis database, All US Law 
Reviews and Journals, returned only nineteen articles, indicating a woefully neglected area of 
study, particularly considering the significant role appellate judges play in a common law 
system.  Prior to and since the publication of Judicial Entrepreneurs by Cates and McIntosh, 
there has been essentially no scholarship on the topic.  In contrast to the lack of scholarship in 
the legal and political science literature, the concept of the market-based entrepreneur continues 
to be researched, developed, and written about in scholarly and general publications unabated. 
D.  A New Model for Judicial Entrepreneurs 
     There remains the quintessential problem of creating a definition of an entrepreneur, and 
more particularly, that of the judicial entrepreneur.  The review of the market and non-market 
literature on entrepreneurialism has demonstrated that researchers tend to use descriptive 
concepts of an entrepreneur; they know an entrepreneur when they see one, but they have not 
developed a useful operational definition.  Of course, as a definition is merely a record of a 
determination to use a term in a particular way: 
No definition is good in itself.  A definition is a construct at the service of the research 
questions that are of interest to a scientific community at a given time.  From this standpoint, 
it can be described as “biodegradable” or transitional.  It and only if: 
1.  It can be used to build theories and carry out more effective empirical research, in order 








     An exact working definition of a judicial entrepreneur may be insufficient and 
counterproductive in attempting to better understand the role of the judicial entrepreneur in the 
judicial decision making process and the development of new legal ideas, but a larger working 
model of a judicial entrepreneur that is based on the characteristics and strategies of the judicial 
entrepreneur, operating within in certain conditions and measures of success, may be more 
appropriate.  Utilizing the market and non-market concepts of the entrepreneur discussed in 
previous chapters, the following two part model of characteristics and strategies may offer a 
better definitional paradigm to help understand the judicial entrepreneur. 
     Characteristically, the judicial entrepreneur will possess the “entrepreneurial spirit, or what 
Schumpteter termed, Unternehmergeist, and as a knowledge-based innovator, will seize upon a 
legal idea or principle, whether novel or not traditionally utilized or underutilized, and publicly 
take ownership of it and actively and persistently advocate for the idea over a period of time in 
order to change or modify an existing legal paradigm.  He is personally and professionally 
driven, seeks the risks and assumes personal responsibility for the endeavor, and is willing to 
utilize his professional stature, reputation, and position as a platform to advocate for his ideas.  
The judicial entrepreneur becomes a recognizable public figure.   
     Strategically, a judicial entrepreneur consciously and intentionally takes advantage of existing 
opportunities, and creates new ones, to strategically promote his innovative legal ideas through 
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the written word.  The primary vehicle for the judge is the written opinion,
86
 but he does not limit 
himself only to legal opinions; he must also promotes his ideas through extra-judicial writings, 
such as law review articles and treatises intended to persuade judges, lawyers, and legal 
academics, and more general legal books tailored to reach the larger reading public.  He 
strategically engages in debate and conversation, both in the written word and through public 
personal engagement, with judges, legal academics, and the general public to promote his ideas.  
Judicial entrepreneurs utilizes their unique and special knowledge based skills and status, and 
taking advantage of timing and convergence, they commit to causing discontinuity in existing 
intellectual paradigms, and creating new paradigms through creative destruction.  And 
ultimately, the judicial entrepreneur strives to create new intellectual paradigms through 
innovation of ideas. 
     This comprehensive model of a judicial entrepreneur incorporates many of the ideas from the 
market and non-market entrepreneurial literature and builds on the principles of knowledge 
based skills, opportunity, timing, convergence, creative imitation, strategy, methods, persistence, 
risk, and creative destruction.  A judicial entrepreneur is not simply a mere producer of judicial 
opinions on the courts, but is actively engaged and meets the criteria set forth above.  Based on 
the criteria outlined, Posner has been the consummate judicial entrepreneur in his advocacy in 
the use of economic analysis of law in judicial decision making.  
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Chapter IV.  Judicial Entrepreneur:  Richard A. Posner    
A. Introduction 
“For the rational study of law the black-letter man may be the man of the present, but the man of 
the future is the man of statistics and the master of economics.”  Oliver Wendell Holmes
87
  




      Richard A. Posner is the consummate judicial entrepreneur, on and off the bench.  Since 
embracing economic principles as tools to better understand, interpret, and apply the law, he has 
not only become the leading proponent of economic analysis of law, but also the leading scholar, 
judge, and public intellectual most associated with the EAL movement.  Posner did not invent 
the idea of economic analysis of law, which had existed in a number of permutations throughout 
legal history; over a century ago, Oliver Wendell Holmes had noted that the future of the law 
would include statistics and economics.
89
  But Posner was beginning his legal career when few 
leading scholars were seriously exploring the use of economics in law in the 1960s, and was 
intellectually drawn to this developing analytical field.
90
  As a knowledge-worker and innovator, 
through “creative imitation” he helped to reinvent EAL and take the lead in what would become 
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known as the EAL movement.
91
  He would later continue pursuing his advocacy of the use of the 
economic analysis of the law as a judicial entrepreneur, on and off the federal appellate bench.  
B. Economic Analysis of the Law:  A Brief History 
“Economics is considered by its jurisprudential advocates to be not just any old social 
science, but the queen of the social sciences, the only social science capable of providing 
analytical models which facilitate the discovery of precise, verifiable answers to many 
difficult questions about legal policy and decision-making.”
92
  Neil Duxbury 
 
     Economic analysis of the law, or law and economics, or EAL, is not easily defined, for it has 
come to represent a larger movement of diverse academic interests utilizing economic principles 
for the analysis of legal issues.  At its most basic level, EAL could be defined as simply the 
utilization of economic principles as analytical tools to interpret laws, improve efficiency, 
maximize wealth, and understand the general nature of law and legal processes.  But that 
definition would be insufficient to truly understand the history and dynamic interplay of law and 
economics as a jurisprudential movement.  EAL is both descriptive and normative.
93
  Law and 
economics is interested in an empirical understanding of the impact of the law and judicial 
decisions, but it is also normative in its attempts to make the law more efficient and in turn, 
maximize wealth and utility.   
     The advent of contemporary law and economics is to some degree a revolutionary idea 
because it represents a radical departure from traditional jurisprudential norms and goals of 
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justice or order.  It presented a challenge to the existing status quo.  Most criticism of law and 
economics tends to be based on these normative efforts which are viewed as part and parcel of a 
conservative neo-liberal agenda, and although there may be some truth in that assessment in 
certain quarters, it is not controlling.  Even critical legal scholars utilize economic analysis in 
their attempts to understand the law.
94
  The empirical analysis of EAL reflects a general attempt 
to create an impartial and objective measure with which to evaluate the law and the decision-
making through rational choice and other theories.  EAL makes use of many economic tools to 
view legal issues, but the confusion as to how to define law and economics as a movement today 
abounds.  As one historian of American legal jurisprudence has commented: 
Today, law and economics is a subject over which controversy and confusion reign.  
Defining the subject is like trying to eat spaghetti with a spoon.  Law and economics can 
be positive, normative, neo-classical, institutional, Austrian—quite simply, the subject is 
weighed down by a multitude of competing methodologies and perspectives which are 
not always easily distinguishable.  However one conceives it, one finds that between 
promoters and detractors, misunderstanding abound.  There is even a debate over whether 
or not the subject is coming or going.  For some, law and economics has reached the peak 
of its popularity.  For others, it continues to grow from strength to strength.  Literature 
criticizing the subject proliferates as rapidly as the literature expounding it.  For anyone 
coming fresh to law and economics, disorientation is a state quickly achieved.
95
 
    The attention and confusion that EAL receives speaks to its prominence t plays in 
contemporary legal discourse and jurisprudence; the fact that it remains a major topic of 
discussion, and has not been superseded by another dominant legal theory, demonstrates its 
adaptability and continuing promise as a movement.  Perhaps the continuing interest in EAL 
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reflects the fact that the use of economic analysis of the law is not new and has existed in a 
number of permutations.   
     There has been much debate as to the origins of the present permutation of economic analysis 
of the law movement.  Not unlike politics, jurisprudential history can also be broken down into 
legal movements and theories, and EAL, as a movement, is no exception.  EAL is part and parcel 
of an ongoing jurisprudential debate over the different attempts, or theoretical schools, to better 
understand the nature of the law and judicial decision making:  
[S]ince the Langdellian era, American jurisprudence has been constituted by certain 
movements and  responses to movements—which often themselves become 
movements—and that, as one movement builds upon another, some of the legal 
perceptions and beliefs of the past are either rejected or revised.  Langdellianism, 
conceptionalism, formalism, or whatever we want to call it was replaced by realism, 
functionalism, pragmatism, or whatever we want to call that, which in turn was 




     Even though there has been much debate as to the origins of the EAL movement, most 
scholars have attributed its origin to the realist movement.
97
   The present EAL movement, and 
the focus of the dissertation, began with the publication of several seminal law review articles 
and books in the 1960s and 70s.  Ronald Coase’s “The Problem of Social Cost” (1960)
98
 was one 
of the first, and perhaps the most influential, article in law in economics published to date, its 
influence on academic discourse, particularly law and economics, cannot be overstated.  
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Research has shown that it is the most cited law review article of all time, surpassing Holmes’, 
“The Path of the Law,” and Brandeis’, “The Right to Privacy” by a significant margin.
99
  What 
makes “The Problem of Social Cost” such a seminal article in law and economics, and other 
fields is that it provided an entirely new framework for understanding the allocation of costs and 
liability.
100
  The article forced scholars to reevaluate their analytical tools and look at legal 
problems from a different perspective.  Whether one agrees with Coase’s arguments or not, new 
economic tools and perspectives drive the intellectual debate on how to approach traditional 
questions, often taken for granted by scholars. 
     There were other influential pioneering studies utilizing economic analytical tools to evaluate 
the law, such as Guido Calabresi’s “Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts” 
(1961)
 101
 and his book The Cost of Accidents:  A Legal and Economic Analysis (1970).
102
  A 
scholar at Yale Law School and now a federal judge, Calabresi reevaluated costs and liability in 
tort laws; Gary Becker’s The Economics of Discrimination (1971)
103
 and his prior scholarly work 
in applying economic analysis to traditionally non-market fields, such as race, family, and 
addiction, started an entire cottage industry of applying economic analysis to numerous topics.  It 
is hard to even think about contemporary issues without considering a Beckerian approach which 
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uses economics to analyze traditionally non-market issues.  And, then there is Posner’s seminal 
treatise, Economic Analysis of the Law (1972),
104
 which synthesized much of the academic 
literature to that date for use into a treatise used by legal practitioners, judges, and students.  
Since then, there has been a steady stream, some might even argue, a deluge, of articles and 
books written specifically about EAL, or incorporating economic principles in legal articles in 
some form.  EAL has become an established subject in jurisprudential considerations and law 
school curriculums, as it embraces such economic principles as efficiency, wealth maximization, 
rational decision making, and transaction costs, and applies them to particular areas of the law, 
both substantive and procedural.  This development did not happen by accident, but required a 
concerted effort to introduce a paradigm shift in legal discourse and education.  
     The wellspring for the contemporary use of law and economics is the University of Chicago.  
Other law schools played a role in the development of EAL, or at a minimum, provided forums 
from which to critique the movement, such as Harvard and Yale, but suffice it to say, the 
University of Chicago Law School, in conjunction with the Economics Department, provided a 
fertile home for economists and lawyers inclined to the use of economics in law which laid the 
foundation necessary for the movement to thrive.  Interestingly, the movement was not founded 
by lawyers, but instead by influential economic academics who moved from the Economics 
Department of the University of Chicago to the law school.  Scholars have pinpointed the 
beginning of the economic analysis of law at the University of Chicago with the appointment of 
Henry Simmons, an economist, to the law school in 1939 to teach Economic Analysis and Public 
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 and subsequently the appointment of Aaron Director in 1946.
106
  Director was a key 
figure who led the movement, particularly in the area of antitrust,
107
 and hired and marshalled 
colleagues to join the law school over the next few decades.  It was under his direction that the 
first law review dedicated to law and economics, Journal of Law and Economics, was founded at 
the University of Chicago in 1958.   
     The focus on economics, particularly a neo-liberal market-oriented approach, became 
synonymous with the school, and scholars simply referred to the intellectual ideas coming out of 
the school as the “Chicago School.”  The Chicago School has been summarized as standing for 
the “belief in the efficacy of the free market as a means of organizing resources, for skepticism 
about government intervention into economic affairs, and for emphasis on the quantity of money 
as a key factor in producing inflation.”
108
  The Chicago School’s influence, in numerous fields, 
but in particular, law and economics, has been profound. 
     One of the most significant developments of the Chicago School was the application of 
economic analysis to traditional common law subjects, such as torts, contracts, criminal, and 
property law, which are considered not exclusively market areas of the law versus non-common 
law areas or statutory areas of the law, such as antitrust.  Although not a perfect distinction, it is a 
useful dichotomy to differentiate between traditionally market areas of the law, such as antitrust 
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and corporate, and non-market areas, the common law, to appreciate the development of EAL 
into areas of the law otherwise ignored by economic considerations.  Like so many movements, 
the economic interpretation of the common law and scholars had recognized the inherent 




 but it is the contemporary 
Chicago School which has made it the subject of much research. 
     The bridge between traditionally market and non-market areas of the law is the fundamental 
economic assumption that “people are rational maximizers of their satisfactions.”
110
  Based on 
that assumption, economics may be a useful tool to improve outcomes in what were traditionally 
known as non-economic areas of the law.  If people are rational maximizers of their satisfaction 
in the market, then they should also be rational maximizers in their non-market decisions and 
actions, as well.  Much of the general criticism of EAL is based on the assumption that 
practitioners still rely upon a simple neoclassical model of the rational decision maker.  Even 
though the concept of the rational decision maker has largely been discarded by scholars such as 
Richard Thaler and other behavioral economists and replaced with more nuanced models of 
decision making, it remains as foundational point for beginning any economic analysis.  The 
model of the rational choice decision maker is recognized as being deficient, just as the 
reasonable person model in law has deficiencies, but both are helpful benchmarks from which to 
begin any economic analysis or discussion. 
     In many respects, the breadth of law and economics continues to grow to accommodate 
developments in other academic disciplines, and to respond to criticism of the utilization of 
                                                          
109
 Ibid., 322-323. 
110
 Posner, The Economics of Justice, 1. 
41 
 
economic principles and models in their application to law.  EALs’ malleability and lack of finite 
definition facilitates its expansive interpretation and application.  Another legal historian noted 
unequivocally that “Law and Economics is securely established in American jurisprudential 
culture.”
111
  The EAL movement is considered by some to be the “intellectual movement that has 
had the greatest influence on American academic law”
112
 over the past half century.  The 
influence of EAL is best summed up by the former Dean of the Yale Law School and early 
Critical Legal Studies (CLS) advocate, Anthony Kronman, when he described the 
comprehensive influence of EAL in his book, The Lost Lawyer:   
Law and economics is today a permanent, institutionalized feature of American legal 
education.  Specialized journals are devoted to it, and its presence is pervasive in the 
older law reviews as well; faculty positions at many law schools are explicitly reserved 
for its adherents; and it is now represented by a professional organization of its own, the 
American Association of Law and Economics.  Even these external markers of success 
do not fully measure the movement’s influence, which is nearly unrivaled in some fields 
(corporations and commercial law) and dominant in others (torts, contracts, and 
property).  The law-and-economics movement has transformed the way that teachers in 
these fields think about their subject and present it to their students.  And in almost every 
area of law a working knowledge of economics is now required to keep abreast of 




     EAL is not without its critics, and there are many.  Critiques of EAL include both criticism of 
the impact economic analysis on substantive areas of the law and the motivations behind the 
movement.  Critics point out that the law is different and that there are fundamental goals of the 
law, such as justice, which should be the law’s primary consideration, and they find fault with 
EAL’s use of such economic principles as wealth maximization, efficiency, and rational choice 
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decision making as legal tools for understanding the law.
114
  Others criticize the economics of 
analysis of law movement as an attempt to foster an economic and political neo-liberal agenda 
masked as scientific objectivity on American jurisprudence.
115
  Critical Legal Studies advocates 
have leveled criticism that EAL is simply an excuse for the perpetuation of a neo-liberal 
interpretation of the law, and a pawn of the developing conservative legal movement, although it 
has been pointed out that “many of the field’s most prestigious practitioners are quite liberal and 
motivated primarily by a desire to make law an empirical discipline.”
116
  These arguments are 
not without merit, but are not the subject of the dissertation, and will not be addressed in detail 
here, but it is necessary and important to appreciate that EAL was not readily accepted by the 
legal community, and that there has been opposition since the beginning.   
Critical Legal Studies 
     In a pointed contrast to EAL, during this period of development of the school of law and 
economics, there was a second legal school of thought, Critical Legal Studies or CLS, which 
developed and became prominent in the 1960s and 1970s.  Critical Legal Studies represents 
several interpretations of legal processes, but at its most basic, CLS advances the idea that law 
and politics cannot be separated and that the use of traditional legal reasoning masks established 
hierarchical legal norms and relationships between and among parties.  Whereas EAL is most 
associated with conservative legal thought, CLS is associated with legal thought on the Left.  For 
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a variety of reasons, CLS has been significantly less successful than law and economics, which 
has become the dominant legal theory taught in law schools.  CLS has come under a great deal of 
criticism from a variety of quarters: 
But the critical legal studies movement has failed to capitalize on the sense of 
disenchantment out of which it was born.  Like the legal realists before them, proponents 
of critical legal studies have proved to be better debunkers than reformers.  Indeed, the 
reforms which they have advocated have tended to be thoroughly utopian, prompting the 
popular criticism of critical legal studies is all bark and no bite, that it is a style of critique 




     CLS is still taught and written about, but it remains a relatively minor legal theory in 
comparison to EAL, although it did branch off and create a number of other legally related 
theoretical legal movements, such as Critical Race Theory.  This comparison raises some 
interesting questions, which will not be addressed at length here, as to whether the success of 
EAL may be attributable to the substantive elements of law and economics being more appealing 
to the larger legal community, better advocacy and dissemination, timing, or some other factors 
that made EAL acceptable as a legal theory.  CLS has certainly attracted support among 
prominent law professors – Roberto Unger, Duncan Kennedy – but perhaps because of its radical 
critique of the law and American society generally, it failed to break out of academia.   
     Even though it continues to have its advocates, CLS broke down into a number competing 
intellectual disciplines.  As one critic of EAL has noted:   
While critical legal studies, its great combatant for the minds of the legal academy, has 
been all but vanquished, law and economics continues to increase in its influence.
118
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Duncan Kennedy summed up a possible reason for the failure of CLS in an interview: 
The role of critique in the story is a complex one.  Critique is a practice of rationalists.  It 
is wrong to think of critique people or the skeptics as different in that respect from the 
people building the rational structure over time.  My picture of it is that the glory of 
rationalism is its commitment to critique, and its comedy or tragedy, depending on how 
you look at it, is that in the generational play, and in the course of historical drift, the 
oedipal young trash their rationalist elders in order to clear the ground for their own 
rationalist theories.  That’s how you succeed in life.  You first clear some ground, then 
you build your own.  The irony of history, the sort of Hegelian trick of history here, is 
that the critical process has turned out to be more cumulative than the constructive 
process.  This is an irony.  The development of critical techniques is preserved generation 
after generation, and developed as the young critique the old in order to lay waste to their 
structures so that they can build their own.
119
 
       Kennedy’s analysis could also be applied to a number of other jurisprudential theories.  
Economics analysis of the law is a series of tools to analyze the law, as compared to a critical 
analysis of the structure of the law.  This may be a simplification, but it may go a long way to 
understanding why EAL has thrived, whereas CLS has petered out.  There is a demand to create 
new models to understand the operations of the law. New models create opportunities for 
dialogue, analysis, and publications.  The use of EAL by both liberal and conservative legal 
scholars demonstrates that economics is but just one more tool to better understanding the law.   
     It has been argued that we are now in a period called the post-Chicago School era of law and 
economics, in which EAL has been broken down into two main intellectual branches:  one 
branch “seeks to discredit the Chicago School directly by maintaining that there is an ideological 
bias inherent in the application of economics of law;” and, the other attempts to “incorporate law 
and economics into a broader spectrum of interdisciplinary theories about law,” or the “Socio-
economic approach.”
120
  A cursory review of the popular literature of behavioral economics, 
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such as Nudge by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, and other popular books, demonstrates the 
ongoing influence of the law and economics movement on legal and public policy discourse.  
Whether the research falls under the umbrella of EAL or not, economic modelling and the use of 
economic analysis of law and behavior are here to stay and will only continue to grow. 
C. Posner and Creative Imitation 
“Creative imitation” is clearly a contradiction in terms.  What is creative must surely be 
original.  And if there is one thing imitation is not, it is “original.”  Yet the term fits.  It describes 
the strategy that is ‘imitation’ in its substance.  What the entrepreneur does is something 
somebody else has already done.  But it is ‘creative’ because the entrepreneur applying the 
strategy of ‘creative imitation’ understands what the innovation represents better than the people 




     “Nothing comes from nothing,” as King Lear observed in a somewhat different context.  
Everything new emerges from what had come before.  Moreover, even what we call invention is 
by itself only of limited interest, for it normally requires entrepreneurs to apply it to the world 
and change how we live.  The question of originality, therefore, is usually less important than it 
appears, and that Posner did not devise EAL is only of passing concern.  Interestingly, Posner is 
not a trained economist.  As an undergraduate he majored in English Literature.
122
  In law school 
he had limited exposure to any forms of legal tools utilizing economic analysis of the law, except 
for editorial work done on the law review and working on antitrust matters while clerking for 
Supreme Court Justice William Brennan. Then, while working at the Federal Trade Commission 
and Communications Task Force, he developed his interest in the use of economics in the law, 
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which was only strengthened when in 1969 he joined the faculty at the University of Chicago, 
where a group of scholars were working on law and economics issues.
123
 
     Law and economics had existed in American law for quite some time prior to Posner going to 
the University of Chicago in 1969 to teach which was considered the heart of the EAL 
movement.  Posner’s timing was fortuitous and perfect.  He was in the right place at the right 
time, but more importantly he seized on an emerging intellectual opportunity and through 
creative imitation, he developed and made it his own.  In the legal academy of the 1960s, except 
for the University of Chicago, economic analysis of law was on the fringes and was not 
fashionable, but the legal academy became more receptive to the ideas in the 1970s.
124
  In many 
respects, the rise of EAL, conservative think tanks, and the Federalist Society go hand in hand 
from 1960s to the present. 
     Posner led the intellectual assault of the movement and provided it with respectability; first as 
an academic, later as a federal judge, and finally as a public intellectual and advocate for EAL, 
but in all cases, as a prolific writer in constant engagement with fellow EAL scholars and critics 
of EAL.  The quantitative and qualitative research method of citation and case study analysis 
conducted, respectively, in the next two chapters will provide a degree of measure of influence 
that Posner has had on the legal academy and courts.  A cursory review of his writing during the 
early period when EAL was just gaining traction gives an example of his scholarly productivity 
during his academic tenure at the University of Chicago before joining the federal bench.  Prior 
to 1980, through the late 1960s and 70s, Posner published over sixty law review articles, 
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including several seminal articles, including, “A Theory of Negligence” in 1972, which has been 
cited over 536 times; “An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration” 
in 1973, which has been cited 449 times; “The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis” in 1978, 
which has been cited 434 times; “An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking” in 1974, which 
has been cited 410 times; and, “Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory” in 1979, which 
has been cited 408 times, just to name just a few of the articles.
125
  Additionally, he published the 
first edition of his treatise Economic Analysis of Law in 1972, which is now in its eighth edition 
and has been cited in over 122 federal court opinions.  This just represents a fraction of the 
output prior to 1980, when the law and economics movement was just beginning.  Posner’s 
entrepreneurial efforts have always been marked by intellectual combat – and his relentless 




     Where Posner led the intellectual debate and became the face of EAL, many others were 
involved in the process of disseminating the ideas, particularly Henry Manne, who did much to 
marshal interest through organizational efforts, and it has been noted that “his activities are 
essential in explaining the rapidity and depth of [EAL] diffusion in the 1970s and 1980s.”
127
  
Manne, a law professor and law school administrator, was much more ideological in his 
approach to law and economics and desired to change the structure of law schools to be more 
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law and economics oriented,
128
 and would eventually found the Law and Economics Center at 
the University of Miami, which was funded by the conservative Olin Foundation.
129
  Yet, even 
though there is a strong conservative and libertarian influence within law and economics, one 
critic has noted that it was other less ideological practitioners who helped EAL to find 
acceptance in the legal academy: 
[They] were not Chicago-style libertarians, and as they moved on to more prestigious law 
schools, they helped eat away at the perception that the approach was simply thinly 
veiled ideology.  This legitimated law and economics in the legal academic mainstream, 
and opened the way to its institutional advances in the 1980s and 1990s.
130
 
     Posner’s intellectual tour de force, and the debates he entered into with scholars on economic 
analysis of law issues, made EAL not only fashionable, but also required reading for any scholar 
who wanted to enter the debate.
131
  An understanding of economics was necessary to be well 
versed in the debate among serious legal scholars.
132
  Law was not the only institution in 
America to be impacted by the development of neo-liberal theory during this time.  The Chicago 
School of economic thought had a profound impact on all quarters of American society.  Would 
the law have eventually incorporated principles of economic analysis of the law without Posner?  
Perhaps, but it would seem that what differentiates EAL’s acceptance from a simple neo-liberal 
revival was Posner.  Posner elevated the debate.  As one critic has noted, “While the work of 
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Director and Coase helped to establish law and economics as a respectable field, it was the 
emergence of Richard Posner that made it an academic phenomenon of the first rank.”
133
 
     For many, law and economics meant many things and Posner recognized the challenges of 
creating a working definition for law and economics when he wrote:   
Because of the enormous range of behavior regulated by the legal system, law and 
economics could be defined so broadly as to be virtually coextensive with economics.  
This would not be a useful definition.
134
 
When asked in an interview to “describe the major tenets of law and economics,” Posner 
responded that it, “would be hard to do, but I would say that on the side of positive analysis there 
is an effort to understand the structure of the law.  Do the various rules and doctrines have 
economizing features, and what are the consequences?”
135
  The key to understanding Posner is 
not only understanding the “economizing features” of EAL, but also the “consequences.”  Posner 
is interested in the impact that decisions have beyond simply the contestants in a legal dispute.  
What is the impact of any decision?  He is interested in policy considerations of legal decisions.  
Do they maximize wealth?  Utility?  Efficiency?   
     Posner differentiates the “old” school of law and economics, the historical, in which 
“economics confined its attention to laws governing explicit economic relationships,” such as 
antitrust law, from the “new” school of law and economics, of which he is a proponent, which 
applies economics to laws that may not traditionally have been considered explicitly economic in 
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nature, such as criminal law.
136
  Posner addresses this point in the first page of his seminal 
treatise, Economic Analysis of Law: 
Economics is the science of human choice in a world in which resources are limited in 
relation to human wants.  It explores and tests the implications of the assumption that 
man is a rational maximizer of his ends in life, his satisfactions – what we shall call his 
“self interest.” 
It is implicit in the definition of man as a rational maximizer of his self-interest that 
people respond to incentives – that if you change a person’s surroundings so that he could 
increase his satisfactions by altering his behavior, most of the time he will do so.
137
 
As Posner points out, “The formal structure of economics is designed to present a simplified 
model of reality, which can then be made more complicated and realistic.”
138
  It can be argued 
that it is the economic modelling that provides tools to help understand legal issues from a 
variety of different angles not traditionally found in American jurisprudence.  
     Even though Posner took the lead in the debate over the economic analysis of the law, he was 
not, nor is he, dogmatic.  On the contrary, one of Posner’s hallmarks is his intellectual flexibility 
and willingness to look at a situation from a variety of angles and to evolve his position over 
time, while remaining persistent in his goal of utilizing economic principles to better understand 
the law.  This is a unique characteristic of entrepreneurial knowledge based workers:  there is 
constant re-creative imitation and an opportunistic tendency to incorporate new ideas and 
arguments.  This is in contrast to other judges, such as Supreme Court justice Antonin Scalia, 
who has a tendency to be rigid in his views, and except for engaging with the justices on the 
Supreme Court, particularly Stephen Breyer, is unwilling to address or engage with critics 
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outside the Court in a constructive manner.  Posner relentlessly asks:  Does it work?  What are 
the consequences?  Can the goals be accomplished more efficiently for greater wealth-
maximization and utility?  Another area of interest for Posner, not addressed in the dissertation, 
is his interest in pragmatism, particularly as it relates to judicial decision making. 
     A judicial entrepreneur is consciously strategic and is alert to opportunities to promote 
innovative legal ideas or methods, either original or through creative imitation, and is capable of 
strategically employing the written word to disseminate the ideas, and Posner saw EAL as 
exciting and different.  As a judicial entrepreneur, he was alert to the emerging ideas of law and 
economics, and was able to promote EAL as an innovative new legal idea through his extensive 
writing.  Timing was also a key element to Posner’s success as a judicial entrepreneur.  Utilizing 
his unique and special skills, and his position and status as a professor at the University of 
Chicago and later as a federal appellate judge, and taking advantage of timing and convergence, 
he contributed to a discontinuity in the existing intellectual paradigm that helped to create a new 
paradigm through the innovation of existing ideas, and make them his own.   
     As a judicial entrepreneur, his advocacy for the use of law and economics in the interpretation 
and application of laws could not have been more opportune and salient.  Posner’s advocacy of 
law and economics was perfectly timed because not only was he able to ride the tide of the 
Chicago School of economics, but his ideas coincided with a general revival of neo-classical 
economics in the modern economy; a growing belief in laissez faire economics; and government 
deregulation; a reinterpretation of antitrust laws; and a general conservative shift both politically 
and economically to market based solutions being applied to political and legal issues.  Like the 
business cycle, legal ideas go in and out of fashion, depending on a variety of economic, 
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political, social, and historical circumstances that may or may not be in the control of the judicial 
entrepreneur.  What the judicial entrepreneurs control is their ability to see an opportunity, seize 
it, and promote the new idea.   
     There are certain attributes and traits the judicial entrepreneur possesses that help to facilitate 
success, particularly within the conservative and status oriented confines of the legal academy 
and profession.  Such attributes include judicial position, status and reputation, of the judicial 
entrepreneur, professional expertise, personality, personal and professional motivation, and 
perseverance.  Posner is one of the most respected jurists sitting on the federal courts, as well as 
perhaps one the greatest living legal scholars.  This does not guarantee success for his ideas and 
his entrepreneurial activities, but deference is accorded both on the bench and within the legal 
community, which has its own form of cache.  The federal judiciary, the legal community and 
the law in general, are extremely status conscious and deferential, so certain characteristics and 
positions will be given significantly more deference and provide an opportunity and audience for 
new ideas.  This is most significant in the area of the legal academy, where most new legal ideas 
are created and disseminated.   
     Posner exhibits Schumpeter’s entrepreneurial spirit, or Unternehmergeist, in his intense 
engagement with other scholars and judges debating the principles of economic analysis of the 
law, which might raise the question:  Did he win on the merit of his ideas or simply wear down 
his opponents?  Posner never shies away from an intellectual debate on a particular topic, and 
although forceful in his arguments, he is not ideologically dogmatic, and remains receptive to 
new ideas and willing to modify his existing idea, a hallmark of the knowledge-based 
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entrepreneur and judicial entrepreneur.  Had he simply been dogmatic and unwilling to enter into 
a meaningful debate, he would probably have been regarded as no more than a very bright crank. 
     There are some strategies that a judicial entrepreneur may use that are more successful than 
others.  Judicial entrepreneurs need not confine themselves simply to writing judicial opinions.  
Although Posner has written well over 2,250 opinions, he has also written over fifty books and 
countless articles. In a profession in which the written word is paramount, Posner is perhaps 
second to none.  Posner recognizes the importance of what he calls “extrajudicial writings by 
judges,” when he notes in “Reflections on Judging” that his,  
book belongs to the genre of extrajudicial writings by judges.  American judges have 
done a lot of such writing, in part because of the lateral-entry character of an American 
judicial career; the judicial opinion is not the only vehicle in which judges who had 
another legal career before they became judges know how to express their thoughts.
139
   
The extrajudicial writings of Richard Posner are a significant part of his strategy as a judicial 
entrepreneur to express his view on the judiciary and legal questions.  Legal opinions, if 
published, tend to be limiting, and it is through articles and books, that Posner has been able to 
address contemporary legal questions and argue for an economic analysis of the law.  He does 
this in public intellectual venues directed at the general educated reader, as well as academic 
venues.  The judicial entrepreneur becomes a public figure beyond simply his stature as a judge.  
Whether writing about the Economics of Justice, arguing for an inherent economic perspective of 
the common law, or more recently writing about economic concerns in The Crisis of Capitalist 
Democracy, Posner steps beyond the court and the robe to strategically reach a larger public 
audience with his ideas. 
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     Another strategy that Posner uses as a judicial entrepreneur is to attempt to use economic 
analysis of law in his judicial decision making as a federal judge.  He admits so much when 
discussing why he became a judge: 
I also thought a federal appellate judgeship would be an interesting and challenging job 
because of the variety and importance of many federal cases, that I would have an 
opportunity both to apply economic analysis in a real-world setting and to employ 
rhetorical methods that would be out of place in academic writing, and that it would be 




     But there are other ways to communicate, too, and Posner frequently lectures to legal and 
other audiences.  There are entrepreneurial methods and strategies that consider timing and 
context; understanding historical opportunity; leveraging institutional changes; developing 
personal relations within the court; and, nurturing personal and professional relationships within 
the scholarly network of the legal academy.  Even today, in his late seventies, he had a blog with 
Gary Becker, who recently passed away, in which they debated controversial legal issues of the 
day, keeping abreast of both the issues and new technology.  One of the distinguishing qualities 
that Posner has, as a judicial entrepreneur and a knowledge worker, is his intellectual flexibility 
and willingness to develop his ideas and modify them when necessary.  His intellectual 
flexibility is itself a form of creative imitation because he is always incorporating new ideas to 
improve upon the original ideas developed during the early years of the economic analysis of law 
movement which reflects his pragmatic approach. 
     A very telling example of Posner’s intellectual honesty and flexibility is his ability to truly 
engage in an academic debate and to listen and learn from other scholars.  Posner would not be 
so respected and admired if he was simply a dogmatic ideologue; to the contrary, in addition to 
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having a fecund mind, he appreciates the intellectual engagement to tease out ideas.  An 
excellent example is how Posner reacted to Richard Dworkin’s famous critique, “Is Wealth a 
Value?”  When asked about Dworkin, Posner responded: 
Yes, when I started off I was very dogmatic about the application of economics in a very 
pure form.  I modified my views – partly because I got very good criticism from Dworkin 
in his article “Is Wealth a Value?”  That was pretty convincing.  So I have modified my 
position.  I also think that being a judge, now for twenty-five years, has taken off some of 




The impact and energy that Posner had upon EAL cannot be underestimated.  One critic 
of the law economics movement summed up Posner’s abilities and success: 
First and foremost, the breadth of the ambition of Posner’s major work, Economic 
Analysis of Law, signaled to the legal academy that law and economics could identify 
major defects in traditional approaches across the entirety of legal scholarship, thereby 
inducing others, especially prospective law professors, to follow his lead.  Second, Posner 
legitimated law and economics as mainstream field by setting off so many arguments 
with legal academia’s incumbent scholars.  Third, because he was publishing in so many 
different fields, Posner created a strong incentive for even the unsympathetic to become 




     It is generally agreed that EAL has become the dominant legal school of thought today.  This 
may be attributed, in part, to Posner’s activities as a judicial entrepreneur, taking a new legal 
idea, and through creative innovation and innovation, working tirelessly to disseminate that idea.  
Much of the literature discusses the influence Posner has had on the legal academy and legal 
thought over the last forty years, but a more challenging area to assess is his impact, and the 
receptivity of EAL in the area of federal appellate judicial decision making and opinions, which 
will be the focus of the remainder of the dissertation.  
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     Though Posner is much less involved in EAL today than he had once been, his impact on the 
incorporation of EAL has been profound and lasting.  A critic of EAL noted his initial influence 
on the EAL movement when he wrote, “it was the emergence of Richard Posner that made it 
[EAL] an academic phenomenon of the first rank.”
143
  It is not a far reach to argue that not only 
has Posner become the personification of EAL, but his innovation, persistence, and 
entrepreneurialism has helped to secure EAL as perhaps the dominant legal theory in the legal 
academy today.  Is EAL a perfect tool for legal analysis or to understand the law?  No.  It is just 
one tool of many with which to analyze the law.  Posner recognizes that the use of the economic 
analysis of the law is imperfect and is just an analytical tool that can be used, but as a tool of 
legal analysis it tends to be more effective than other traditional theoretical frameworks for 
interpreting, understanding, and applying the law.  He concedes: 
Should the weaknesses of economics discourage attempts to apply economics to 
nonmarket behavior?  Surely not.  Although much non-market behavior is indeed 
baffling, this is so whether one approaches it from the standpoint of economics, which 
assumes that humans behave rationally, or from the standpoint other human sciences, 
which do not make that assumption but have nothing to put in its place.  The economics 
of law may well be a weak field, partaking of the general weakness of economics and of 
additional weaknesses specific to itself.  But is the psychology of law strong?  The 
sociology of law?  Legal anthropology?  Jurisprudence as a positive theory of law?  
These fields of interdisciplinary legal studies, and others that could be named, are older 
than economic analysis of law yet are weaker candidates for a leading role in fashioning a 
positive theory of law.
144
  
     The tensions that Posner confronted during the early years of the EAL movement continue to 
this day, but economic analysis of the law is securely a part of the contemporary legal canon, 
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which in no small part is attributed to his entrepreneurial activities and creative imitation of 
economic analysis of the law.   
     There is much commentary and anecdotal reflection about Posner’s influence upon the law 
and economics movement and American jurisprudence in general that can be cited.  For 
example, in 2005 the New York University Annual Survey of American Law ran several tribute 
articles to Posner, and in 2007 both the University of Chicago Law Review and Harvard Law 
Review dedicated issues to articles “Commemorating Twenty-Five Years of Judge Richard A. 
Posner,”
145
 analyzing his jurisprudence in a number of cases.  These tributes are but a small 
sample of the accolades he has received, and continues to receive to this day; and he is still alive.  
As one of the tribute authors candidly noted: 
 
The encomiastic mode is often in vogue in legal gatherings. It is not my own preference 
because it almost always ends in self-congratulation as its primary motivation.  Even so, I 
think it is appropriate in every sense on this occasion.  Richard Posner is not only our 




     Moving beyond the professional accolades and anecdotal evidence to determine influence 
based on empirical findings, a quantitative citation analysis and a qualitative case law analysis 
will be conducted to determine what influence Posner has had in the next two chapters. 
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V.  Legal Publication and Case Law Citation Analysis 
A.  Introduction 
“Citation analysis is growing mainly because it enables rigorous quantitative analysis of 
elusive but important social phenomena such as reputation, influence, prestige, celebrity, the 
diffusion of knowledge, the rise and decline of schools of thought, stare decisis (that is, the 
basing of judicial decision on previous decisions – precedents), the quality of scholarly 
output, the quality of journals, and the productivity of scholars, judges, courts, and law 
schools.”
147
   
     Posner is an extremely prolific writer on a variety of legal and non-legal topics.  A cursory 
review of Posner’s publications listed on the University of Chicago’s School of Law’s web site 
lists fifty-five books authored; editor or contributor to another eighty-four books; author of 
nearly four hundred journal articles; and, the author of countless other articles appearing in 
general newspapers and magazines, and regarding case law, he is considered one of the most 
cited legal authorities.  Based simply on his prodigious amount of writing, it is tempting to 
simply assume that he has had a significant impact on legal discourse and judicial decision 
making because of the sheer volume of his published work, but a first, and important step, in 
evaluating Posner’s impact as a judicial entrepreneur, it is necessary to empirically evaluate, to 
the extent possible, the impact he has had on both the federal judiciary and the legal academy 
through his legal writings.  To do so, it is necessary to conduct a quantitative analysis of citations 
to his legal publications, both law review articles and treatises, and citations to the case law 
opinions he has authored through the latest tools in citation analysis. 
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B.  Citation Analysis Methodology 
     Quantitative citation analysis, or legal citology, is important in providing “relatively objective 
tools for assessing scholarly impact,” but the methodology is not without its critics as a tool for 
determining causation.
148
  Empirical analysis of legal citations is a relatively recent 
methodology, which can be largely attributable to technological advancements in online research 
tools, such as LexisNexis and Westlaw, Shepard’s citation services, primarily for case law, and 
HeinOnline, primarily for law review articles.  These systems provide tools to quantify the 
number of times an author might cite to a particular publication in either case law or law review 
articles.
149
  The importance of citation analysis in determining influence, particularly within the 
courts and legal research cannot be underestimated.  Posner noted in his 2000 article, “An 
Economic Analysis of the Use of Citations in the Law”: 
Both adjudication, a central practical activity of the legal system, and legal research are 
citation-heavy activities.  Judges, lawyers, who brief and argue cases, and law professors 
and students engaged in traditional legal-doctrinal research could all be thought, with 
only slight exaggeration, to make their living in part by careful citation both of judicial 
decisions and of law-review articles and other secondary materials.  The seriousness with 
which the legal profession takes citations suggests that the analysis of citations in law is 
likely to uncover more systematic features, a more consistent practice, of citing than 
would a similar analysis in fields for which citing is of less consequences.
150
 
     Citation analysis is not a perfect form of empirical analysis, but it does provide strong 
inferential value for understanding impact.  There are a number of concerns that citation analysis 
presents, and the most obvious issue is that older articles have had more time to be cited than 
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newer articles, and the number of citations may not necessarily reflect influence, just longevity.  
Posner also recognizes this concern:  
Differences in the vintages of works also make comparison difficult.  The older the work, 
the more time it has had to accumulate citations, but the number of citations is apt to be 
depressed by shifts in interest away from the topic of the cited work or by the appearance 
of up-to-date substitutes for it. 
151
 
     The problem of measuring citations over time was also recognized in a seminal law review 
article on citation analysis titled, “The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All Time,” by Fred 
Shapiro and Michelle Pearse.  This was a third, and most recent, article in series authored by 
Shapiro and Pearse on case citation analysis.
152
  In the article, they follow a similar analysis to 
the one utilized in the dissertation, and recognize “it takes decades for an article to amass the 
stratospheric citation count.”
153
  Interestingly, in the Shapiro/Pearse rankings, Posner has only 
one article in the top 100 most cited-law review articles of all time.  Ranked at 64
th
 on the list, 
Posner’s 1974 article, “Theories of Economic Regulation,”
154
 has been cited 765 times,
155
 
although the number of all of Posner, does not rank very high on HeinOnline citation results 
because Shapiro and Pearse go beyond utilizing law review articles for their analysis, and 
include additional social science databases, which provide more citations beyond law review 
articles.  For purposes of the dissertation, the citation analysis will be limited to federal case law 
and law review articles.   
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     The number one article cited on their list is Coase’s “The Problem of Social Cost,”
156
 which 
has been cited 5157 times according to their analysis.
157
 “The Problem of Social Cost” is 
foundational to the economic analysis of law movement.  Except for Coase, and Calabresi’s 
article, “Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts,”
158
 law and economics 
articles are woefully deficient from the Shapiro/Pearse list, which may simply reflect the recent 
historical development of EAL and the inclusion of social science publications in their citation 
analysis research parameters, skewing the citation analysis to older more established journal 
publications.  The authors recognize the lack of law and economics articles in the top 100 
rankings, but point out:  
Of the several movements of the late twentieth century that rebelled against the doctrinal 
traditions of law as an autonomous discipline, law and economics is the one that most 




     Citation analysis works well in measuring the citations and possible influence of law review 
and journal articles, but measuring the impact and finding causation in federal appellate decision 
making presents certain challenges.  A number of factors make measuring Posner’s influence on 
judicial decision making a challenge, but not impossible.  First, even though there may be a case 
in which parties are litigating, a final opinion on a point of law may not emerge.  In fact, contrary 
to popular belief, very few case law opinions are ever written, except at the appellate level.  
                                                          
156
 Ronald H. Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost,” Journal of Law and Economics 3, no. 1 
(1960). 
157
 Shapiro and Pearse, “The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All Time,” 1489.   
158
 Ibid., 1491.  Calabresi, Guido, “Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 
The Yale Law Journal 70, 499 (1961).  Ranked 69
th
 with 739 citations.   
159
 Ibid., 1507. 
62 
 
Second, Posner’s influence may not be directly cited in a final court’s opinion, but may be 
contained in the supporting documents created during the litigation, such as a memorandum of 
law or legal brief, documents attorneys submit to support their legal arguments.  In the 
memorandum of law, the attorneys will cite cases, statutes, law review articles, and treatises to 
support their legal arguments, including citations to Posner’s articles, treatises, and published 
opinions.  Since memorandums of law and briefs do not have legal precedential value, they are 
considered less important than legal opinions issued by a court, and these documents are as of 
yet not easily searchable with present technology, but services, such as Courtlink, are now 
permitting such citation analysis to a limited extent. 
     Through such research tools as Shepard’s Citations, the frequency in which opinions are cited 
may be easily and reliably determined, but for what legal proposition a case is being cited 
presents additional challenges.  A case may include several different legal propositions, and the 
citation may reflect only one of them.  Opinions tend not to be explicitly clear as to the legal 
principles on which they are relying in their decision.  For example,  judges usually do not 
explicitly state in their opinion that economic analysis of the law was the principle upon which 
they relied in their legal analysis, particularly since concepts, such as efficiency, tend not to be 
legally recognized legal principles, unless expressly codified or stated in the common law.  
Posner recognizes the challenges of trying to determine the impact of economic analysis in 
judicial opinions: 
The normative role of economic analysis in the law is fairly obvious.  The positive role – 
that of explaining the rules and outcomes in the legal system as they are – is less obvious, 
but not less important.  As we shall see, many areas of the law, especially the great 
common law fields of property, torts, and contracts, bear the stamp of economic 
reasoning.  Few legal opinions, to be sure, contain explicit references to economic 
concepts and few judges have a substantial background in economics. (Italicized for 
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emphasis)  But the true grounds of decision are often concealed rather than illuminated 
by the characteristic rhetoric of judicial opinions.  Indeed, legal education consists 
primarily of learning to dig beneath the rhetorical surface to find those grounds.  It is an 
advantage of economic analysis rather than a drawback that it does not analyze cases in 
the conceptual modes employed in the opinions themselves.
160
 
     It is easier to make a substantive correlation between a published law review article and a 
citation to it for authority, than a citation to a particular legal opinion, but to remedy this possible 
deficiency, a qualitative case study analysis of a selection of his opinions in antitrust and 
criminal cases will be conducted in the next two chapters.   
     In order to focus on the question of Posner’s impact as a judicial entrepreneur on the legal 
academy and the federal judiciary, the citation analysis will break down the analysis into two  
areas:  secondary sources, law review articles, and texts; and, primary law, judicial opinions.  
The law review articles and texts will be broken down into the following:  1) a list of the top 20 
legal articles published by Posner, and the number of times they have been cited by other law 
review articles; 2) Posner’s top 100 legal articles published and the number of times they have 
been cited by other legal articles over the period from 1968 to 2013; 3) the frequency of citations 
to his primary treatise, Economic Analysis of Law, his general book on the topic, The Economics 
of Justice, and his three primary texts on judicial decision making, The Problems of 
Jurisprudence, How Judges Think, and his most recent book, Reflections on Judging; and, 4) 
and, an analysis of the frequency of his case citations.  Utilizing the commercially available 
research tools HeinOnline, LexisNexis, and Shepard’s Citation Service, it is possible to evaluate 
the frequency of citations to his law review articles, treatises, general legal books, and legal 
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opinions over the years.  The period addressed will evaluate the frequency of his journal 
publications and their citations from 1968 to 2013. 
C.  Citation Analysis:  Law Review Articles 
     As noted, Posner has written almost four hundred journal articles, and counting.  Not all of 
these journal articles are legal in nature.  In order to evaluate the citation frequency of only the 
legal journal articles, I utilized the commercial research products HeinOnline and LexisNexis.  
The services provide different coverage and research methodology, but combined represent the 
most comprehensive tools for evaluating the influence of Posner’s writings.  Based on the 
frequency of citations to Posner’s published legal journal articles, his influence, particularly in 
the area of law and economics, is unquestionable.  In order to come to this conclusion, I 
conducted the following queries on the respective databases that produced the following results 
below. 
General Citation Summary 
1)  The number of legal journal articles that note Posner as the primary author (HeinOnline):  
310 articles.  Limited to primary authorship. 
2)  Number of legal journal articles in which Posner was primary and co-author 
(LexisNexis):  600 articles.  These results would include papers in which Posner was a 
panelist in which the comments were published as an article – a common practice for law 
journals. 
3) Number of legal journal articles in which Posner was mentioned in the title (HeinOnline):  
239 articles.  This does not reflect the articles in which Posner’s arguments were 
discussed in the article, but his name may not have been mentioned in the title. 
4) Number of legal journal articles in which Posner was mentioned in the title (LexisNexis):  
343 articles. 




6) Number of legal articles in which “Law and Economics” in the title (LexisNexis):  994. 
7) Number of legal articles in which “Economic Analysis of Law” in the title (HeinOnline):  
162 articles. 
8) Number of legal articles in which “Economic Analysis of Law” in the title (LexisNexis): 
47 articles. 
     Based on the analysis above, “Economic Analysis of the Law,” even though the title of 
Posner’s seminal treatise, is less popular than “Law and Economics” as a title to describe the 
movement.  As well, although the results demonstrate a significant amount of articles, the 
disparities in the numbers between the two providers demonstrate the content differences 
between the commercially available databases, providing a strong inferential interpretation. 
Top Twenty Cited Posner Articles 
1)  “An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law.” (18 J. Legal Stud. 325 (1989)) - Cited 
571 times. 
2) “A Theory of Negligence.” (1 J. Legal Stud. 29 (1972)) - Cited 536 times. 
3) “Market Power In Antitrust Cases.” (94 Harv. L. Rev. 937 (1980-1981)) - Cited 482 
times. 
4) “An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration.”  (2 J. 
Legal Stud. 399 (1973) - Cited 449 times. 
5) “Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom.”  (50 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 800 (1983)) - Cited 444 times. 
6) “The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective.”  (18 J.L. & Econ. 875 
(1975)) - Cited 440 times. 
7) “The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis.”  (127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 925 (1978-1979)) - 
Cited 434 times. 
8) “An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking.”  (3 J. Legal Stud. 103 (1979)) - Cited 
410 times. 




10)  “An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law.”  (85 Colum. L. Rev. 1193 (1985)) - 
Cited 370 times. 
11)   “Trademark Law:  An Economic Perspective.”  (30 J. L. & Econ. 265 (1987)) - 
Cited 348 times. 
12)   “The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline:  1962-1987.”  (100 Harv. L. 
Rev. 761 (1986-1987)) - Cited 342 times. 
13)   “The Ethical and Political Basis for the Efficiency Norm in Common Law 
Adjudication.”  (8 Hofstra L. Rev. 487 (1979-1980)) - Cited 332 times. 
14)   “Adjudication as a Private Good.”  8 J. Legal Stud. 235 (1979)) - Cited 273 times. 
15)   “Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the 
Constitution.”  37 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 179 (1986-1987)) - Cited 268 times. 
16)   “Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law.”  (50 Stan. L. Rev. 1551 
(1997 – 1998) - Cited 262 times. 
17)   “Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation.”  (21 Stan. L. Rev. 548 (1968-1969)) - Cited 
261 times. 
18)   “The Right to Privacy.”  (12 Ga. L. Rev.  393 (1977-1978)) - Cited 258 times. 
19)   “Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution.”  (49 U. Chi. 
L. Rev.  263 (1982)) - Cited 243 times. 
20)   “The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution:  Per Se 
Legality.”  (48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 6 (1981)) - Cited 242 times. 
     Utilizing HeinOnline, which is known for its historic coverage of law review articles, the list 
represents the top twenty articles cited which were authored by Posner.  According to this 
database, his top twenty law review articles have been cited 7373 times to 2013.  Considering the 
number of law review articles that he has written or co-authored, the top twenty only represents a 
fraction of the corpus of his work. 
Posner’s Top 100 Cited Articles 
     The graphs below represent Posner’s top 100 articles based on the number of citations 
beginning in 1968 and ending in 2013.  As predicted by Shapiro and Pearse’s research, early 
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articles are cited substantially more frequently than the most recent articles.  His top 100 articles, 
according to HeinOnline research have been cited for a total 15,901 times by other articles – this 
does not include case law, treatises, and other secondary social science resources that may not be 
included in the HeinOnline database.  Although not a complete accounting, it does provide 
strong inferential data as to the profound influence Posner has had on academic discussion and 
law reviews.  It can be anticipated, with the passage of time, Posner will continue to be cited and 
his articles from his later years.  The decline may also reflect Posner’s publication direction.  
Rather than write law review articles, Posner is choosing to dedicate more of his time to writing 
books and updating his blog. 





































Chart No. 1:  Top 100 Posner Legal Articles  


































Top 100 Legal Articles by Year
Year Published Rank 1-20 Citations Rank 21-40 Citations Rank 41-60 Citations Rank 61-80 Citations Rank 81-100 Citations Totals
1968 1 17-Jan 17-Sep 261
1969 2 23 231 58 103 334
1970 1 34 173 173
1971 1 95 46 46
1972 1 2 536 536
1973 2 4 449 31 191 640
1974 2 8 410 27 211 621
1975 2 6 440 22 232 672
1975 1 39 141 141
1975 1 29 209 209
1975 1 35 169 169
1976 2 33 177 76 71 248
1976 0 0
1977 2 24 229 61 98 327
1977 1 25 226 226
1978 3 7 434 21 238 98 46 718
1978 3 18 258 40 140 63 97 495
1979 3 9 408 59 102 88 52 562
1979 3 14 273 44 130 99 46 449
1980 5 3 482 37 144 43 132 69 85 85 56 899
1980 2 54 116 73 78 194
1980 1 80 62 62
1981 3 20 242 47 123 75 74 439
1981 1 51 118 118
1982 2 19 243 62 97 340
1983 2 5 444 65 90 534
1983 1 77 70 70
1984 2 64 94 97 46 140
1985 2 10 370 68 86 456
1985 1 74 76 76
1986 3 12 342 36 158 67 88 588
1986 2 15 268 46 127 395
1986 1 55 115 115
1987 4 11 348 26 212 45 128 71 87 775
1987 1 38 142 142
1988 1 57 107 107
1989 4 1 571 50 119 79 66 81 59 815
1989 1 53 116 116
1989 1 70 84 84
1990 1 28 209 209
1991 1 30 207 207
1992 2 42 138 93 49 187
1992 2 49 120 100 45 165
1993 1 90 52 52
1994 1 72 78 78
1995 1 66 88 88
1996 1 60 98 98
1997 3 16 262 32 179 52 117 558
1998 1 48 123 123
1998 0 0
1999 0 0
2000 2 56 107 94 47 154
2000 1 96 46 46
2001 1 84 56 56
2001 1 86 55 55
2001 1 89 52 52
2002 0 0
2003 2 41 138 82 57 195
2004 2 78 69 87 53 131
2005 1 92 49 49
2006 1 83 57 57










D.  Citation Analysis:  Federal Case Law 
“I have continued to do academic writing, mainly though not only academic writing 
that applies economic analysis (and sometimes related fields of social science) to law, 
throughout my judicial career.  I have applied such analysis to various substantive 
and procedural areas of law, but also to judicial behavior itself.  And I have used 




     As demonstrated, it may be inferred that by citing Posner’s publications in a judicial opinion, 
judges are recognizing Posner’s legal views as worth noting, whether to support or criticize.  It is 
more challenging to determine for what legal proposition the citation is being utilized without an 
analysis of the text, which will be done in later chapters.  Unfortunately, many of his early and 
most cited publications are not available on LexisNexis, and therefore cannot be Shepardized to 
measure influence on case law.  Measuring Posner’s impact on judicial decision making is a little 
more challenging, but not impossible.  Shapiro and Pearse view the influence upon case law as 
the “Real World” Impact on Law and Practice and Beyond.”  As they recognize: 
Because legal scholarship relates to the law and, thus, to the making and interpreting of 
law, another metric for measuring legal scholarship is whether it has influence on the bar, 
judges, legislators, and other policymakers.  Recent blogging commentary and articles 
have discussed the lack of importance or relevance of legal scholarship to the bar and the 
courts.  Impact among scholars and citation in other scholarship do not necessarily 
correlate with how much the courts rely on the articles. 
One of the most popular and respected measurements of impact is reference in court 
opinions.  Both KeyCite on Westlaw and Shepard’s on Lexis cover citations to law 
review articles made in judicial opinions.  Unfortunately, the citation reports are only for 
articles indexed in their databases.  For articles not included, a homegrown citation 
search in the all-state and all-federal case law databases was done.  Unlike some 
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     The same methodology as discussed above was utilized in the dissertation, but only the 
LexisNexis All Federal Cases was utilized.  Conducting searches in LexisNexis’ All Federal 
Cases database, Posner’s seminal treatise, “Economic Analysis of Law,” has been cited in 136 
Federal court case opinions, but it is also safe to say that it has been cited in numerous legal 
briefs and memorandums of law submitted to the courts on behalf of litigants.  In the LexisNexis 
Law Review articles database, the citations to the treatise exceeds the permissible limit on 
LexisNexis of 3000 citations.  It is a significant treatise, now in its 8
th
 edition.  “The Economics 
of Justice, ” published in 1981, has been cited in 764 law review articles, but only three cases;  
“The Problems of Jurisprudence,” published in 1990, has been cited in 1125 law review articles, 
but only eleven cases; “How Judges Think,” published in 2008, has been cited in 427 law review 
articles, but only nineteen cases; and, his most recent book, “Reflections on Judging,” published 
in 2013, had been cited in one law review article, and in one case, to date.   
     The small sample of Posner’s publications submitted for citation analysis indicates his strong 
influence in law reviews, but less so in case law opinions.  This is not surprising.  Courts tend not 
to cite to general books on the law for precedential value, except for treatises.  Posner’s 
“Economic Analysis of Law” has been cited in 136 federal court decisions.  Legal treatises are 
written with the legal practitioner in mind, and less for the academy, although they are utilized 
there, too.  What is surprising is that his general legal books have been cited at all in court 
opinions, and from this small sample, demonstrates the respect and influence that Posner has 
within the federal judiciary.   
     Unfortunately, due to the structure of legal opinions, measuring the number of citations to 
Posner’s articles and/or publications in case law opinions presents certain challenges, but once 
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again, it is not impossible.  Utilizing search query “(Richard /2 Posner) and not (before or 
honorable /15 Richard /2 Posner) was used to search All Federal Cases on LexisNexis from 
01/01/1968 to 02/14/2014, and the search returned 1282 cases that had citations to Posner not as 
the judge writing the opinions, but citations to his published works.  The “and not” function of 
the Boolean search was designed to remove all cases that referred to cases “Before” Richard A. 
Posner, or the “Honorable” Richard A. Posner, in his capacity as a judge, in order only to capture 
citations to secondary sources.  Although not a perfect methodology, it does provide a reasonably 
good accounting of all the cases that have cited to Posner’s publications.  As noted, not all cases 
have final opinions, nor do all opinions reflect references to Posner contained in the litigation 
briefs, motions, or pleadings.  For example, a search in Courtlink’s Single Search of Federal 
Dockets, found approximately 1233 briefs and memorandums of law cite to a Posner 
publications, but this list is not exhaustive by any means because the coverage is limited to the 
last several years and only to a few federal courts, but is once again indicative of Posner’s legal 
authority that attorneys rely upon his writings in their legal arguments.   
     Posner’s writings have not received the same reception in the legal academy and the courts.  
The chart below outlines his top twenty articles and the number of times they have been cited in 
other articles, but when a search is conducted in All Federal Cases, the number of citations seems 
rather small, except in the areas of antitrust and statutory interpretation, but his law review 
articles and publications are cited in Federal case opinions, which is relatively rare.  To give 
some perspective, the number one cited law review article is Coase’s “The Problem of Social 
Cost,” but when a LexisNexis search is run for the title in All Federal Cases, only eighteen cases 
have cited to Coase, and only a few specifically for “The Problem of Social Cost.”  The citations 
to Posner may seem miniscule, but in the aggregate, it is a rather impressive record.  Although 
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the Coase has the most cited article, Posner still receives more cites for his articles in case law.  
Considering that case law tends to be significantly briefer and addresses only a few points of law 
in any given opinion, judges need not address competing theories in their opinions or explain the 
full complexity of their views.  They may be approaching their decision from an economic 
analysis, but they need not spell out or directly support with citations, such analysis. 
Top Twenty Cited Posner Articles in Federal Case Law Opinions 
1)  “An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law.” (18 J. Legal Stud. 325 (1989)) - Cited 
571 times. Case law citations = 8. 
2) “A Theory of Negligence.” (1 J. Legal Stud. 29 (1972)) - Cited 536 times.  Case law 
citations = 6. 
3) “Market Power In Antitrust Cases.” (94 Harv. L. Rev. 937 (1980-1981)) - Cited 482 
times.  Case law citations = 38. 
4) “An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration.”  (2 J. 
Legal Stud. 399 (1973) - Cited 449 times.  Case law citations = 6. 
5) “Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom.”  (50 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 800 (1983)) - Cited 444 times.  Case law citations = 16. 
6) “The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective.”  (18 J.L. & Econ. 875 
(1975)) - Cited 440 times.  Case law citations = 1. 
7) “The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis.”  (127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 925 (1978-1979)) - 
Cited 434 times.  Case law citations = 3. 
8) “An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking.”  (3 J. Legal Stud. 103 (1979)) - Cited 
410 times.  Case law citations = 3. 
9) “Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory.”  (8 J. Legal Stud. 103 (1979)) - Cited 
408 times.  Case law citations = 0. 
10)  “An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law.”  (85 Colum. L. Rev. 1193 (1985)) - 
Cited 370 times.  Case law citations = 2. 
11)   “Trademark Law:  An Economic Perspective.”  (30 J. L. & Econ. 265 (1987)) - 
Cited 348 times.  Case law citations = 17. 
12)   “The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline:  1962-1987.”  (100 Harv. L. 
Rev. 761 (1986-1987)) - Cited 342 times.  Case law citations = 0. 
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13)   “The Ethical and Political Basis for the Efficiency Norm in Common Law 
Adjudication.”  (8 Hofstra L. Rev. 487 (1979-1980)) - Cited 332 times.  Case law 
citations = 0. 
14)   “Adjudication as a Private Good.”  8 J. Legal Stud. 235 (1979)) - Cited 273 times.  
Case law citations = 0. 
15)   “Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the 
Constitution.”  37 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 179 (1986-1987)) - Cited 268 times.  Case 
law citations = 1. 
16)   “Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law.”  (50 Stan. L. Rev. 1551 
(1997 – 1998) - Cited 262 times.  Case law citations = 2. 
17)   “Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation.”  (21 Stan. L. Rev. 548 (1968-1969)) - Cited 
261 times.  Case law citations = 6. 
18)   “The Right to Privacy.”  (12 Ga. L. Rev.  393 (1977-1978)) - Cited 258 times.  Case 
law citations = 3. 
19)   “Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution.”  (49 U. Chi. 
L. Rev.  263 (1982)) - Cited 243 times.  Case law citations = 6. 
20)   “The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution:  Per Se 
Legality.”  (48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 6 (1981)) - Cited 242 times.  Case law citations = 28. 
 
     Based on the data, it is safe to infer influence, and of the top twenty articles mentioned above, 
thirteen concern the application of economics to law.  As noted, due to the nature of opinions, it 
is challenging to measure the influence of one area of the law, but Posner’s articles addressing 
antitrust, trademark, and statutory interpretation tend to receive the most cites, indicating 
influence in those particular areas of the law.  The concept of efficiency is a central element to 
law and economics and by searching the concept of “efficiency” one can infer the influence of 
economic analysis of law in the opinion.  A search of Posner will return over well over 3000 
opinions, LexisNexis results limit, but when combined with the term “efficien!”, truncated to 
provide any root endings, 499 opinions mention the concept of efficiency.  Searching the concept 
75 
 
of efficiency by circuit demonstrates a consistent pattern of use, supporting Posner’s argument 
that economic concepts are inherent to the common law. 
     The use of citation analysis is not an exact science, but as an empirical tool, it does provide 
some utility in making inferential claims.  The level of Posner’s citations, particularly with law 
review articles are clearly impressive and demonstrate a significant degree of influence.  
Although the influence seems to disproportionately favor law review citations, the citations to his 
articles, treatises, and books in case law is significant, too.  Causation may be more tenuous in 
the case law citations, but a qualitative analysis of several cases will prove helpful in 




VI.  Posner and the Economics of Crime                                                                     
A. Introduction 
“I contend, in short, that most of the distinctive doctrines of the criminal law can be 
explained as if the objective of the law were to promote economic efficiency.”
163
 
“My interest in the economics of non-market behavior began with, and remains centered 





     Having outlined the necessary definitional elements of a judicial entrepreneur, it is necessary 
to ask whether Posner has applied his theories of economic analysis to the legal issues he has 
addressed as a federal judge.  A central element of economic analysis of law is the goal of 
promoting efficiency, and criminal law is no exception.  Posner’s impact in traditional market 
oriented areas of the law, such as antitrust, is well established, but in respect to non-traditional 
market oriented areas of the law, such as criminal law, the record is less clear.  Still, it is 
important to evaluate his case law opinions to assess his efficacy through the application of the 
principles to the cases before him as a federal judge.  Of course, we need to know not only 
whether he practice what he preaches, but whether he promotes what he practices and is he 
successful at these promotions.  To further understand Posner’s efforts and influence, a 
qualitative case law analysis will be conducted to investigate his use of economic analysis in 
Fourth Amendment criminal cases addressing the exclusionary rule and common law tort 
alternatives. 
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     Criminal law would seem an area of the law in which economic concepts would be 
inapplicable, for discussions of crime and punishment often focus on justice, but the idea of 
using economic principles in criminal law has a long history beginning with the work of the 
utilitarian philosopher, Jeremy Bentham.  It is hard to imagine that practical administrators in 
existing criminal justice systems did not take costs and benefits into account as they made 
operational decisions.  Posner notes this dissonance in the treatment of crime in non-economic 
terms: 
The areas of law and economics about which economists and lawyers display 
considerable unease are the (sometimes arbitrary classified as) nonmarket areas – crime, 
torts, and contracts; the environment; the family; the legislative and administrative 
processes; constitutional law; jurisprudence and legal process; legal history; primitive 
law; and so on…  All the reasons that I gave at the outset for why some economists resist 
the extension of economics beyond its traditional domain of explicit market behavior 
coalesce in regard to these areas.  And because they are also close to the heart of what 
lawyers think distinctive about law – of what they think makes is something more than a 
method of economic regulation – this branch of economic analysis of law dismays many 
lawyers.  Furthermore, lawyers tend to have more rigid, stereotyped ideas of the 
boundaries of economics than economists do, in part because most lawyers are not aware 
of the extension (which is recent, though its roots go back to Adam Smith and Jeremy 
Bentham) of economics to market behavior…  Indeed, a demarcation which places 
secured financing on one side of the divide and contract law on the other seems entirely 
artificial.  The distinction between market and nonmarket economics may be as arbitrary 
as it is uninteresting.
165
 
The contemporary interest in the economic analysis of criminal behavior may largely be 
attributable to Posner’s colleague at the University of Chicago and Nobel Laureate in economics, 
Gary Becker.
166
  In 1968 Becker published a seminal work, “Crime and Punishment: An 
Economic Approach,” which represented a radical departure from existing academic work on 
crime, in that he reinterpreted how criminal activity should be viewed through the lenses of 
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economics.  For Becker, ““crime” [is] an important economic activity or “industry” 
notwithstanding the almost total neglect by economists.”
167
 Crime is not simply a sociological 
issue of deviant behavior, but a form of economic activity, in which criminal behavior could be 
understood in economic terms.  The perpetrator and victim may be considered parties in non-
voluntary economic exchanges, in which there are measurable costs, and it is in society’s interest 
to make a system of criminal justice that is more efficient for the victim, perpetrator, and society 
in general.  In contrast to torts and breaches of contract, which are mostly private causes of 
action, criminal law requires the intervention of the state, in which the “criminal is ordered to 
pay a fine to the state or suffer a nonpecuniary sanction such as being imprisoned.”
168
  The 
perpetrator does not pay the victim in criminal proceedings, although there are civil actions that 
may be brought against them by the victim, making it a private cause of action. 
     Since Becker’s early work, the economic analysis of law movement has embraced theoretical 
economic alternatives to understand criminal activity and punishment.  At its basic level, 
criminal activity may be viewed from two perspectives:  criminal activity is a form of economic 
behavior operating outside the normal legal market of exchange of goods and services; and 
criminals, like all rational decision makers in the market place, consciously weigh the benefit of 
their behavior against the possible cost, which would be the possibility of being caught and 
punished by the state.  Weighing these considerations, criminals make their decisions 
accordingly.  Simply, Posner notes in his landmark treatise, “A person commits a crime because 
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the expected benefits exceed the expected costs.”
169
  For Posner and advocates of EAL, the 
purpose of the criminal law is to promote efficiency and to force people back into the market of 
mutual exchange and to deter inefficient transactions through criminal activity: 
The major function of criminal law in a capitalist society is to prevent people from 
bypassing the system of voluntary, compensated exchanges – the “market,” explicit or 
implicit – in situations where, because transaction costs are low, the market is a more 




     Market bypassing is inefficient because there are costs incurred by the individuals and 
society.  In most cases, Posner uses the concept of efficiency to mean that one party is made 
better off, without making another party any worse off.
171
  This is also known as Pareto 
Superiority efficiency, an economic concept commonly used in economic analysis of the law.  
Obviously, there are limitations to the extent economic principles may be applied to criminal 
law, and certain crimes, such those of passion, cannot easily be equated as transactions bypassing 
the market, but economic analysis of the law provides another framework for interpreting and 
understanding criminal behavior in economic terms. 
B.  Efficiency and Exclusionary Rule 
     A significant percentage of the caseload a federal appeals court judge addresses are criminal 
matters on appeal from lower trial courts, and within these cases there are several areas of 
criminal law worth evaluating to determine the impact economic analysis of law has had on 
criminal law  There is one area of criminal law which has been of particular interest to Posner, 
                                                          
169
 Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 219. 
170
 Posner, “An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law,” 1194. 
171
 Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 12. 
80 
 
and that is the Fourth Amendment and the development of the exclusionary rule, which excludes 
illegally obtained evidence from criminal proceedings.  Posner is not opposed to the exclusionary 
rule per se, believing it serves as a behavioral deterrent to poor policing practices by state and 
federal authorities, but he argues that it over-deters, that there are alternatives to the rule, that it 
provides a right to the accused that is not in the Fourth Amendment.
172
  If economic analysis of 
the law is concerned with efficiency, then the exclusionary rule is not an efficient way of 
redressing the problems associated with tainted evidence, nor does it provide an efficient remedy 
to those whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated.  For Posner, the remedy for 
violations of the Fourth Amendment, and an alternative to the exclusionary rule, may be found in 
common law tort law and civil action against state and federal violators.    
     The exclusionary rule is a common law rule of evidence created by some state and federal 
courts during the 20
th
 century to suppress evidence acquired without a proper search warrant by 
law enforcement.  There was a lack of consistency in the rule’s application throughout the 
states,
173
 but in Mapp v. Ohio (1961) the Supreme Court applied the exclusionary rule to the 
states through the incorporation of the Fourth Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment’s due 
process clause.  The exclusionary rule is described in the criminal procedure treatise, Moore’s 
Federal Practice: 
A violation of the Fourth Amendment usually results in suppression of the evidence 
gained from the illegal search or seizure.  Generally, under the exclusionary rule, any 
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There are numerous exceptions to the exclusionary rule that address such issues as the "fruits of 
the poisonous tree," but they will not be addressed in the dissertation.  The focus of the chapter is 
on alternatives to the exclusionary rule, not the exceptions, which do, however, indicate a 
measure of judicial dissatisfaction with the rule.  
     The exclusionary rule is one of the most controversial criminal procedural rules expanded 
under the Warren Court’s revolution in criminal law and procedure in the 1960s.
175
  At its most 
basic level, there are two basic arguments in favor of utilizing the exclusionary rule as a remedy:  
it deters untoward conduct by police and prosecutors, and courts should not legitimate illegal 
conduct because it discredits courts.  The popular argument in opposition to the exclusionary rule 
was easily summed up by Judge Benjamin Cardozo’s famous remark, “The Criminal is to go free 
because the constable blundered.”
176
  Obviously, the debate surrounding the exclusionary rule, 
legally and politically, is much more complex with a long jurisprudential history throughout its 
development, but also has been in relative decline over the last thirty years,  reflecting its 
unpopularity, a narrowing of the rule’s applicability by the courts, and the tendency to less 
criminal trials. 
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     Posner has been a leading advocate, on and off the bench, to modify the exclusionary rule, 
and create alternative remedies to address tainted evidence, which he has argued can be better 
addressed through private common law tort actions brought by the victim against the offending 
authority.  The exclusionary rule lacks the political and legal resonance that it once had for a 
variety of reasons, including limitations placed upon it over the last forty years and the increase 
in plea bargaining at the expense of criminal trials, but when Posner entered the legal profession 
in the 1960s, the exclusionary rule was a very important and contentious legal topic.  In the 
1960s there was a dramatic increase in crime, and public reaction to the exclusionary rule was 
hostile.  The idea that a criminal may be set free due to a “technicality” was not only a salient 
legal issue, but a political issue.
177
  The exclusionary rule and the debates surrounding it would 
not have been lost on Posner and other conservative legal thinkers of the time who believed the 
Warren Court had gone too far in protecting the rights of the accused. 
     Posner’s entrepreneurial activities aimed at changing the exclusionary rule’s application, 
decreasing the frequency of its use, and relying upon private tort claims of action may be divided 
into a two-part entrepreneurial campaign involving scholarly articles and legal opinions.  Prior to 
and since joining the federal bench, he utilized his scholarly writings, articles, and treatises to 
attack the exclusionary rule; and, though he had constraints placed upon him by the cases before 
him, he used his legal opinions as a federal judge to address the deficiencies of the exclusionary 
rule and advocate for changes. 
     In the same year that Posner joined the Seventh Circuit, he published a seminal law review 
article on the exclusionary rule titled, “Rethinking the Fourth Amendment,” in which he argued 
                                                          
177
 Powe, Jr., The Warren Court and American Politics, 199. 
83 
 
“for a new way of looking at the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches 
and seizures” by relying upon common law tort remedies to address evidence illegally seized, 
rather than use the exclusionary rule.  Posner has long argued that criminal law and tort law are 
very similar because they both address violations of bodily integrity, trespass on property, etc.,
178
 
and that the exclusionary rule is problematic because “the interest a criminal has in avoiding 
punishment for his crime in not protected by the Fourth Amendment,”
179
   
     Defendants who believe their Fourth Amendment rights have been violated by the police 
should avail themselves of the traditional private common law tort remedies, such as trespass on 
property, in order to provide a more efficient outcome, but not permitting evidence to be 
suppressed and a possibly guilty criminal freed.  Rather than the court simply suppressing the 
evidence and possible let the defendant go free, an inefficient result.  Instead, the defendant 
should seek redress against the governing agency through a private cause of action for torts.  
Posner is not saying a criminal defendant does not have a right against the state for violation of 
their rights, but that violation would be more efficiently addressed as a private cause of action 
against the state.  The criminal evidence would still remain admissible and the defendant would 
be made whole through private compensation by the offending government agency or agent.  
Another issue raised is that the exclusionary rule may not efficiently deter, as it fails to penalize 
the wrongdoer, the police. 
     The tort idea and article was a radical departure from existing jurisprudence on the matter.  
Posner recognized that his arguments might have seemed unconventional for the time, noting 
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that, “I approach the Fourth Amendment not from the usual directions – that is, not from a 
background in constitutional law or criminal procedure – but from an interest, heavily economic, 
in privacy, in remedies, and in tort law.”
180
  His article, less designed as a framework for specific 
policy change, is rather an attempt to look at the exclusionary rule differently and to open a 
dialogue on its fundamental problems from an economic perspective.  Mindful of the obstacles 
he faced, he wrote:   
Whether the Court should change direction as sharply as suggested here depends not only 
on the intrinsic merits of the proposed changes but also on institutional factors, notably 
the weight to be given the principle of stare decisis, that the paper does not discuss.
181
  
     What is most problematic to Posner is that the Fourth Amendment should “not be seen as 
protecting the criminal’s interest in avoiding punishment.  It is a real interest – if the criminal is 
punished he incurs a cost – but not a lawful interest.”
182
  To address this anomaly between 
incurring a cost and creating a lawful interest, Posner suggests that criminals should turn to 
common law tort remedies to address any infringement of Fourth Amendment rights.  Rather 
than creating a right for the accused to have evidence excluded, the accused would have a right 
in common law torts and could exercise that right by bringing a civil tort action, such as trespass, 
for damages against the offending official, rather than seeking to having evidence obtained 
improperly from being suppressed. 
     Efficiency is one of Posner’s primary concerns, and the common law tort claims are a much 
more efficient avenue for addressing violations of the Fourth Amendment:   
                                                          
180




 Ibid., 51. 
85 
 
Tort law is the natural avenue for redressing invasions of lawful interests other than 
breaches of contract; and actions for the torts listed earlier – conversion, false arrest and 
imprisonment, trespass to land and to chattels, assault, battery, infliction of emotional 
distress, and invasion of the right of privacy – are the natural avenue for recovering 
damages for impairment of lawful interests through unreasonable searches and seizures.”  
These actions are available to criminal and noncriminal alike, although naturally a 
criminal could not hope to recover, as part of his damages, the cost to him of being 
punished for a crime of which he was guilty; nor should he be compensated for this 
cost.
183
   
     Posner recognizes that he was swimming against the tide of judicial and academic opinion, 
noting a prior 1955 law review article, “Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual 
Rights,” which raised a similar concern that tort remedies may be an inadequate and ineffective 
remedy because there were too many hurtles for the accused to overcome to achieve redress.
184
  
Commencing a civil action to redress illegal searches and seizures may be impractical for many 
defendants: 
Courts believe that the exclusionary rule serves to protect individuals from unlawful 
searches under the Fourth Amendment. Civil actions may provide some deterrence, but 
the practical problems involved in prosecuting a civil suit, such as cost, delay and a jury's 




His suggested remedies for evidence illegally seized was a radical departure from existing 
jurisprudence in 1981, less so today, but interestingly he advocated these reforms at an opportune 
time in his career when he was making the transition from academic to federal judge.  In some 
respects, it was the perfect opportunity to take what many perceived as an academic idea on how 
to reform a controversial subject of criminal procedure and apply and incorporate it, as a judicial 
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entrepreneur, into his legal opinions to create a new body of jurisprudence that relied upon tort 
remedies as an efficient alternative to the exclusionary rule.  “Rethinking the Fourth 
Amendment,” although not one of his most famous articles, has been cited in 123 law review 
articles, many of them in prominent journals, and five court opinions, and it has contributed 
significantly to the flow of arguments on the exclusionary rule and its alternatives.  For example, 
Akhill Reed Amar, a prominent constitutional law professor, recognized in a Harvard Law 
Review article
186
 Posner’s original contribution to treating a Fourth Amendment violation as a 
tort claim.  
C.  Posner and the Case Law 
     How has Posner applied these ideas in his judicial opinions?  In order to evaluate the impact 
of Posner’s interpretation of the exclusionary rule, it is necessary to review his written opinions 
as a federal judge.  Since he published “Rethinking the Fourth Amendment” in 1981, and his 
follow-up article in 1985, “An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law,” which has been cited 
over 370 times and is his tenth most cited article, Posner has written opinions in106 cases in 
which the exclusionary rule is mentioned.  Only twelve, however, mention the term “tort” or tort 
as a possible remedy.  To better appreciate the influence of Posner’s influence of economic 
analysis of law, a qualitative case law analysis of these cases will be conducted. 
     It is important to recognize that every case that addresses the exclusionary rule may not 
present an opportunity to address exclusionary rule reform via common law tort action.  The 
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particular facts of a case and legal issue on appeal before the court must provide an opportunity 
to raise the issue of both the exclusionary rule and tort remedies, and federal appellate courts, 
unlike the Supreme Court, rarely are presented with cases that provide the perfect opportunity to 
change the law.  The Supreme Court is in a position where it can pick and choose its cases and is 
in a better position to change a legal rule.  In fact, due to the history of the exclusionary rule, 
only the Supreme Court is in the position to truly modify the rule.  Congress has created 
exceptions, but on the ultimate Fourth Amendment question, only the Supreme Court can 
overturn the precedent.  The lower courts may facilitate the process by raising novel 
constitutional interpretations to help mold how the exclusionary rule is applied.  An additional 
issue will prevent an appellate court judge from utilizing a novel legal principle, and that is the 
possibility that the appellate court’s opinion will be reversed on appeal by the entire circuit 
sitting en banc, or by the Supreme Court.  Thus, Posner writes not only for the Supreme Court 
and other circuits, but also to persuade his colleagues on the Seventh Circuit. 
     An important strategy available to the appellate court judge as a judicial entrepreneur is to 
raise points of law or legal ideas in opinions that may not be relevant to the resolution of the 
issues of the case as trial balloons for consideration down the road.  The most famous of these 
trial balloons is Footnote #4 in Carolene Products (1938), where Justice Harlan Fiske Stone 
suggested that a heightened level of constitutional scrutiny was required for legislation targeting 
“discrete and insular minorities” rather than the simple rational basis standard of review applied 
to economic legislation.
187
  Raising peripheral points of law, either through such strategic tools 
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of dicta, which are not binding, or in a rationale for the decision, are tactics for tentatively raising 
ideas without risking losing the case or for testing the jurisprudential water to see whether an 
idea can attract support.  Posner has often made use of this trial balloon tactic, which 
demonstrates strategic planning on his part.  Raising the issue of private common law tort actions 
in his exclusionary rule opinions is a strategic attempt to influence future opinions. 
     Of the twelve opinions in which Posner mentions the exclusionary rule and torts, only a 
couple of cases are relevant to the points he raised in his 1981 article.  Beginning with United 
States v. Salgado in 1986, Posner raises the possibility of tort remedies as an alternative to the 
exclusionary rule, and continues this argument in the following cases until his more recent 
decision in United States v. Williams (2013).  During that time, Posner develops and fine tunes 
his ideas on the exclusionary rule.  In Salgado, Posner sets forth his jurisprudential marker as to 
how he views the exclusionary rule, and the rule’s fundamental drawback of providing certain 
rights to the accused not found in the Fourth Amendment.   In the opinion, in which Posner wrote 
for the majority, he establishes his precedential definition of the exclusionary rule and his 
opposition to how it is applied: 
The exclusionary rule is a sanction, and sanctions are supposed to be proportioned to the 
wrongdoing that they punish. The exclusionary rule punishes the government for 
obtaining evidence by unconstitutional means. It does this by forbidding the government 
to use such evidence to convict the person whose constitutional rights it violated. It does 
not go further and forbid the government to convict him on the basis of lawfully obtained 
evidence. It thus does not seek to make the person whose rights have been violated better 
off than he would have been if no violation had occurred. We conclude that the 
exclusionary rule does not require the exclusion of evidence that would have been 
obtained lawfully, just in order to punish a search that did not harm the defendant in any 
                                                                                                                                                                                           




sense relevant to a criminal proceeding, because the search was not a necessary step in 
obtaining evidence used to convict him.
188
 
     Although Posner is not saying it directly, he is establishing efficiency as a goal when he 
writes that the exclusionary rule “does not seek to make the person whose rights have been 
violated better off than he would have been if no violation had occurred” because this would 
result in an inefficient result.  This is pure economic analysis of the law language discussing the 
Pareto efficiencies, in less than academic terms.  By excluding evidence obtained illegally and 
perhaps allowing the convicted to go free, the defendant is made better off by the result, even if 
the rule had not been violated and the information gathered lawfully.  If the defendant is made 
better off, but society is at a loss, this violates the Pareto Superiority efficiency that some can be 
made better off without others being made worse off.   
     Posner continues to expand upon the basic exclusionary rule by raising for the first time the 
possibility of a tort remedy as an alternative to the exclusionary rule.  This language is 
unnecessary for the disposition of the legal question before the court, but he seems to be raising 
the possibility with his colleagues of providing alternatives through common law torts in future 
cases. 
Maybe Salgado's privacy was invaded, though in rather an ethereal sense, by the fact that 
Bridges laid eyes on his drug paraphernalia. But for such invasions the only remedy is a 
tort remedy unless evidence that would not otherwise have been obtained is used in a 
criminal proceeding against the owner of the paraphernalia.
189
 
     This is the first time Posner has strategically raised the possibility of a common law tort 
remedy for invasion of privacy.  Including a novel legal theory in an opinion may have 
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implications for other cases, even if the idea in question was not relied upon in the legal 
reasoning to decide the case.  A Shepard’s citation analysis of Salgado case reveals that it has 
been cited ninety-eight times in forty-three other cases, forty law review articles, and in fifteen 
treatises, statutes, and other court documents. 
     The second case that provided Posner with an opportunity to address the issue of tort remedy 
and the exclusionary rule was United States v. Stefonek (1999).  Writing for the majority in the 
case, Posner once again treats the actions of government officials as a tort, maintaining that the 
exclusionary rule should not apply unless there was an actual injury: 
 . . .  just as careless or even willful behavior is not actionable as a tort unless it causes 
injury, Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 907 (1977), so there must be a causal relation 
between the violation of the Fourth Amendment and the invasion of the defendant's 
interests for him to be entitled to the remedy of exclusion. In a case of inevitable 
discovery, the defendant would by definition have been no better off had the violation of 
his constitutional rights not occurred, because the evidence would in that event have been 
obtained lawfully and used lawfully against him. This is a similar case, the only 
difference being that here the lack of injury to a protected interest is a certainty rather 
than merely a probability. We know that if the warrant had complied with the Fourth 
Amendment, the very same evidence would have been seized as was seized, because we 
know that Magistrate Judge Gorence intended to permit the search and seizure that 
occurred; it was the very search and seizure specified in the application for the warrant 
that she issued. We thus know that no lawful interest of Stefonek's was harmed by the 
constitutional error, and equally that the taxpaying and law-abiding public will be harmed 
if her conviction is thrown out because of the error.  Where a violation of the particularity 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment can be shown to have had no causal relation to the 
scope of the search or to the quantity or character of evidence seized, suppression of the 
evidence is not a proper sanction.
190
 
Once again Posner is using the concept of the Pareto efficiency, when he writes “the defendant 
would by definition have been no better off had the violation of his constitutional rights not 
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occurred.”  It would be an inefficient windfall to the defendant to exclude the evidence.  He 
continues to evaluate the case as a tort when he writes: 
The broader principle that encompasses both types of "harmless error," plus the common 
law principle noted earlier that there is no tort without an injury, is that a litigant may not 
complain about a violation of rights that does not harm the interest (whether in privacy or 
in a fair trial) that the rights protect. (There are no "attempted torts.") The principle is 




     A pattern begins to develop in Posner’s opinions of critiquing the exclusionary rule, 
establishing that the situation is not Pareto efficient, and then establishing that the facts fit the 
common law interpretation of torts.  A Shepard’s citation analysis of the case found that it had 
been cited 223 times, of which 121 were in other cases, forty in law review articles, and eighty-
two in miscellaneous treaties, statutes, and court documents.   
     Five years later in United States v. Johnson (2004), Posner, writing for the majority, uses the 
concept of tort to explain the problems associated with the case and the exclusionary rule 
exceptions of independent-source and inevitable-discovery doctrines: 
The First Circuit's analysis merely recognizes that if there is a lawful basis for the seizure 
of some evidence, the fact that the seizure was also based on illegal acts need not trigger 
punishment, because the acts did no harm (no harm so far as obtaining the evidence was 
concerned-- there might be collateral damage, remediable by suits under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 or state tort law, to property or privacy interests of the defendant). There is a need 
for punishment when the only basis for the seizure of the evidence is a series of illegal 
acts.  The assumption that the independent source must be "lawful" is thus not merely an 
accidental dictum; it is part of the essential logic of the rule and of its origins in 
fundamental principles of tort law.
192
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Posner is re-directing the defendant’s legal recourse for violation of his Fourth Amendment 
rights to the Federal Tort Claims Act
193
 or state tort laws, rather than relying upon the 
exclusionary rule for redress.  This is the practical application of the law, no longer simply 
relying upon the exclusionary rule, but directing the defendant to bring a private tort claim.  
Later in the case he raises the point that there has to be an actual harm to the defendant by the 
state’s action: 
Proliferation of legal categories is a chronic problem for American law, as it deflects 
attention from practical to definitional concerns. The independent-source and inevitable-
discovery doctrines are easily collapsed into the familiar rule of tort law that a person 
can't complain about a violation of his rights if the same injury would have occurred even 
if they had not been violated. To punish a person for an act that does no harm is not 
required in order to deter harmful acts. But this is in general, not in every case; the 
defendant, Antoine Johnson, is arguing in effect for an exception to the tort rule.
194
 
Posner continues his analysis of comparing criminal procedure to common law torts: 
A fundamental principle of tort law is that there is no tort without an injury, and so since 
neither fire was a sine qua non of the plaintiff's injury, it could be argued that neither fire 
maker had committed a tort. Tort law rejects this conclusion for the practical reason that 
tortious activity that produces harm would go unsanctioned otherwise. The reason for 
denying liability when there is no causal relation between the violation of a duty and the 
harm of which the plaintiff is complaining is, as we noted earlier, that punishing a person 
for an act that does no harm is not needed to deter harmful acts. The reason fails when 
there is harm that would not have occurred had there not been unlawful acts.
195
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     This is a more tenuous case, but it does concern a criminal matter, tort law as recourse, and 
his critique of relying upon the exclusionary rule.  A Shepard’s citation report of the case lists 
fifty-three overall citations, of which twenty are for other cases, ten law review articles, and the 
remainder for treatises, statutes, and court documents.  Two of the cases do cite to the case 
regarding the use of tort remedies - one was another Seventh Circuit cases and the other a state 
case from Kansas.   
     Four years later Posner had another opportunity to address the question of torts as a remedy in 
Samuel v. Frank (2008), but by 2008 the exclusionary rule, although still applied in numerous 
cases, had been scaled back in a number of opinions providing many exceptions to the rules on 
evidence.  Writing for the majority, Posner held:  
There is . . .  no rule or principle that evidence obtained by improper means may not be 
used in a legal proceeding. It has often seemed better to let the evidence in but punish the 
officer who used those means to obtain it, an increasingly feasible option of the having-
your-cake-and-eating-it type now that there are effective tort remedies, especially federal 
tort remedies, against official misconduct. The emergence of those remedies may be one 
of the reasons that exclusionary rules have fallen out of favor--as they have; we find 
today's Supreme Court saying that "suppression of evidence. . .  has always been our last 
resort, not our first impulse."
196
 
     He then goes on not only to advocate a tort remedy, but also to address one of the 
fundamental criticisms of tort remedies, that the defendant is usually not an attractive plaintiff 
when he brings a civil action against a public official and would tend not to get a fair hearing in 
front of a jury: 
Tort remedies are fully effective when the victim of coercion is a witness who is not 
himself (in this case herself) a defendant, or a criminal of any type. A criminal is not a 
very appealing tort plaintiff, but Tisha is not a criminal. She is not accused of being the 
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defendant's accomplice rather than his victim. She was only 15 when she ran away with 
him, and he was 32 years her senior. 
A Shepard’s citation demonstrates that the case was only cited thirty-five times, nineteen other 
cases and four law reviews, with the remainder in treatises, statutes, and court documents.  None 
of the citations were for tort remedies suggested by Posner, but as indicated in the opinion, the 
idea of a tort remedy rather than relying on the exclusionary rule is no longer wishful thinking, 
and as Posner cites to a Supreme Court decision in Hudson v. Michigan (2006), the exclusionary 
rule had become more an exception than the rule it had been in Mapp v. Ohio (1961): 
Suppression of evidence . . . has always been our last resort, not our first impulse. The 
exclusionary rule generates "substantial social costs," which sometimes include setting 
the guilty free and the dangerous at large. We have therefore been "caution [us] against 
expanding" it, and "have repeatedly emphasized that the rule's 'costly toll' upon truth-
seeking and law enforcement objectives presents a high obstacle for those urging [its] 
application.”  We have rejected "[i]ndiscriminate application" of the rule, and have held it 
to be applicable only "where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously 
served," --that is, "where its deterrence benefits outweigh its 'substantial social costs'".
197
 
     This is an interesting opinion because the Court is actually applying an economic analysis of 
law to a constitutional issue by weighing the deterrence benefit against the social costs.  It is not 
simply a question of addressing a constitutional protection or legal right, but of weighing 
benefits versus costs.  A year later, Posner addressed the question again in United States v. Sims 
(2009), and was significantly more direct in his critique of the Fourth Amendment than in any of 
his prior cases addressing tort remedies.   
The Fourth Amendment, read literally at any rate, does not require warrants; it merely 
restricts them. It does not forbid searches without warrants; it merely forbids 
unreasonable searches. "There is nothing in the amendment's text to suggest that a 
warrant is required in order to make a search or seizure reasonable. All that the 
amendment says about warrants is that they must describe with particularity the object of 
the search or seizure and must be supported both by an oath or affirmation and by 
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probable cause, which is understood, in the case of searches incident to criminal 
investigations, to mean probable cause that the search will turn up contraband or evidence 
of crime."…  "[T]he framers of the Fourth Amendment were more fearful that the 
warrant would protect the police from the citizen's tort suit through operation of the 
doctrine of official immunity than hopeful that the warrant would protect the citizen 
against the police…  ("the fourth amendment does not of its own force require a warrant 
for any search. Its text is a limitation on warrants . . . stemming from dissatisfaction with 
the use of warrants by the crown courts during colonial days").
198
 
His 1980s critique of the exclusionary rule was significantly milder, and the possibility of tort 
remedies simply wishful thinking, but by 2009 torts were beginning to be viewed as a reasonable 
possibility:   
A person whose rights have been violated by a search can be remitted to a suit against the 
police for committing a constitutional tort.  Now that such suits are common and 
effective, the exclusionary rule is bound some day to give way to them. For the rule is too 
strict: illegally seized evidence essential to convicting the defendant of a grave crime 
might have to be suppressed, and the criminal let go to continue his career of criminality, 
even if the harm inflicted by the illegal search to the interests intended to be protected by 
the Fourth Amendment was slight in comparison to the harm to society of letting the 
defendant off scot free. 
 
Concerned with such anomalies though unwilling as yet to abrogate the exclusionary rule 
(although it has no constitutional basis--it is a doctrine of federal common law), the 
Supreme Court has in the name of "inevitable discovery" created an exception to the rule 
for cases like this in which the harm caused by an illegal search to the values protected by 
the Fourth Amendment is not merely slight in relation to the social benefits of the search, 
but zero. It is zero because, had the police complied with the Fourth Amendment the 
consequences for the defendant would have been exactly the same as they were. The 
search would have been authorized, would have taken place, and would have been 
identical in scope, both as to places searched and things seized, to the search that the 
police did conduct. The defendant would have been no better off had the warrant 
complied with the Fourth Amendment.
199
 
It is interesting to note in his opinion a common anomaly that makes citation analysis 
problematic, but not fatal:  he cites to one of his own opinions, United States v. Stefonek, to 
support his argument.  It is an acceptable practice, but it skews the results of any citation 
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analysis.  A Shepard’s analysis shows that the case has been cited thirty three times, four in 
cases, two in law reviews, and the remainder in treatises, statutes, and court documents. 
     In the last opinion that Posner wrote on the matter, United States v. Williams (2013), he is 
unequivocal in his views in opposition to the exclusionary rule as a remedy for an illegal search 
and seizure that should only be used as a last resort.  Once again, quoting from the Supreme 
Court, he writes:  “Exclusionary rules, which protect the guilty, are no longer favored.  
"Suppression of evidence… has always been our last resort, not our first impulse.”  He continues 
in a case against an attorney: 
The reason for an exclusionary rule is not to make the defendant whole by putting him 
back in the position that he would have occupied had it not been for the violation. 





Here, too,  he relies upon the argument, although not explicitly, that the exclusionary rule is 
inefficient, and the language he uses is the language of torts: “the rule is not to make the 
defendant whole by putting him back in the position that he would have occupied had it not been 
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D.  Conclusion 
     Posner has been influential in spreading the idea of using private common law tort actions as 
an alternative to the use of the exclusionary rule to address the actions of state actors in the 
attainment of evidence.  Beginning with his article on “Rethinking the Fourth Amendment” 
published in 1981, which has been cited 123 times, and his article “An Economic Analysis of 
Crime” published in 1985, which has been cited 370 times, which is one of the top ten Posner 
articles cited, Posner has been a judicial entrepreneur in applying economic principles, 
particularly the concept of efficiency, to reforming the exclusionary rule.  Unfortunately, except 
for the few cases mentioned above, his trial balloon opinions to get the exclusionary rule 
incorporated into criminal jurisprudence as an alternative have not been successful, but four 
federal cases have cited to his opinions, evidence that it has been considered, particularly one 
case which recognizes the scholarly contribution to the literature on tort as an alternative to the 
exclusionary rule:  
We also think it is significant that all the scholarly authority that we have found runs 
against Hector’s position.  See Akhil Reed Amar, The Constitution and Criminal 
Procedure (1997); Douglas Laycock, Modern American Remedies:  Cases and Materials 
143 (1994); William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies (1991); John 
C. Jeffries, Jr., Damages for Constitutional Violations (1989); Daniel J. Meltzer, 
Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials; Richard A. Posner, 
Rethinking the Fourth Amendment (1981).
201
 (Italicized and bolded for emphasis). 
 
     Published in 1981, Posner’s article, “Rethinking the Fourth Amendment,” is the wellspring 
from which the legal idea developed.  Additionally, a simple citation analysis of the federal court 
decision demonstrates almost a six-fold increase in cases that mention the exclusionary rule and 
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  A possible explanation for the increase is the number of opinions written 
during this time due to the increase in federal criminal prosecution and the use of Federal Tort 
Claims Act, but it may also be argued that they reflect Posner’s efforts to raise the possibility of 
alternatives.   
     Posner’s views on promoting tort alternatives to the exclusionary rule have become more 
common, but as discussed, the challenges of incorporating economic principles into the criminal 
law remain challenging, and Posner has been less successful in his efforts, than in antitrust.   
Whether the exclusionary rule is replaced by tort remedies as an alternative may have less to do 
with arguments for efficiency, and more to the inherent problems with the exclusionary rule and 
a general shift in criminal procedure, but it is evident that where Posner had been on the fringes 
in 1981, his arguments are significantly more mainstream today. 
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VII.  Posner and the Economics of Antitrust 
A. Introduction 
 
“The antitrust laws are here to stay, and the practical question is how to administer them better 
– more rationally, more accurately, more expeditiously, more efficiently.”
203
 




     There are certain areas of the law that are more amenable to the application of economic 
principles than others, and antitrust law is one of the legal subject matters most apt to fully utilize 
economics in judicial decision making and analysis.  Unlike criminal law, discussed in the prior 
chapter, antitrust law presents greater opportunity to utilize economic principles than other legal 
subject matters.  In order to assess Posner’s use of economic principles and assess his influence 
upon antitrust law, a citation analysis of his antitrust publications and a quantitative case law 
analysis of his opinions in the area of antitrust will be conducted. 
     Antitrust law is a complicated area of the law to the uninitiated.  Much of the legal discourse 
and development is not statutorily based, but rather based on common law decisions by federal 
judges interpreting several important antitrust statutes, including the Sherman Antitrust Act of 
1890; the Clayton Act of 1914; the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914; the Robinson-
Patman Act of 1936; and, the Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950.  An area of the law where federal 
judges have been highly influential, it is an ideal setting for their entrepreneurial instincts.  
Posner recognized the unique role of judges in antitrust jurisprudence, though he conceded that it 
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had been a mixed blessing. “Federal antitrust statutes . . . are quite brief,” he wrote, and  “courts 
have spent many years interpreting, or perhaps more accurately supplying, their meaning, but the 
course of judicial interpretation has been so marked by contradiction and ambiguity as to leave 
the law in an exceedingly uncertain and fluid state.”
205
  It was this unsatisfactory condition, so 
inimical to efficiency, which he sought to remedy. 
     Posner’s influence in changing the contemporary antitrust law paradigm, first as an academic 
scholar and then as a federal judge and judicial entrepreneur, has been well recognized by the 
courts and legal academic community through their reliance and citations to his work.
206
  Prior to 
becoming a federal judge, and while on the bench, he has played a significant intellectual role in 
recognizing the problems existing in antitrust law, providing recommendations on how to 
improve the efficacy of antitrust laws through the use of economic analysis, and overhauling 
existing antitrust common law.   
     But if Posner has become perhaps the antitrust reform movement’s most prominent figure, he 
has also been misinterpreted by many scholars and practitioners.  Posner cannot be easily 
categorized.  Due to his advocacy for the use of law and economics in antitrust jurisprudence, he 
has been perceived as being ideologically in favor of market-oriented remedies for all antitrust 
matters and opposed to antitrust laws in principle.  In truth, however, he is an interventionist, 
who supports a strong and effective antitrust regimen, with the goal of tailoring antitrust laws to 
promote economic efficiency benefitting the consumer, not simply the traditional interests of 
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business.  Many scholars, particularly within the law and economics movement, have argued 
against keeping statutory antitrust laws and have followed an anti-interventionist approach to 
antitrust jurisprudence, essentially crying, leave the markets alone, but Posner has argued for 
keeping the existing regulatory regime and proffered numerous suggestions on how to improve 
antitrust law that have largely been incorporated into the antitrust common law legal canon. 
     Posner’s entrepreneurialism and explicit attempts to change antitrust law through his 
extrajudicial writings and through common law as a judge reflect his belief in the futility of 
changing antitrust laws via statutory means.  He seems convinced that the path to change 
involves changing the minds of federal judges: 
The body of antitrust doctrine is largely the product of judicial interpretation of the vague 
provisions of the antitrust laws and thus can be changed by the courts within the broad 
limits set by the statutory language and what we know of the intent behind it.  What is 
required is judicial recognition that many of the existing judge-made rules of antitrust are 




     Posner has been an effective judicial entrepreneur in the area of antitrust law, but his impact is 
multifaceted and has been pursued through their principal areas of legal advocacy:  scholarly 
writings, judicial opinions, and general books.  In order to evaluate the impact of his role as a 
judicial entrepreneur, his scholarly contributions, prior to and since joining the federal bench, 
must be included in the totality of his judicial entrepreneurial activities.  The discourse between 
the bench and the academy has played a significant role in antitrust jurisprudence development 
over the last forty years.  There is a clear line of intellectual bridging from the academy to the 
federal jurisprudence, and a heavy reliance on the work of legal scholars and the professors who 
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wrote the treatises the courts and practitioners rely upon today for their understanding of antitrust 
law.  Even before he was appointed to the court of appeals, Posner as an academic at the 
University of Chicago in the 1970s had assumed a prominent role in this dialogue. 
     Much of the common law development stems from the intellectual ideas fostered by Posner 
and other scholars at the University of Chicago and Harvard Law School.  Without Posner’s 
success as an academic, and the prestige and respect he garnered from his writings, particularly 
Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective (1976), a book written for attorneys and the lay public 
prior to joining the federal bench, it is unlikely he would have been as influential a federal judge.  
In the area of antitrust law, the concept of a judicial entrepreneur must reflect the totality of 
jurists’ contributions to the jurisprudence, both on and off the bench, to fully appreciate their 
influence, which is the case for Posner.  Looking at the totality of his academic writings and his 
opinions, Posner has been the consummate judicial entrepreneur in the field of antitrust 
jurisprudence.  It may be argued that Posner first made his intellectual mark, and much of his 











B. Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis 




“Intellectual “schools” tend to be “Protestant” rather than “Catholic,” meaning that there is no 
central creedal authority to delimit orthodoxy and heresy.  This is particularly true of a “school” 
like Chicago, which is only loosely tied to a geographic locus, spans decades temporarily, and 




     Antitrust law covers many discrete areas of the economic relationships between businesses 
and their impact on consumers.  From price fixing to mergers, vertical restraints to exclusionary 
practices, the antitrust jurisprudence covers a tremendous swath of economic issues and business 
practices.  Since the 1960s, there has been a significant paradigmatic shift in antitrust 
jurisprudence from being traditionally interventionist in antitrust matters to an anti-
interventionist approach, which defers to the market to govern and resolve business relationships, 
unless per se clearly in violation of antitrust laws.  These changes were not statutorily enacted, 
but through the common law courts have reinterpreted the laws, but not without the profound 
influence of law and economics legal theories emanating from the University of Chicago and to a 
lesser degree, Harvard Law School.   
     In order to appreciate Posner’s profound influence on law and economics, it is necessary to 
understand the intellectual milieu of the University of Chicago that Posner gravitated to in the 
1960s and where he eventually found an intellectual home.  The University of Chicago would 
provide some of the most significant scholarly thinkers in the area of antitrust law, including 
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Robert Bork, George Easterbrook, and most importantly, Richard Posner, who became its most 
prominent proponent.  Director’s influence was extremely important in creating the Chicago 
School.  Bork, one of the school’s most famous, and to some, infamous protégés, commented 
years later on Director’s influence:   
A lot of us who took the antitrust course or the economics course (taught by Director) and 




This is a rather interesting insight because it could be argued that economics had the same 
influence throughout the entire legal academy over the next thirty years:  economic principles 
were the new legal tools for better understanding how the law operated, and economic ideas 
could be applied to a variety of issues to provide a new and different understanding.  In addition 
to the Chicago School, there was a competing Harvard School of thought on antitrust law, 
although its influence was not as significant; it offered perhaps the only competing alternative to 
Chicago, but its influence was waning as Chicago’s influence ascended. 
     The Chicago School’s antitrust jurisprudence stood for a number of principles: “(1) markets 
are robust when it comes to competition; and (2) courts are infirm when it comes to policing 
competition.”
211
  In 1978 Posner published a seminal article, “The Chicago School of Antitrust 
Analysis,” in which he argued that the “distinction between” the Harvard and Chicago Schools 
of antitrust analysis had “greatly diminished.”
212
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The basic tenet of the Chicago school, that problems of competition and monopoly 
should be analyzed using the tools of general economic theory rather than those of 
traditional industrial organization, has triumphed.
213
 
Changes of mind within both the Chicago school and its principal rival, which I have 
called the Harvard school, have produced a steady trend toward convergence.  
Differences remain, but increasingly they are technical rather than ideological.
214
 
Even though Posner was not a student, but a colleague of Director, he too, was profoundly 
influenced by the ideas of using economic principles in antitrust law.  Posner discussed his early 
introduction in antitrust law in an interview in 2012: 
There was very little economics in the law school curriculum, but I knew Turner.  I cite-
checked on the law review part of an article by Derek Bok, who later became president of 
Harvard University.  It was an article on antitrust, and the section I cite-checked actually 
dealt with economic analysis.  I also worked on major antitrust case for Justice Brennan 
when I was a law clerk, and I relied in part on Bork’s article.  I then went to work for the 
Federal Trade Commission, Justice Department, and communications task force.  I was 
intrigued with economic issues, and by the time I started teaching I had decided that I 
wanted to specialize in the applications of economics to law.
215
 
     Posner was excited about the use of economics in legal analysis.  Posner met Director while 
Posner was teaching at Stanford in 1968, and commented on the magnetism of Director, an 
entrepreneur of ideas in his own right:  
He [Director] was… a Socrates-like figure in the sense that he wrote very little…[but 
had] a very penetrating style of discussion.  He wouldn’t let you get away with anything.  
Most of what people say in conversation [is] casual nonsense, and he didn’t tolerate any 
of that.  He was polite but he was very firm and a real teacher.
216
 
     Perhaps because Director was better known for his teaching than his writing, it was Posner, 
due to his extensive and constant scholarly output would become most associated with the 
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economic analysis of law and its influence on antitrust reform.  Posner hits on a point in that 
aforementioned statement which is reflective of the appeal of law and economics to so many 
scholars – it is rigorous.  Law is an intellectual endeavor and economics provides another set of 
tools to understand and approach legal reasoning.  If the legal academy’s teaching philosophy is 
the Socratic Method, then the idea of an intellectual tool that requires concrete analysis will have 
great appeal in the classroom and in scholarship.  It could be argued that this is why so many 
scholars are attracted to utilizing economic principles in their legal analysis – it requires a sense 
of intellectual discipline and rigor that is attractive to scholars, as well as providing intellectual 
fodder for those needing publishing ideas for tenure at law schools. 
     Posner would later relocate to the University of Chicago Law School in 1969, and has 
remained there ever since.  Steven Teles, a legal scholar critical of law and economics, has 
recognized Posner’s influence and impact on law and economics: 
While the work of Director and [Ronald] Coase helped to establish law and economics as 
a respectable field, it was the emergence of Richard Posner that made it an academic 
phenomenon of the first rank.
217
 
Posner was an intellectual whirlwind, producing non-stop and shaking up the legal academy with 
his writing on economics and the law: 
First and foremost, the breadth of the ambition of Posner’s major work, Economic 
Analysis of Law, signaled to the legal academy that law and economics could identify 
major defects in traditional approaches across the entirety of legal scholarship, thereby 
inducing others, especially prospective law professors, to follow his lead.
218
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Posner’s work, in short, produced positive externality for the movement, by increasing 
the demand for its scholarship and removing blockages to its supply.
219
 
The Chicago School’s watershed was the late 1970s,
220
 but Posner’s involvement in antitrust 
predates his tenure and began while a law student.  Becoming one of the leading experts on 
antitrust law was an unexpected course for an English major.  He would note on his interest in 
antitrust law:  “By the time I went to the teaching market and I was hired by Stanford I knew I 
wanted to do economic analysis of law.”
221
  There were also other important antitrust scholars at 
the time, including the Harvard Law School’s Donald Turner and Phillip Areeda, who would 
later publish a seminal treatise on antitrust, used to this day, which would incorporate many of 
the ideas of the law and economics movement. 
     In addition to the many scholarly articles Posner had written on antitrust law, it was the 
publication of his seminal book in 1976, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective, which firmly 
established him as the leader of the law and economics movement in the area of antitrust 
jurisprudence, and laid the groundwork for interpreting and changing the existing legal paradigm 
for understanding federal antitrust laws.  Bork would publish The Antitrust Paradox two years 
later, another influential antitrust book, but it was Posner’s book that was more influential.
222
  
Like the Economics of Justice published in 1980, Antitrust Law was tailored to both a scholarly 
and lay audience.  In some respects, both books, published relatively close together, represent 
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Posner’s effort to establish himself as a public intellectual in the law and to break down the 
barriers between the legal academy and the general public.  Antitrust Law was also intended for 
lawyers, judges, and politicians, who may not fully understand the nature of antitrust law, the use 
of economics, and necessity for change.  Posner makes his intentions clear in the beginning of 
the book: 
It seems timely to try to place a distinctive approach to antitrust before a somewhat larger 




     This is distinctively Posner style.  It is also a reflection and element of his judicial 
entrepreneurial efforts to change opinions through his extrajudicial writings.  Posner is an 
entrepreneur, who wants to move his ideas beyond the academy and the courts, but the ideas are 
not simply intellectual; they serve a larger purpose, as he wants to change the existing antitrust 
policy paradigm.
224
  Posner argues that the existing antitrust framework was rife with problems 
and inefficient for a changing economy:  
The antitrust field is in need of a thorough rethinking of both its substantive and 
administrative aspects, and the essential intellectual tool for this process of rethinking, I 
believe – besides simple logic and common sense, which are scarce commodities in this 
as in most fields – is the science of economics.
225
 
The importance of Posner’s book cannot be exaggerated.  Teles has not only referred to it as 
“epochal,” but has recognized that it had “helped to move law and economics from its relatively 
low profile in the 1960s to its ubiquity in the 1970s and 1980s.  While leading liberal legal 
scholars largely ignored the previous generation of law and economics scholarship, they felt 
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compelled to respond to Posner.”
226
  Prior to his book and the work of the Chicago School, 
surprisingly, antitrust law jurisprudence had been largely bereft of a strong economic analytical 
component.  Posner’s suggestions for improving antitrust laws utilizing the principles and tools 
of economic analysis of the law were not new, but they were revolutionary, in that they argued 
for a paradigm shift in the way that existing antitrust laws were interpreted by courts where 
“allocative efficiency alone should guide antitrust policy.”
227
  The purpose of the antitrust laws 
was to promote economic welfare: 
Economic welfare should be understood in terms of the economist’s concept of 
efficiency; that business firms should be assumed to be rational profit maximizers, so that 
the issue in evaluating the antitrust significance of a particular business practice should 




     Efficiency as a guiding principle to antitrust was significant change in perspective.  Within a 
decade, the use of economic principles was well settled and affirmed in the seminal Supreme 
Court case, Matsushita v. Zenith (1986),
229
 where the Court recognized the role of using 
economic principles when deciding antitrust cases, rather than the older models of antitrust 
interpretation.  Writing for the majority, Justice Lewis Powell observed: 
It follows from these settled principles that if the factual context renders respondents' 
claim implausible -- if the claim is one that simply makes no economic sense -- 
respondents must come forward with more persuasive evidence to support their claim 
than would otherwise be necessary.
230
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Posner cites to Matsushita as a prime example of utilizing economic analysis. The Sherman Anti-
Trust Act, he writes: 
was enacted in 1890, but is interpreted today as if Congress had enacted the evolving 
economic analysis of monopoly and competition. Today the Act means, not what its 




     By the time Bob Pitofsky published “How the Chicago School Overshot the Mark: The Effect 
of Conservative Economic Analysis on U.S. Antitrust” in 2008, much of the Chicago School’s 
economic approach to using economic analysis in antitrust law had been accepted by the leading 
law schools and the courts.  Prior to the recent reforms, there was the interventionist approach in 
which the courts were assumed to play an active role in antitrust law; the anti-interventionist 
approach is market oriented, viewing laws and judges as inappropriate mechanisms or remedies 
for resolving issues of competition in the marketplace.  The paradigm shift was quick, profound, 
and the anti-interventionist approach to antitrust law is the dominant approach to this day.   
The intellectual DNA of U.S. antitrust doctrine governing single-firm conduct today is 
not exclusively or predominately a single strand of Chicago School ideas.   Rather, the 
intellectual DNA of modern U.S. antitrust doctrine is chiefly a double helix that consists 
of two intertwined chains of ideas, one drawn from the Chicago School of Robert Bork, 
Richard Posner, and Frank Easterbrook, and the other drawn from the Harvard School 
(HS) of Phillip Areeda, Donald Turner, and Stephen Breyer.”
232
 
     Ironically, whereas Posner is considered one of the fundamental players of the Chicago 
School and the law and economics movement in antitrust law, he is also considered by many to 
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be a centrist.  Posner is an entrepreneur of ideas, but he is pragmatic in the philosophical sense of 
being concerned about the outcomes and ramifications of policy and court decisions.  Writing 
about the history of the Chicago School, Daniel Crane wrote in the University of Chicago Law 
Review: 
If one wants to identify a Chicago School centrist, there is not a more representative 
scholar than Richard Posner.  Although the general trend of Posner’s antitrust work has 
been less interventionist than the views of the previous epoch, in important ways Posner’s 
work has supported enhanced intervention.
233
 
Critics have argued that the Chicago School is anti-interventionist and committed to ending 
antitrust laws altogether, and even though Posner is a product of the Chicago School, he stands 
outside the Chicago School of thought regarding the courts’ role:  he believes in antitrust law, 
making him by default an interventionist in antitrust matters, and an entrepreneur.  Posner’s 
iconoclastic approach to antitrust law makes him unique, reflecting an approach that is more 
thoughtful and less doctrinal in the application of economic analysis of the law in antitrust 
matters. 
C. Extrajudicial Publications 
     In evaluating the efficacy of a judicial entrepreneur, it is necessary to look at a judge’s 
opinions, but in respect to antitrust jurisprudence, it is also necessary to look at a judge’s 
influence through extrajudicial writings, particularly in light of the paradigm shift in antitrust 
laws since the 1970s.  Due to the nature of how antitrust jurisprudence develops, extrajudicial 
scholarly writings on antitrust matters are extremely influential in the federal courts.  In addition 
to case law, Posner’s entrepreneurial activities must be evaluated in the area of his extrajudicial 
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publications, particularly his casebooks, treatises, numerous law review articles, and books 
designed to reach a broader lay audience.  Prior to becoming a federal judge, Posner was a 
significant force in the movement not to necessarily change the statutory antitrust law, but rather 
the common law application of antitrust law.  His entrepreneurial goals were very clear in 1976, 
four years before his appointment to the federal bench, when he expressed his beliefs that some 
of the essential elements of antitrust law required fundamental changes in the antitrust principles 
governing collusion, mergers, exchanges of information among competitors, restrictions on 




     Posner has written numerous articles on antitrust, including his two of his most cited articles, 
“The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis,” published in 1979 and cited 434 times, and “Market 
Power in Antitrust Cases” published in 1981 and cited 482 times.
235
  As discussed in a previous 
chapter, citation analysis is an important tool with which to evaluate the reputation and influence 
of a judicial entrepreneur.  A brief list of his major antitrust articles with the number of citations, 




1) “Market Power in Antitrust Cases,”  94 Harv. L. Rev. 937 (1980-1981) – 482 cites, of 
which 43 are federal court opinions, including the Supreme Court. 
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2) “The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis,” 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. (1978-1979) – 434 cites, 
of which 3 are federal court opinions. 
 
3) “Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation,” 21 Stan. L. Rev. 548 (1968-1969) – 262 cites, of 
which 6 are federal court opinions. 
 
4) “The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution, Per Se Legality,” 48 
U. Chi. L. Rev. (1981) – 242 cites, of which 30 are federal court opinions, including the 
Supreme Court. 
 
5) “Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court:  An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, 
Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions,” 75 Colum. L. Rev. 282 (1975) 
– cited 232 times, of which 15 are federal court opinions, including three Supreme Court 
opinions. 
 
6) “Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws:  A Suggested Approach,”  21 Stan. L. Rev. 1562 
(1968-1969) – cited 231 times, of which 14 are federal court opinions, including two 
Supreme Court opinions.  
 
7) “The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach:  Reflections on the Sylvania 
Decision,” 45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1977 -1978). – cited 226 times, of which 17 are federal 
court opinions. 
 
8) “A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement,” 13 J.L. & Econ. 365 (1970) – cited 173 
times, of which 1 is a federal court opinion. 
 
9) “Antitrust in the New Economy,” 68 Antitrust L. J. 925 (2000-2001) – cited 107 times, 
which has been cited in 1 federal court opinion. 
 
10)  “Should Indirect Purchases Have Standing to Sue under the Antitrust Laws—An 
Economic Analysis of the Rule of Illinois Brick,” 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 602 (1978-1979) – 
cited 97 times, of which 6 are federal court opinions, including one Supreme Court 
opinion. 
 
11)   “Exclusionary Practices and the Antitrust Laws,” 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 506 (1973-1974) – 
cited 71 times, of which 5 are federal court opinions. 
 
12)   “Contribution among Antitrust Defendants:  A Legal and Economic Analysis,” 23 J. L. 
Econ. 331 (1980) – cited 62 times, of which 5 are federal court opinions, including two 
Supreme Court opinions. 
 
13)   “The Federal Trade Commission,” 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 47 (1969-1970) – cited 107 times, 




14)   “Information and Antitrust:  Reflections on the Gypsum and Engineers Decisions,” 67 
Geo. L. J. 1187 (1978-1979) has been cited 46 times, of which 1 is a federal court 
opinion. 
 
15)   “Vertical Restraints and Antitrust Policy,” 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 229 (2005) – cited 24 
times. 
 
16)   “Oligopolistic Pricing Suits, the Sherman Act, and Economic Welfare:  A Reply to 
Professor Markovits,” 28 Stan. L. Rev. 903 (1975-1976) – cited 23 times. 
 
17)   “Antitrust Policy and the Consumer Movement,” 15 Antitrust Bull. 361 (1970) – cited 3 
times. 
 
18)   “The Antitrust Decisions of the Burger Court,” 47 Antitrust L. J. 819 (1978-1979) – 
cited 3 times. 
 
19)   “Antitrust in the Not-for-Profit Sector,” 52 J. L. & Econ. 1 (2009) – cited 3 times. 
 
20)   “The Supreme Court and Antitrust Policy:  A New Direction,” 44 Antitrust L. J. 141 
(1975) – cited 2 times. 
 
21)   “A Dissenting View:  Do We Really Need an FTC,” 3 Antitrust L. & Econ. Rev. 65 
(1969-1970) – cited 2 times. 
 
22)   “The Decline and Fall of AT&T:  A Personal Recollection,” 61 Fed. Comm. L.J. 11 
(2008-2009) – cited 2 times. 
 
     This is not an exhaustive list of all the articles that Posner has published on antitrust, and the 
figures represent a conservative reflection of his influence based on the available electronic 
research tools.  For example, HeinOnline notes that the fifteenth article on the list above, 
“Vertical Restraints and Antitrust Policy,” published in 2005, has only twenty-four cites, but 
when the cite is Shepardized on LexisNexis, there are thirty-two citations:  twenty-four articles, 
five legal treatises, and three legal briefs.   As a newer article, the influence may be captured by 
including other secondary sources, such as treatises, court documents, and legal briefs, but the 
list above does not include articles that are cited in treatises, statutes, and legal briefs.  What the 
list demonstrates, at a minimum, is Posner’s influence upon the academy and the federal courts 
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through the publication of his extrajudicial scholarly publications.  Additionally, many of the 
articles were published prior to his becoming a federal judge, which raises an important element 
necessary for the successful judicial entrepreneur – reputation.   Posner secured his reputation as 
an antitrust scholar before being appointed to the federal judiciary through his extrajudicial 
writings. 
     Posner’s reputation before joining the bench was so impressive that he almost played a quasi-
judicial role – his views not only garnered respect, but also precedential value.  This is most 
evident in Justice Powell’s seminal opinion in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 
(1977)
237
 and it dramatically changed contemporary antitrust law.
238
  The case addressed the 
legal question of whether the per se rule or the rule of reason should apply to vertical restraints in 
the case and going forward.
239
   The case concerned the application of vertical restraints upon 
sellers, franchisees, of television sets and whether the agreements restricting sales to certain 
locations represented a restraint of trade, but more importantly, which legal rule should be 
applied to determine whether the agreements were legal or not under Section 1 of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act.  It is, as Posner says, a rather complicated case and area of the law.   
Mention of the Rule of Reason requires a brief excursus into fundamental, and potentially 
quite confusing, antitrust terminology.  It is conventional to distinguish between practices 
that are “per se” violation of antitrust law, such as horizontal price fixing…, and those 
that are tested by the Rule of Reason and therefore condemned only if found to interfere 
with competition unreasonably.  These are not illuminating terms.
240
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But Powell and the majority relied heavily upon Posner’s extrajudicial writing to support their 
opinion, overruling a prior Warren Court era opinion, Schwinn,
241
 which stated that such 
arrangements were per se illegal.  Posner advocated for, and Powell and the majority agreed, that 
a rule of reason analysis was best applied to the circumstances.  Not only did the Court reject the 
Warren Court era’s embrace of per se illegality, but it also established an efficiency argument 
and a pragmatic approach based on the rule of reason: 
[W]e conclude that the per se rule stated in Schwinn must be overruled.  In so holding we 
do not foreclose the possibility that particular applications of vertical restrictions might 
justify per se prohibition under Northern Pac. R. Co. But we do make clear that departure 
from the rule-of-reason standard must be based upon demonstrable economic effect 
rather than - as in Schwinn - upon formalistic line drawing.”
242
 
Posner is cited ten times in the Court’s opinion, and Justice Byron White takes note of the 
Court’s reliance on Posner by noting in his concurring opinion: 
I have a further reservation about the majority's reliance on "relevant economic impact" 
as the test for retaining per se rules regarding vertical restraints. It is common ground 
among the leading advocates of a purely economic approach to the question of 
distribution restraints that the economic arguments in favor of allowing vertical nonprice 
restraints generally apply to vertical price restraints as well.  Although the majority 
asserts that "the per se illegality of price restrictions… involves significantly different 
questions of analysis and policy," I suspect this purported distinction may be as difficult 
to justify as that of Schwinn under the terms of the majority's analysis.  Thus Professor 
Posner, in an article cited five times by the majority, concludes: "I believe that the law 
should treat price and nonprice restrictions the same and that it should make no 
distinction between the imposition of restrictions in a sale contract and their imposition in 
an agency contract."  Posner, supra, n. 7, at 298. Indeed, the Court has already recognized 
that resale price maintenance may increase output by inducing "demand creating activity" 
by dealers (such as additional retail outlets, advertising and promotion, and product 
servicing) that outweighs the additional sales that would result from lower prices brought 
about by dealer price competition. These same output-enhancing possibilities of nonprice 
vertical restraints are relied upon by the majority as evidence of their social utility and 
                                                          
241
 United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. 1967. 388 U.S. 365. 
242
 Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 59. 
117 
 
economic soundness, and as a justification for judging them under the rule of reason. The 
effect, if not the intention, of the Court's opinion is necessarily to call into question the 
firmly established per se rule against price restraints.
243
 
As a postscript to this seminal case, Posner, ever the entrepreneur, solidified his reputation in, 
“The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach:  Reflections on the Sylvania Decision.”  
Here, he traced the evolution of his own intellectual development in both Schwinn, where he had 
been involved, and Sylvania, where the Court relied upon his analysis: 
My interest in Sylvania is based not only on the fact that it is one of the most discussed 
antitrust decisions of recent years. I briefed and argued the Schwinn case for the 
government. Subsequently, my views on the proper treatment of restrictions in 
distribution under the antitrust laws took a 180-degree turn, and the article expressing my 
new thinking was heavily cited by the majority in Sylvania.
244
 
He goes on further to recognize the influence the Chicago School had on the Court, but more 
particularly, on scholars, including, himself: 
Wholly apart from the Court's kind words for franchise restrictions and its adoption of the 
free-rider concept, certain language in the opinion concerning the use of economics to 
guide antitrust analysis can be expected to reverberate throughout the lower federal 
courts. The Court said that "competitive economies have social and political as well as 
economic advantages, but an antitrust policy divorced from market considerations would 
lack any objective benchmarks," and that any "departure from the rule of reason standard 
must be based upon demonstrable economic effect.”  One must not read a Supreme Court 
opinion like a bond indenture, but it does appear that the Court is implying that antitrust 
prohibitions must have an economic rationale and that the aesthetic delights of smallness 
and the yearning to resurrect a nation of sturdy Jeffersonian yeomen will not be permitted 
to decide antitrust cases. This impression is reinforced by the frequency of the Court's 
citations to the writings of members of the "Chicago School," like Bork and me, who 
argue that economic efficiency is the only goal of antitrust law.
245
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     Sylvania is an interesting opinion because the majority is recognizing Posner as not only an 
expert in antitrust law, even though just a professor, but also tipping its hat to his reputation – 
this is three years before Posner joins the federal bench, but in a rather odd way, perhaps due to 
the common law nature of antitrust law, Posner is treated as a quasi-judicial authority.  It is this 
case in point, which explains why Posner’s extrajudicial writings cannot be separated from his 
opinions as a judge, in explaining and evaluating him as a judicial entrepreneur.  
     In addition to producing an antitrust casebook with his colleague and fellow federal judge, 
Frank Easterbrook, Posner is perhaps best known for his book, Antitrust Law: An Economic 
Perspective, published first 1976, in which he set forth his issues with the existing antitrust 
paradigm and proposed changes to improve the common law interpretation of the antitrust laws.  
The book has been cited in 953 law review articles and forty-eight federal court opinions,
246
 plus 
an indeterminate number of treatises and briefs.  It should be noted, since the first publication of 
the book was in 1976, many of the law review articles, if available, only go back to 1980 online 
or later, so it can only be assumed that the number of citations far exceeds the results listed.  The 
Second Edition, dropping the subtitle, An Economic Perspective, was published in 2001, twenty-
five years after the first book, reflecting the seismic change in antitrust adjudication, in which 
many of his suggestions in the first edition were incorporated into antitrust law and 
administration, but a few important issues still remain, of which the ever entrepreneurial, Posner 
is unwilling to let go. 
 
                                                          
246
 The LexisNexis database “US Law Reviews & Journals, Combined” was searched using the 
query:  (Richard /2 Posner) /2 (Antitrust Law); and the case law citations were derived from 
searching Federal Court Cases, Combined, using the same search query. 
119 
 
D. Posner and the Case Law 
     It may be assumed that, due to the success of economic analysis being incorporated into 
antitrust jurisprudence, the federal dockets would be filled with antitrust cases.  Quite the 
contrary, the courts, particularly the Supreme Court, have been anti-interventionist in antitrust 
matters over the last few decades.  Perhaps the greatest irony is that Posner and other scholars in 
the 1970s were so successful in changing existing antitrust laws that fewer antitrust cases are 
adjudicated.  The Supreme Court rarely hears antitrust cases,
247
 and since 1995, the Supreme 
Court has only decided twenty-two antitrust cases.  As the Supreme Court can generally pick and 
choose cases, its docket is a reflection of the anti-interventionist perspective and the success of 
economic analysis of law. 
     Federal appeals courts are limited to the cases presented on appeal from the lower courts 
within their respective circuits.  As a federal court judge on the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals, Posner is limited to addressing those matters, particularly antitrust, that have reached 
the court on appeal and which are assigned to him.  The scope of the legal issues that may be 
addressed are usually limited to only those questions of law which are presented on appeal, 
although a judicial entrepreneur is not constrained from providing dicta, expansive reasoning, or 
legal trial balloons.  In respect to scholarly articles, Posner may write on whatever topic in 
antitrust he wishes, but opinion writing is much more formal and limited, and not a forum in 
which judges can express their views as freely or outside the points of law raised.   
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     To the lay observer, it is assumed that a court will address all legal issues at one point or 
another, perhaps more so at the lower court trial level, but appellate courts tend to be limited to 
questions of law brought on appeal, and there is not a legal opinion that addresses every point of 
law or fact pattern.  Cases may not ideally present themselves, a challenge for the judicial 
entrepreneur, although courts, particularly the Supreme Court, will decide on points of law not 
raised earlier by the litigants on appeal.  Since the Supreme Court is the court of law resort, it in 
a better position to do this than the lower federal appellate courts, whose opinions are subject to 
appeal and judicial review.     
     In order to evaluate his efficacy as a judicial entrepreneur the parameters are more 
constrained, but there are still opportunities.  Since joining the federal bench in 1980, Posner has 
written thousands of opinions, but in the area of antitrust, the Seventh Circuit has published 1272 
opinions that mention the term antitrust, although these results narrow down to 581 opinions 
when the search limits the results only to those opinions that mention antitrust at least three times 
– not simply a reference to the term, but usually an opinion with more substantive analysis.  
Posner has written over two thousand opinions, 204 opinions on antitrust law spanning antitrust 
jurisprudence.  He has written over a third of those opinions produced on his circuit indicating 
that his colleagues are willing to defer to his expertise. 
     There are two areas in which Posner has been an advocate and judicial entrepreneur in the 
antitrust laws: the use of economic efficiency as a tool of legal reasoning, and the idea of making 
tacit collusion a punishable violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.  Of the 1272 
opinions in the 7
th
 Circuit that mention antitrust, in one form or another, the term “efficient” is 
utilized 232 times.  “Tacit collusion,” the subject of quite a bit of Posner’s writing and an idea 
121 
 
closely associated with him, is only mentioned in six opinions, although “collusion, as a form of 
price fixing is mentioned in sixty-two opinions.  Running a search of LexisNexis All Federal 
Court opinions for “antitrust and tacit collusion” resulted in sixty-nine opinions.  Posner is a 
judicial entrepreneur, but he has been more successful incorporating efficiency than tacit 
collusion, though he remains persistent.  A qualitative case law analysis will be conducted of 
Posner’s antitrust opinions to evaluate his application of efficiency and tacit collusion. 
Efficiency 
     One of the central themes of law and economics, and a principle for which Posner is most 
associated as a judicial entrepreneur, is his advocacy for efficiency being a goal of the law and a 
tool in pragmatic adjudication.  In the antitrust case, Morrison v. Murray Biscuit Company 
(1986), basing his comments on a long-line of precedential cases, Posner reiterates the purpose 
of antitrust law and the use of economic analysis of law when writing for the majority he states: 
To answer a question about antitrust as about any other field of law it is always helpful 
and often essential to consider what the purpose of the law is. The purpose of antitrust 
law, at least as articulated in the modern cases, is to protect the competitive process as a 
means of promoting economic efficiency. (Case citations omitted)
248
    
 An analysis of all federal cases with opinions decided in the periods between the passage of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890 and when Posner joined the federal bench in 1980, and the period 
in which Posner has sat on the bench from 1980 to 2015, indicates a substantial increase in the 
use of the term efficiency in antitrust cases since he joined the federal bench.  The only decline is 
in the number of Supreme Court opinions using the term “efficiency” in antitrust matters, but this 
may reflect the anti-interventionist approach and declining number of antitrust cases the Supreme 
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Court chooses to hear discussed previously.  The following searches were conducted in the 
LexisNexis case opinion databases for the respective courts and dates.  (Chart #2:  Use of the 





Chart No. 2 – Use of the Term Efficiency in Case Law 
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     Since Posner has joined the bench, there has been a significant increase in the number of 
cases that utilize the term efficiency in the opinion.  The first set of figures between 1890 and 
1980 reflect ninety years of antitrust jurisprudence, whereas since 1980, only forty-five years and 
half of the first period, there is a significant jump in the use of the term.  It may be debated 
whether there is a causal relationship between Posner’s entrepreneurial activities and the increase 
in the term efficiency generally in antitrust opinions.  It could be argued that it was the general 
influence of law and economics on antitrust law that is accountable for the increase in the term.  
For purposes of control and contrast, in comparison to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the 
Second Circuit’s figures for antitrust opinions are also included.  The comparison between the 
Seventh and Second Circuits is interesting because there is a difference between the two courts, 
with more antitrust matters in the Seventh Circuit and significantly more cases utilizing the term 
efficiency in the opinion.  Once again, this may indicate a causal relationship between Posner’s 
entrepreneurial activities and the influence he has had on his fellow colleagues on the bench in 
the Seventh Circuit.  The discrepancy of cases addressing antitrust law in the Second and 
Seventh Circuits may reflect plaintiff’s forum shopping for a court amendable to antitrust legal 
actions, too. 
     There are several cases in which Posner addresses the purpose of the antitrust laws to promote 
efficiency.  In Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. United States (1983), writing for the majority, Posner 
affirms, “The allocative-efficiency or consumer-welfare concept of competition dominates 
current thinking, judicial and academic, in the antitrust field.” 
249
  As mentioned before, 
Morrison v. Murray Biscuit Company (1986) stressed that point, as does Olympia Equipment 
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Leasing Co. v. Western Union Telephone Company (1986), Posner makes the point again, when 
discussing the development of the antitrust laws: 
as the emphasis of antitrust policy shifted from the protection of competition as a process 
of rivalry to the protection of competition as a means of promoting economic efficiency, 
it became recognized that the lawful monopolist should be free to compete like everyone 
else; otherwise the antitrust laws would be holding an umbrella over inefficient 
competitors.  “A monopolist, no less than any other competitor, is permitted and indeed 
encouraged to compete aggressively on the merits…”
250
 
Posner has been influential in changing the perspective of judges through his writings and 
emphasis on economics, as with his Seventh Circuit colleague, Judge Richard Cudahy: 
[T]he sole goal of antitrust is efficiency or, put another way, the maximization of total 
societal wealth, the question whether a sports league is a "single entity" turns on whether 
the actions of the league have any potential to lessen economic competition among the 
separately owned  teams.
251
  
     The incorporation of efficiency in legal analysis in case law may be connected to Posner’s 
work as a judicial entrepreneur and the influence of the Chicago School on antitrust law.  It is 
taken for granted today that efficiency is a reasonable objective, but as indicated from the case 
law analysis, it was not as important a tool for legal reasoning in antitrust law as it has become 
since 1980.  The incorporation of efficiency as a goal is a paradigm shift in antitrust law. 
Tacit Collusion 
     Posner’s advocacy for making tacit collusion a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act is important because it not only demonstrates his judicial entrepreneurialism in 
antitrust law, but also because tacit collusion is a perfect example of a cause of action in which to 
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utilize the tools of economic analysis in the law for which he has been advocating for so many 
years.  Tacit collusion is a form of price fixing, in which the parties do not overtly come to an 
agreement to fix prices, but the results of their mutual actions create a situation in which price 
fixing occurs.  There is a meeting of the minds, even though there may not be an overt 
agreement.  Using economic tools, collusion can be determined without any evidence of 
agreement.  The debate over whether tacit collusion, in respect to price fixing, should be 
considered an antitrust violation under the Sherman Act has been a long one and of particular 
interest to Posner.   
     Posner does not claim to develop the theory of tacit collusion as a violation; he attributes the 
original arguments to George Stigler from the University of Chicago in the 1950s.
252
  What 
makes tacit collusion important to the economic analysis of law is that it could be analyzed and 
explained through the economic principles of price theory.  It is a perfect example of the benefits 
of economic analysis.  Whereas explicit collusion is simply evidentiary, tacit collusion is not, but 
the tools of economics could be used to determine whether it had occurred.
253
  Although true in 
principle, there are challenges to utilizing pricing theories in adjudication, primarily the level of 
economic sophistication required.  The irony is that whereas the goal of utilizing tacit collusion 
to determine whether price fixing has occurred is pure economic analysis of law based on the 
economic analysis required, it is actually not a conservative approach or goal, and making tacit 
collusion a violation is anti-Chicago School in nature because it justifies a new interventionist 
approach to antitrust laws and expands the role of the judiciary.  Posner explains tacit collusion: 
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Tacit collusion, sometimes called oligopolistic price coordination or conscious 
parallelism, describes the process, not in itself unlawful, by which firms in a concentrated 
market might in effect share monopoly power, setting their prices at a profit-maximizing, 
supracompetitive level by recognizing their shared economic interests and their 
interdependence with respect to price and output decisions.
254
 
In some circumstances competing sellers might be able to coordinate their pricing 
without conspiring in the usual sense of the term – that is, without any overt or detectable 
acts of communications.  This is the phenomenon that lawyers call “conscious 
parallelism” and some economists term “oligopolistic interdependence,” but which I 




Posner is not interested in the “criminal-law sense” of parties colluding to fix prices; he is 
interested in using economics to ferret out collusion between parties that may not be explicit.   
The basic reform necessary to the control of price fixing and oligopoly is to redirect the 
enforcement of section 1 of the Sherman Act from its present obsession with proving the 
fact of a conspiracy or attempt to fix prices, in the criminal-law sense of these terms, to a 
search for evidence, economic in character, of collusive price behavior in the market.
256
 
If the goal of antitrust is to promote efficiency, then whether the parties intended to price fix or 
not becomes irrelevant, and the only concern is a measurable outcome which would indicate tacit 
collusion.  This is similar to the idea of strict liability, which is also a model of efficiency, 
because the result is designed to deter certain behavior, but also to provide an efficient result 
without having to prove intent. 
     Since 1969 when Posner published his article, “Oligopoly and the Antitrust Law:  A 
Suggested Approach,” Posner has been arguing for, and has come to personify, changing the 
rules on tacit collusion.  In the article he is seeking an expansive role for judicial involvement 
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and proposes for consideration a new approach to a persistent and difficult problem of antitrust 
policy. 
The problem is: What rules and remedies are necessary to prevent supracompetitive 
prices in oligopolies, markets in which a few sellers account for most of the output?  The 
heart of the suggested approach is a questioning of the prevailing view that monopoly 
pricing by oligopolists, when unaccompanied by any detectable acts of collusion, 
constitutes an economically and legally distinct problem requiring new doctrines and new 




Although this principle has not been incorporated into antitrust jurisprudence, which requires 
evidence of collusion, this issue represents Posner as judicial entrepreneur.  First writing on this 
topic in 1969, he brings it up again in 1976 in Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective, and then 
continues to bring up the issue in the second edition of Antitrust Law in 2001, by noting that 
reform is still required: 
The courts and enforcement agencies are largely helpless in dealing with forms of 
collusive pricing that do not generate detectable acts of agreement or communication 
among the colluding sellers.
258
 
The errors of legal policy have been errors of both commission and omission.  Practices 
are forbidden that should not be, and other practices that in fact contravene the policy of 
the antitrust laws are left alone.
259
 
He continues with his arguments for the incorporation of tacit collusion: 
Besides difficulties with substantive doctrine, the antitrust area has been plagued by 
problems of remedy and enforcement.  Indeed, today those problems not only are more 
serious than the substantive problems but are the source of most of those problems, such 
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     The issue of tacit collusion is important because it demonstrates two perspectives for Posner:  
the strengths of using economic analysis to determine price fixing, but also the limits of 
economics analysis of law adjudication.  The failure is not so much based on the inadequacies of 
the principles of economic analysis of law, as on the legal practice and limited understanding of 
economics by lawyers and judges: 
Since lawyers and judges are more comfortable with conspiracy doctrine, than price 
theory, the displacement of emphasis from economic consequences to the fact of 
conspiring is natural.  But it is inconsistent with an effective antitrust policy.
261
 
The only objection to the proposed approach that I consider substantial is the difficulty of 
proving collusive pricing by economic evidence, given the complex, technical, and often 
inconclusive character of such evidence.
262
 
     In 1976 he was hopeful that tacit collusion would be incorporated into antitrust jurisprudence, 
but the complexity of economic modelling would eventually undermine his efforts, and as of 
today, it still remains a theoretical approach that has not been embraced by the courts.  He 
appreciates the reasons courts may be reluctant to embrace tacit collusion as a violation: 
The initial cases brought under such an approach will be protracted, unwieldy, and 
perhaps inconclusive, but with time, economists and lawyers will refine the theoretical 
and empirical economics of price fixing to the point where the law against price fixing 
can be administered in accordance with its substantive economic objectives.
263
 
     Tacit collusion is Posner’s bête noir and demonstrates not only his contribution to the 
Chicago School, but his independence of it, too.  He is not anti-interventionist in antitrust 
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matters, and his advocacy of tacit collusion is a case in point.  He is an entrepreneur who has 
advocated for the use of the idea and to change the antitrust paradigm with the use of economic 
analysis.  As he notes in the first edition: 
This is where I part company with many other students in antitrust policy.  If the 
economic evidence introduced in a case warrants an inference of collusive pricing, there 
is neither legal nor practical justification for requiring evidence that will support the 
further inference that the collusion was explicit rather than tacit.  Certainly from an 
economic standpoint it is a detail whether the collusive pricing scheme was organized 
and implemented in such a way as to generate evidence of actual communications.
264
 
 Another scholar noted in 2012 Posner’s contribution and importance to the debate on tacit 
collusion: 
Despite his frequent iconoclasm, Judge Posner is the most influential member of the 
Chicago School, and his analysis of tacit collusion is one of his most famous policy 
positions. It is part of the Chicago tradition because it builds on Stigler's classic analysis 
of collusive oligopoly to formulate both a legal standard and practical enforcement 
recommendations. His application of the analysis to mergers provided the groundwork 
for the enforcement agencies' Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which have transformed the 
law of Section 7 of the Clayton Act. As a proposal for interpretation and enforcement of 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, however, Posner's recommendation has not succeeded.
265
  
Posner has advocated for the incorporation of tacit collusion in much of his writings, and has 
recognized that other courts have not incorporated the principle.  In the case of JTC Petroleum v. 
Piasa Motor Fuels (1999),
266
 a case concerning a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust 
Act in which asphalt pavers created an unspoken cartel to discourage competition in the market, 
Posner wrote the opinion and outlined the lack of support for treating tacit collusion among the 
circuits: 
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The question whether purely tacit collusion, or as it is sometimes called oligopolistic 
interdependence, might violate the Sherman Act has been much mooted in academic 
circles.  A number of cases treat it as open.  We cannot find a case that squarely supports 
the theory; the Second Circuit appears to have rejected it, we threw some cold water on it.  
We cannot agree that it derives any support at all from the fact that section 2, unlike 
section 1 (which is limited to combinations, contracts, and conspiracies), does not require 
an agreement (unless the specific charge is conspiracy to monopolize).  If oligopolistic 
interdependence can be described as "joint monopolization" or "attempted joint 
monopolization" (JTC's terms), equally it can be described as a combination or a (tacit) 
conspiracy.” 
The most compelling objection to JTC's theory has nothing to do with the language of the 
Sherman Act but rather is the difficulty of formulating effective relief without 
transforming the district court into a regulatory agency, here for example charged with 
compelling producers of emulsion to sell to JTC. At all events the theory is a novel one 
and when a litigant wants a court to buy a novel theory it has to do more than assert it, 
wholly ignoring the objections that have been made to it and the cases that have 
questioned or rejected it.
267
  
     Even though Posner has not been successful in getting tacit collusion incorporated, his 
antitrust opinions which address price fixing and collusion generally, which are contrary to the 
goals of efficiency remain important topics for Posner.  A select set of opinions are listed below, 
which demonstrate the precedential value of his opinion as indicated in the number of times they 
have been cited.  Even though he has written extensively on antitrust, there are only thirteen legal 
opinions written by Posner that include both the issue of price fixing and collusion. 
1)  In Re:  Text Messaging Antitrust Litigation (2010) – cited 142 times. 
2) Sheridan v. Marathon Petroleum Co., LLC (2008) – cited 93 times. 
3) Williams Electric Games, Inc. v. Garrity, (2005) – cited 206 times. 
4) In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., (2002) – cited 460 times. 
5) In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., (2002) – cited 156 times. 
6) In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., (1999) – cited 325 times. 
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7) Khan v. State Oil Co., (1998) – cited 17 times. 
8) In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599 (1997) – cited 840 
times. 
9) Blue Cross & Blue Shield United v. Marshfield Clinic, (1995) – cited 352 times. 
10)   United States v. Heffernan, (1994) – cited 56 times. 
11)   FTC v. Elders Grain, Inc., (1989) – cited 198 times. 
12)   Hospital Corp. of America v. FTC, (1986) – cited 350 times. 
13)   General Leaseways, Inc. v. National Truck Leasing Assoc., (1984) – cited 254 times.  
     Using citation analysis with present tools to demonstrate influence is effective, but does not 
capture the full influence of a particular jurist.  For example, a Single Search of the LexisNexis 
docketing service, Courtlink, will result in 970 documents referencing “Richard /2 Posner and 
antitrust,” of which 346 are legal briefs and motions to the court in support of a particular legal 
action requested of the courts.  The content in Courtlink is different from case law opinions, and 
represents a relatively recent sample of court documents, but in comparison to case law opinions, 
it demonstrates that as much influence attends to the briefs and motions in the litigation process 
as the judge’s final opinions.  For example, in a 2010 Brief before the First Circuit in the matter 
of White v. R.M. Packer Company, the Respondent-Appellant used Posner to support their 
arguments that Posner is opposed to, but ultimately concedes that the law is clear on tacit 
agreements: 
“A merely tacit agreement is not an antitrust violation.”  As even Judge Posner has 
reluctantly acknowledged, "an express, manifested agreement, and thus an agreement 
133 
 
involving actual, verbalized communication, must be proved in order for a price-fixing 




     In this particular matter, an opinion was published by the First Circuit, in which the opinion 
relied on several points raised in Posner’s prior writings.  The opinion does not only rely upon 
Posner’s previous court opinions, but also his published works, in particular the Second Edition 
of Antitrust.
269
  There is a causal chain in which, during the litigation process, parties rely upon 
Posner to support their legal arguments.  Although not as successful in incorporating tacit 
collusion into antitrust jurisprudence, Posner remains a judicial entrepreneur in his continued 
advocacy for the incorporation of tacit collusion into the cannon of antitrust law. 
 
E. Conclusion 
     There are numerous areas of antitrust jurisprudence that may be analyzed to evaluate the 
impact of Posner’s influence.  Since efficiency is central to economic analysis of law, it is 
important to address the use of efficiency as a jurisprudential goal.  But it is also important to 
demonstrate where he has not been successful, not to negate his efforts as a judicial entrepreneur, 
but to demonstrate his persistent efforts to change the status quo.  He may have not been 
successful at incorporating tacit collusion as a price fixing antitrust violation, but the idea has 
become synonymous with Posner.  As a judicial entrepreneur for reform of the antitrust law, 
there are few rivals to Posner, but much of the battle for antitrust reform has been fought, and 
some might argue, won.   
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Chicago’s intellectual edifice is in a state of neglect.  Its erstwhile paladins are largely 
dead, bored with the field, or complacent.  Some, like Posner and Easterbrook continue to 
offer the occasional, infrequent antitrust intervention, but without the zeal of their earlier 
years.  By and large, the view seems to be that what needed to be said was said and the 
field is by and large where it should be.
270
 
     The citation analysis and qualitative case law analysis is important to assess his efforts, 
successes, and failures in antitrust jurisprudence, but strategically, his efforts to advocate for his 
reforms in law review articles, treatises, and books written for the attorney and non-attorney 
alike, are important to recognize as tools of the judicial entrepreneur, particularly in the area of 
antitrust law, which has had an important nexus between the legal academic literature and 
common law development of antitrust law in court opinions.  Posner has been successful in 
seeding the courts and introducing the principle of efficiency into antitrust jurisprudence, but he 
has not been completely successful, as indicated by his lack of success in tacit collusion.  Tacit 
collusion was not his idea, but as a judicial entrepreneur, and through creative imitation, it has 
been one of the ideas with which he has been most associated. 
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VIII.  Judicial Entrepreneur:  Scalia and Statutory Interpretation 
A. Introduction 
“Where a mind labours to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes every thing from which 
aid can be derived; and in such case the title claims a degree of notice, and will have its due 
share of consideration.”  Chief Justice John Marshall
271
 
"Of course it is true that the words used, even in their literal sense, are the primary, and 
ordinarily the most reliable source of interpreting the meaning of any writing: be it a statute, a 
contract, or anything else. But it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed 
jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes always 
have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the 
surest guide to their meaning."  Judge Learned Hand
272
 
“Laws mean what they actually say, not what legislators intended them to say but did not write 
into the law’s text for anyone (and everyone so moved) to read.”  Justice Scalia
273
 




Within the legal academy and judiciary, there are legal topics which float in and out of 
popular discourse and discussion.  From time to time a particular legal topic becomes salient, 
either because a particular case has brought the issue to the public’s attention, changing 
jurisprudential standards or considerations, or because a judicial entrepreneur has seized upon 
the idea and has actively engaged the topic with the goal of disrupting the existing intellectual 
paradigm.  The reasons some issues become popular are varied, but perhaps the most important 
reason is that an entrepreneur seizes upon the idea and gives it new life.  One such perennial 
legal topic is the use of legislative history and other secondary sources as tools of statutory 
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interpretation when deciding cases.  Whereas Posner has become synonymous with law and 
economics, for almost thirty years the Supreme Court justice, Antonin Scalia, has become the 
most prominent opponent of the use of legislative history and secondary sources in statutory 
interpretation.  In this, he has been successful in reawakening the dialogue on the topic, creating 
a paradigm shift in the use of legislative history in court opinions, particularly Supreme Court 
opinions. 
Scalia is a judicial entrepreneur, and through his character and strategic activities, he has 
taken on a number of conservative legal issues with mixed success.  He is well known for his 
social conservatism and his efforts to change the abortion and affirmative action jurisprudence 
on the Supreme Court, but perhaps Scalia’s most important and successful efforts as a judicial 
entrepreneur have furthered his goal to reform and limit the use of legislative history through the 
use of textualism and a more formalist approach to statutory interpretation.  His success has not 
been absolute, but more nuanced, and like Posner with law and economics, anyone utilizing or 
writing about statutory interpretation today must, at a minimum, give lip service to the arguments 
that Scalia has made against the broad use of legislative history; he has set the bar for any 
discussion of the topic.  If he has not always succeeded in converting judges to his beliefs, he has 
certainly highlighted the issues and concerns that statutory interpretation raises in the judicial 






B. Theories of Statutory Interpretation 
If the chief task of courts is, in John Marshall’s words, “to say what the law is,” the job of 
statutory interpretation is central to the judge.  Some legal language is too clear to dispute, like 
the constitutional requirement that presidents be thirty-five years of age.  But legislating and 
drafting laws is not a precise science.  Many statutes are not clear or are ambiguous, or contain 
contradictory provisions, or do not foresee the circumstances to which they are applied, and all 
this may give rise to several possible, plausible interpretations, leaving it to judges to choose 
among them.  Greatly complicating the picture is the fact that the substantial, if unavoidable 
judicial discretion is inconsistent with democratic theory because the font of the law is the 
democratically elected legislatures, not a politically appointed and unaccountable judiciary. 
There are several competing schools of thought on how to approach statutory interpretation.  
The prominent schools are textualism or formalism, on one side, and dynamic interpretation, 
pragmatism,
275
 or purposive approach to statutory interpretation on the other,
276
 running through 
all these schools is the common law precedential approach to statutory interpretation.  The 
precedent may in the judge’s view have been wrongly decided, but if it is deeply embedded, the 
judge will probably uphold it because he knows that people have been acting as if it were valid 
and it would be very disruptive (and perhaps even unjust) to radically upset things by 
overturning it.   
Approaching statutory interpretation, the common belief is that the basis of all statutory 
interpretation is the “plain public meaning” rule, which “holds that in interpreting a statute you 
                                                          
275
 Daniel A. Faber, “Do Theories of Statutory Interpretation Matter?  A Case Study,” 
Northwestern University Law Review 94, 1409 (Summer 2000): 1411-1412. 
276
 Robert A. Katzmann, Judging Statutes (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2014). 
138 
 
should begin, though maybe not end, with the word of the statute.”
277
  In ordinary conversations, 
when a speaker’s meaning is unclear, we normally ask, “What do you mean?”  We do not ask, 
“What do the words mean?”; we already know what the words mean, but somehow we suspect 
that they are not conveying the meaning the speaker intended.  As judges, of course, cannot ask 
the lawmaker what he intended, traditionally they have tried to discern the intent by reading 
documents where lawmakers try to explain and justify their support of the law – in other words, 
committee hearings, floor speeches, and so on that could aid them in deciphering the intent of the 
legislature, that is, its purpose in mind. 
278
  This traditional approach to statutory interpretation 
was not without its critics, but was largely accepted as normal legal practice for judges until it 
began to change in the 1980s, and since that time, the loose acceptance of legislative history in 
judicial decision making has been on the wane.   
Scalia’s approach, called textualism, seeks to understand statutes by examining the plain 
public meaning of the words used at the time of the statute’s adoption.  The proponent of 
textualism and “formalism posits that judicial interpreters can and should be tightly constrained 
by the objectively determinable meaning of the statute; if unelected judges exercise much 
discretion in these cases, democratic governance is threatened.”
279
  Scalia, writing in a 
concurring opinion in 1989, three years after joining the Court, succinctly stated his views on 
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statutory interpretation and the use of legislative history in Green v. Bock Laundry Company 
(1989): 
The meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined, not on the basis of 
which meaning can be shown to have been understood by a larger handful of the 
Members of Congress; but rather on the basis of which meaning is (1) most in accord 
with context and ordinary usage, and thus most likely to have been understood by 
the whole Congress which voted on the words of the statute (not to mention the citizens 
subject to it), and (2) most compatible with the surrounding body of law into which the 
provision must be integrated -- a compatibility which, by a benign fiction, we assume 
Congress always has in mind. I would not permit any of the historical and legislative 
material discussed by the Court, or all of it combined, to lead me to a result different 
from the one that these factors suggest.
280
 
Scalia understands that textualism may be insufficient at times to decide a case, and is less 
dogmatic than he appears.  Scalia notes in A Matter of Interpretation that is he is a textualist and 
not a strict constructionist.  To Scalia, textualism is much more complex and nuanced than many 
are led to believe. 
I am not a strict constructionist, and no one ought to be-the better that, I suppose, than a 
nontextualist.  A text should not be construed strictly, and it should not be construed 




     The perennial challenge for a judge is what interpretative tools and methods should be 
utilized when attempting to understand and decipher the meaning and construction of a statute?  
Judges have a host of interpretative tools and materials which they can rely upon to achieve a 
reasonable analysis in their judicial opinions.  What Scalia is opposed to is using legislative 
history as one of these tools.  In Graham County Soil & Water Conservation District v. United 
States (2010), Scalia writes: 
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I agree that the stray snippets of legislative history respondent, the Solicitor General, and 
the dissent have collected prove nothing at all about Congress's purpose...  But I do not 
share the Court's premise that if a “'legislative purpose'” were “'evident'” from such 
history it would make any difference.  The Constitution gives legal effect to the “Laws” 
Congress enacts, Art. VI, cl. 2, not the objectives its Members aimed to achieve in voting 
for them.  If [a] text includes state and local administrative reports and audits, as the 
Court correctly concludes it does, then it is utterly irrelevant whether the Members of 
Congress intended otherwise.  Anyway, it is utterly impossible to discern what the 
Members of Congress intended except to the extent that intent is manifested in the 
only remnant of “history” that bears the unanimous endorsement of the majority in each 




     Some of the theoretical alternatives to textualism include dynamic interpretation, pragmatism, 
and the purposive approach.  To a large extent, they all entail similar theoretical arguments, 
which are antithetical to strict textualism and view the use of legislative history in statutory 
interpretation much more broadly, but within limits.  Katzmann addresses the traditional mode of 
statutory interpretation as the purposive approach. 
The dominant mode of statutory interpretation over the past century has been one 
premised on the view that legislation is a purposive act, and judges should construe 
statutes to execute that legislative purpose.  This approach finds lineage in the sixteenth 
century English decision Heydon’s Case, which summons judges to interpret statutes in a 
way “as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy.”  From this perspective, 
legislation is the product of a deliberative and informed process.  Statutes in this 
conception have purposes or objectives that are discernible.  The task of the judge is to 
make sense of legislation in a way that is faithful to Congress’s purposes.
283
   
     Textualists and Scalia reject the purposive approach to statutory interpretation.  The textualist 
arguments against the purposive approach is based on the premise that it gives judges too much 
discretion to interpret the legislators’ intent and substitute their policies and political values for 
those of the duly elected legislatures; the legislative process is so complex that the intent of the 
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legislators, as expressed in legislative history documents, is too ambiguous or contradictory to 
find a coherent intent or purpose; and, when judges use this discretion they are being 
undemocratic by substituting their views for that of the legislature.
284
  Katzmann recognizes the 
influential role Scalia has played in challenging the positivist approach to statutory 
interpretation: 
The approach I advocate has not gone unchallenged.  Indeed, within the judiciary, a 
sustained attack on the use of legislative history began in the 1980s, largely by Antonin 
Scalia, first as a D.C. Circuit judge and then as Supreme Court justice.  Justice Scalia is 
of the view that because legislation often consists of a brew of deals, compromises, and 
inconsistencies, the search for coherent purpose is elusive.  Thus, it is the statute’s final 
wording that must prevail, he has argued, over “unenacted legislative intent”.  
Textualism, as Justice Scalia has championed it, involves an assault on the dependence of 




     As indicated by Katzmann’s book, the debate led by Scalia for a textualist approach to 
statutory interpretation was still continuing in full force, with the two camps of statutory 
jurisprudence entrenched in their respective opinions, but the record demonstrates that Scalia, as 
a judicial entrepreneur, had succeeded in changing the tide. 
     One of Scalia’s staunchest critics, and antagonists, is Richard Posner.  Posner’s critique of the 
textualist approach to statutory interpretation predates Scalia’s appointment to the Supreme 
Court.  In 1983, Posner published “Statutory Interpretation – in the Classroom and in the 
Courtroom,”
286
 one of his most cited articles, in which he argues against the plain meaning rule 
                                                          
284
 Ibid., 40-41. 
285
 Ibid., 39. 
286
 Posner, “Statutory Interpretation in the Classroom and in the Courtroom,” 800. 
142 
 
and textualism.  Here, he also recognizes that the topic of statutory interpretation has essentially 
lain dormant for many years,
287
 and was ripe for the picking. 
It has been almost fifty years since James Landis complained that academic lawyers did 
not study legislation in a scientific (i.e., rigorous, systematic) spirit, and the situation is 
unchanged.  There are countless studies, many of high distinction, of particular statutes, 
but they are not guided by any overall theory of legislation, and most academic lawyers, 
like most judges and practicing lawyers, would consider it otiose, impractical, and 
pretentious to try to develop one.  No one has ever done for legislation what Holmes did 
for the common law.
288
 
     Nor would Posner pursue the topic, either, instead focusing on issues related to law and 
economics and other legal and academic interests.  But there was an opportunity to seize the 
topic and make it one’s own, and Scalia, as a judicial entrepreneur, seized the opportunity.  
Perhaps not intentionally at first, but over time, it would become one of his highest profile 
judicial concerns.  It is ironic that the very topic that Posner bemoaned needing addressing would 
be seized upon by Scalia and addressed contrary to the way in which Posner had hoped.  First, 
through Scalia’s opinions, then books, and then into a minor cottage industry of speaking on the 
topic, Scalia would make reforming statutory interpretation his own cause, becoming 
synonymous with textualism and the rejection of legislative history.  In this way, as a judicial 











C. Scalia:  Judicial Entrepreneur 
 
As discussed, the model of a judicial entrepreneur is based on two factors:  the characteristics 
of the entrepreneur and the strategies used by the entrepreneur.  For the issue of statutory 
interpretation, based on the model created in the first part of the dissertation of a judicial 
entrepreneur, Scalia is a judicial entrepreneur regarding his efforts to reform statutory 
interpretation, utilize textualism, and minimize the use of legislative history.  In fact, although 
Scalia has expressed a strong interest in such topics as abortion and affirmative action, statutory 
interpretation is the only legal topic that he has written extensively about outside of legal 
opinions, publishing two books that address the topic.  Scalia has written a number of articles, 
for which he is probably less known than his opinions, books, and perhaps most famously his 
oral advocacy on and off the bench:  it is safe to say that Scalia has never shied away from an 
opportunity to express his views on variety of topics publicly, particularly on the role of the 
judge and statutory interpretation.  
Characteristically, Scalia represents Schumpeter’s Unternehmergeist and has been a 
persistent advocate for textualism in statutory interpretation.  His strong and verbose personality 
is well known, and he does not shy away from an opportunity to advocate for his ideas or engage 
someone he believes is wrong.  His biographer, Joan Biskupic, makes numerous references to his 
energy and drive when tackling a particular issue he feels important, particularly the use of 
language in an opinion: 
If words and small phrases mattered to Scalia, the substance of an opinion mattered even 
more.  Lee Liberman, his student at the University at Chicago who helped found the 
Federalist Society, became a law clerk to him on the D.C. Circuit.  She said Scalia was 
144 
 
“tireless in chasing down and eliminating bad dicta from his colleagues’ opinions,” 
referring to phrases that could potentially broaden the reach of a ruling.
289
 
     As a knowledge-based innovator, he has taken an existing jurisprudential idea, statutory 
interpretation, and has breathed new life into an old issue, but most importantly, he seized on the 
convergences of changing legal theories and grasped the opportunity to make textualism his own.  
He has remained actively engaged in the topic ever since he published A Matter of Interpretation 
in 1997 and Reading Law fifteen years later in 2012.  He has not limited his entrepreneurialism 
to legal opinions and books, but has also given numerous speeches and lectures on the topic.  
Even though he is often perceived as being rigid, he has been relatively flexible in his embrace of 
a broader definition of textualism and rejection of the more restrictive formalistic approach; this 
is reflected in his own continued use of legislative history in his legal opinions.  Where Scalia 
has been successful is by forcing judges to pause and think about using legislative history out of 
hand.  For he invites them to appreciate the democratic challenges the use of legislative history 
poses, and in causing discontinuity in the existing intellectual paradigm and creating a new 
paradigm through the process of creative destruction. 
     How Scalia was able to create these changes was through a strategic approach of voicing his 
views on the topic in judicial opinions, the two books he has written specifically on the topic of 
statutory interpretation, and public speeches on the topic.  Scalia’s attack on traditional statutory 
interpretation evolved over time, but it was his appointment to the Supreme Court that made his 
“critique . . .  more radical and more formalist.” 
290
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     As a knowledge-based entrepreneur, Scalia has been a judicial entrepreneur by strategically 
using the written word in his judicial opinions and the two books he has written on the topic, as 
well as the speeches he has given.  Prior to joining the Supreme Court in 1986, Scalia had been 
on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals since 1982.  During the four year period on this court, he 
wrote thirty-one opinions that mention the phrase “legislative history.”
291
 Since his appointment 
to the Supreme Court, 778  opinions have been issued that mention the term “legislative history” 
in the opinion; 660  opinions mention the terms “text” within five words of “statute (“text /5 
statute”), and Scalia has written sixty-one of the majority opinions and seventy-six dissents that 
mention the phrase “legislative history” in these opinions.
292
  (There are other variations of the 
wording that statutory interpretation or legislative history could be used, but for the limited 
purpose of analysis, the search query should suffice).  The decline in the use of statutory 
interpretation may be attributable to three factors:  the declining number of cases the Court is 
hearing over time; the nature of the cases before the Court may not require the interpretation of a 
particular statute; or, Scalia has had an impact on the members of the Court to rely less upon 
legislative history in the analysis in their opinions. 
     Scalia’s earliest and most productive efforts at changing the paradigm of statutory 
interpretation were his judicial opinions.  Scalia was first appointed to D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals, a traditional avenue for subsequent Supreme Court nominations, by President Reagan.  
Right from the beginning Scalia expressed a hesitancy to utilize legislative history, and the tenor 
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of his opinions and his opposition to legislative history quickly became a clear, consistent, and 
recognizable critique.  In one of his first opinions, United States v. Donelson (1982), though he 
reluctantly utilizes legislative history, he adds in a footnote:   
In interpreting the statute we would not be justified, of course, in making the legislative 
history correct at the expense of making the plain language of the law itself inaccurate.
293
 
Nonetheless, in the early years, he does utilize legislative history quite frequently.  In American 
Federation of Government Employees v. FLRA (1983), for example, he writes:   
The text and legislative history of the Act are sufficiently clear to overcome the deference 
we would normally accord an agency's interpretation of its organic statute.
294
 
     It is not until 1985 that a more pronounced antagonistic view of legislative history becomes 
evident in the case of FAIC Securities v. United States (1985):  
We decline the parties' invitation to depart from the plain language of these provisions by 
relying upon their legislative history to "clarify" their meaning. It seems sometimes to be 
assumed that abandonment of the "plain language rule," and increased reliance 
upon legislative history, should be as natural and desirable a modern development -- 
casting off the formalisms of earlier days -- as is the willingness of today's courts to 
inquire into the parties' pre-signing understanding of a contract they have concluded, 
despite the formerly rigid constraints of the parol evidence rule. But there is an enormous 
difference between the two.  Legislative history is a second-best indication, not merely 
because it is (like the oral statements preceding a written contract) a less formal and 
authoritative expression of what the party intended; but because it is in addition, in most 
of its manifestations, not even an expression of the relevant party at all.  In the case of 
legislation that party consists not of the witnesses testifying on the bill, or the speakers 
debating it, or even the committees and floor leaders reporting and presenting it; but of all 
the voting members of both Houses of Congress and (unless the bill has been passed over 
a veto) the President.  The best legislative history regarding the intent of one or another 
of the legislative participants is at most a clue as to what the legislating "party" had in 
mind; the statute itself is the party's only sure expression.  Only where that expression is 
genuinely ambiguous is the clue likely to shed more light than the text.  Nothing in the 
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tortuous legislative history the parties have brought to our attention could possibly 
overcome the plain language here.
295
 
And in the case of Hirschey v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (1985), he again 
addresses his dissatisfaction with legislative history: 
And I think it time for courts to become concerned about the fact that routine deference to 
the detail of committee reports, and the predictable expansion in that detail which routine 
deference has produced, are converting a system of judicial construction into a system of 
committee-staff prescription.  But the authority of the committee report in the present 
case is even more suspect than usual.  Where a committee-generated report deals with the 
meaning of a committee-generated text, one can at least surmise that someone selected 
these statutory words to convey this intended meaning.  The portion of the report at issue 
here, however, comments upon language drafted in an earlier Congress, and reenacted, 
unamended so far as is relevant to the present point, in the 1985 law.  We are supposed to 
believe that the legislative action recommended by the Committee and adopted by the 
Congress, in order to resolve a difficult question of interpretation that had produced a 
conflict in the circuits and internal disagreement within three of the five courts that had 
considered it, was reenactment of the same language unchanged!  Such a supposition is 
absurd on its face; and doubly absurd since the precise section was amended in 1985 on 
such a point of minute detail as changing an "and" to "or.”
296
 
Still, Scalia continues to use legislative history through the remainder of his time on the D.C. 
Circuit Court, noting in Rainbow Navigation v. Department of Navy (1986), one of his last 
opinions on the lower court: 
This is also clear from the legislative history, which happens to be unusually reliable in 
the present case, since the language at issue was actually crafted on the floor of the 




In another case, he clarifies his position on legislative history a bit: 
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Legislative history is used to clarify the meaning of a text, not to create extra-statutory 
law. If it can ever be the basis for plainly departing from the text, it assuredly cannot be 
so when an interpretation that honors both the text and the history is available.
298
  
But Scalia does have his limitations as to how far he will go with legislative history.  Writing in 
Consumers Union of U.S. v. FTC (1986): 
That limitation has absolutely no foundation in the text of the statute, and we decline to 
limit the plain meaning of the text by resort to bits of legislative history that describe 
some, but not necessarily all, of the purposes that the provision serves.
299
 
     During his term on the Court of Appeals, Scalia utilized legislative history in both his 
opinions and dissents, and his main critique against its use is based on the inadequacy or 
deficiencies of the legislative history proffered by the parties, but not legislative history per se.  
During his nomination hearings to the Supreme Court, Scalia, for perhaps obvious reasons, was 
less rigid in his responses to the Senate Committee’s questions regarding his views on the use of 
legislative history.  Scalia’s exchange with Senator Chuck Grassley demonstrates the early stage 
of Scalia’s use of legislative history: 
Senator GRASSLY.   In a case decided last year, Hirschey v. FERC, involving the Equal 
Access to Justice Act, you took the occasion to comment on what role legislative history 
and committee reports play in judicial interpretation.  And I hope it is fair for me to 
conclude that you showed a great deal of hostility toward committee reports in that 
writing.  You wrote in a concurring opinion, and I quote, "I think it's time for courts to 
become concerned about the fact that routine deference to the detail of committee reports 
and the predictable expansion in detail with routine deference has produced have 
converted a system of judicial construction into a system of committee staff prescription.' 
Now, that is pretty doggone strong language.  Let me first ask how important is 
legislative history to you?  
Judge SCALIA. I think it is a significant factor in interpreting a statute.  I have used it in 
my opinions.  
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Senator GRASSLEY.  Well, let me ask you how come you do not repeat the usual answer 
that we get that, you do refer to it, if the language of the statute itself is not clear to the 
judges interpreting?  
Judge SCALIA. Well, I guess I did not repeat that because I -- 
Senator GRASSLEY.  It is so obvious?  
Judge SCALIA.  It is so obvious and -- 
Senator GRASSLEY.  But you accept --  
Judge SCALIA.  One, it is so obvious and, two, because we do not normally have a 
lawsuit in front of us if the language of the statute is clear. Almost invariably, the 
language of the statute is argued to mean one thing by one side and another thing by 
another side. And where that is the case, legislative history -- 
Senator GRASSLEY.  Are you going to be then turning to the legislative history that 
frequently, as you say that the statute is hardly ever clear?  
Judge SCALIA.  I will use what seems to me reliable legislative history when it is 
available to be used.  The trouble with legislative history, Senator, is figuring out what is 
reliable and what is not reliable.  That is the trouble with it.  
Senator GRASSLEY.  Well, I want to tell you as one who has served in Congress for 12 
years, legislative history is very important to those of us here who want further detailed 
expression of that legislative intent.  All right.  You are not suggesting that for committee 
reports to have any meaning, that they must be actually written rather than merely 
approved by Members of Congress?  Are you suggesting that? 
Judge SCALIA.  I do not want to pin myself down to a commitment to use any particular 
type of legislative history or not to use any particular type of legislative history.  I am just 
saying I will not exclude it as a basis for my decisions as I have not in the past.  And that 
it depends on what the significant legislative history is and how genuine a representation 
of the congressional intent it seems to be.
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     In some respects, Scalia’s response to Senator Grassley’s line of inquiry expresses a good 
analysis of Scalia’s views on statutory history.  He will use it in limited circumstances, but to the 
extent that he will rely upon committee reports, or other documents, it becomes more 
questionable the farther the materials move down the chain of the legislative process.   
     His views would change with his opinions after being appointed to the Supreme Court in 
1986.  The Justice Scalia of 2015 is much more doctrinaire than the one who joined the Court 
nearly three decades earlier.  In the early years, he uses legislative history and his critique is 
much more muted.  It would seem that over time Scalia became more comfortable with his views 
on legislative history, but also, having established himself as the expert in the area with his 
publications, it could argued that he has become much more assertive, particularly in lecturing 
colleagues on their shortcoming in the use of legislative history and statutory interpretation in 
general.  Even his two major books on the topic are extremely different; the first published in 
1997 is more like a law review publication, including comments (essays) from Laurence Tribe 
and Ronald Dworkin critiquing Scalia’s analysis, but by 2012 he had co-written a treatise on the 
topic, Reading Law, a canon of usage, brooking no such dissent.   
     Scalia may not have chosen this particular topic to be a judicial entrepreneur, but it is an issue 
that irked him to no end, and his convictions clearly developed over time.  Like all entrepreneurs, 
he found a topic that he could champion.  It was not abortion or affirmative action, which tend to 
have many voices competing for attention, but through statutory interpretation, like Frankfurter’s 
embrace of judicial restraint, Scalia had embraced an idea of judicial decision making aimed at 
his colleagues and not the outside world. 
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     Statutory interpretation is not glamorous.  It is not discussed by the news media, nor do 
citizens protest outside the Supreme Court over it, but it is fundamental to judicial decision 
making.  In addition to advocating on legal issues, where there are many prominent voices 
lending their views, Scalia also chose to advocate for a rather unglamorous legal topic, statutory 
interpretation, where there are very few passionate voices, but an area of the law in which the 
legal community would have to take notice, and one in which, as a Supreme Court justice, could 
have tremendous influence through his opinions.  As well, statutory interpretation was a natural 
fit for Scalia; whether one agrees with his views or not, as a self-proclaimed originalist, even a 
faint-hearted one, Scalia established his bona fides early as a stickler for rules of interpretation, 
and has only become stronger over time.  The rules and methods of statutory interpretation fit 
within the subject matter of constitutional interpretation.  It is probably safe to say, that statutory 
interpretation is probably not the first thing that comes to mind when one thinks of Scalia, but 
even though the subject matter is not glamorous, it is the area of the law where he has been a 
judicial entrepreneur. 
     In 1988 he was still indifferent to legislative history, noting in one case, “If it is at all relevant, 
the legislative history tends to subvert rather than support petitioner's thesis.”
301
  But he 
continued to analyze the legislative history in the case without simply dismissing it out of hand.  
By 1993, though, Scalia relied on legislative history for some of his own opinions, he sharpened 
his pen in the case of Conroy v. Aniskoff (1993): 
The Court begins its analysis with the observation: "The statutory command in § 525 is 
unambiguous, unequivocal, and unlimited." In my view, discussion of that point is where 
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the remainder of the analysis should have ended. Instead, however, the Court feels 
compelled to demonstrate that its holding is consonant with legislative history, including 
some dating back to 1917 -- a full quarter century before the provision at issue was 
enacted.  That is not merely a waste of research time and ink; it is a false and disruptive 
lesson in the law.  It says to the bar that even an "unambiguous [and] unequivocal" statute 
can never be dispositive; that, presumably under penalty of malpractice liability, the 
oracles of legislative history, far into the distant past, must always be consulted. This 
undermines the clarity of law, and condemns litigants (who, unlike us, must pay for it out 
of their own pockets) to subsidizing historical research by lawyers. 
 
The greatest defect of legislative history is its illegitimacy.  We are governed by laws, not 
by the intentions of legislators.  As the Court said in 1844: "The law as it passed is the 
will of the majority of both houses, and the only mode in which that will is spoken is in 
the act itself . . . ." (emphasis added).  But not the least of the defects of legislative history 
is its indeterminacy. If one were to search for an interpretive technique that, on the whole, 
was more likely to confuse than to clarify, one could hardly find a more promising 
candidate than legislative history.  And the present case nicely proves that point. 
 
Judge Harold Leventhal used to describe the use of legislative history as the equivalent of 
entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the guests for one's 
friends. If I may pursue that metaphor:  The legislative history of § 205 of the Soldiers' 
and Sailors' Civil Relief Act contains a variety of diverse personages, a selected few of 
whom -- its "friends" -- the Court has introduced to us in support of its result.  But there 
are many other faces in the crowd, most of which, I think, are set against today's result.
302
 
     By 1993, when the Conroy opinion was written, Scalia had established his textualist views of 
statutory interpretation, and the number of examples of his critiques of its use could go on for 
pages indicating two things:  As a judicial entrepreneur, he remains persistent in his goals to 
change the existing jurisprudential paradigm, and the very fact that the fight continues, indicates 
that an opposing viewpoint remains.  
     Scalia has been successful in persuading the Court to rely less on legislative history and to 
rein in liberal interpretation of statutes, and his success has been recognized.  But judicial 
decision making is not rigid, and statutory interpretation is malleable, which is probably best 
exemplified by the recent Supreme Court’s decision in King v. Burwell, which addresses the 
                                                          
302
 Conroy v. Aniskoff. 1993. 507 U.S. 511, 518-519. 
153 
 
statutory language of the Affordable Care Act.
303
  The six to three decision, with Chief Justice 
Roberts writing the majority opinion for the Court; and justice Scalia writing the dissent may not 
be the perfect example expressing the major schools of statutory interpretation, but it does reflect 
the inherent tensions as to the role of statutory interpretation that continues to this day, and that 
clarity does remain too often in the eye of the judicial beholder, the judge.   
     King v. Burwell addresses primarily the statutory language of a specific provision of the 
Affordable Care Act, “an Exchange established by the State under 42 U.S.C §18031,”
304
and 
whether such exchanges also fall under the federal exchange guidelines for tax purposes.  The 
case presents the statutory interpretation question as to whether the provision should be read 
separately, on its own, or as part and parcel of the entire statute, reflecting its larger purpose.  
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts sets forth the issue in the case and how the Court 
utilizes statutory interpretation in this particular matter: 
When analyzing an agency’s interpretation of a statute, we often apply the two-step 
framework announced in Chevron.  Under that framework, we ask whether the statute is 
ambiguous and, if so, whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.  This approach 
“is premised on the theory that a statute’s ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation 
from Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps.  “In extraordinary cases, 
however, there may be reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended 
such an implicit delegation.” 
This is one of those cases. The tax credits are among the Act’s key reforms, involving 
billions of dollars in spending each year and affecting the price of health insurance for 
millions of people.  Whether those credits are available on Federal Exchanges is thus a 
question of deep “economic and political significance” that is central to this 
statutory scheme; had Congress wished to assign that question to an agency, it surely 
would have done so expressly.  It is especially unlikely that Congress would have 
delegated this decision to the IRS, which has no expertise in crafting health insurance 
policy of this sort.  This is not a case for the IRS. 
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It is instead our task to determine the correct reading of Section 36B.  If the statutory 
language is plain, we must enforce it according to its terms.  But oftentimes the 
“meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become evident when 
placed in context.”  So when deciding whether the language is plain, we must read the 
words “in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.”  





     The majority’s opinion is anathema to Scalia’s rules of statutory interpretation, but the 
majority opinion may not be the best textual analysis of a statute, but rather a pragmatic response 
to an explosive political issue, in which the Court was expected to resolve, what the legislature 
could not.  Scalia’s dissent, although charming for its unique barbs, which perhaps received more 
attention than the substantive or procedural issues addressed in the case, may be a measure of his 
frustration (the more barbs, the more upset the justice might be) with Roberts and Kennedy.  
Scalia’s reference to the majority’s “interpretative jiggery-pokery”
306
 is entertaining, but also 





  The Chevron test is a two-step process in which the Court first asks 
whether a statute is ambiguous, and if so, whether the agency’s interpretation of the ambiguous 
statute is reasonable.  The two-step process “is premised on the theory that a statute’s ambiguity 
constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps.”
309
  
Scalia does not even mention Chevron, but perhaps the greatest irony of Scalia’s dissent, which 
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undermines some his arguments, is his reference to Federalist No. 78.
310
  Referencing the 
Federalist Papers is always suspect because they have no legal weight, but for a judge, who 
dislikes the use of legislative history, to resort to the Federalist Papers raises more fundamental 
questions and contradictions. 
     In addition to his opinions, Scalia has written three books, of which two were co-authored and 
one is essentially an anthology of essays.  His first book, A Matter of Interpretation, published in 
1997 and based on a lecture, sets forth his arguments on statutory interpretation in forty-five 
pages and really resembles a law review article; the remainder of the book consists of 
commentary and responses by legal scholars and academics on the merits of his arguments.  But 
by 1997, his impact on the Supreme Court’s use of legislative history had been well under way.  
His second book, Making Your Case
311
, co-authored with Bryan Garner and published in 2008, is 
a treatise on how to present one’s legal case before the Court, and lists Scalia’s criticisms of 
advocates making their arguments before the Court, although he does recognize a role for 
legislative history.  His most recent book, the subject of much heated debate between Scalia and 
Posner, is Reading Law:  The Interpretation of Legal Texts, which appeared in 2012 and was also 
co-authored with Garner.   
     In A Matter of Interpretation, Scalia writes: “Statutory interpretation is such a broad subject 
that the substance of it cannot be discussed comprehensively here.  It is worth examining a few 
aspects, however, if only to demonstrate the great confusion that prevails.”
312
  This is a 
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surprising concession.  If not in a book on statutory interpretation, then where does one 
comprehensively address the issue of statutory interpretation?  Scalia has always claimed to be a 
“faint-hearted originalist,” and he takes the topic seriously, but not so seriously as to hamper his 
entrepreneurial efforts.  In the book, Scalia recognizes the challenge of statutory interpretation: 
In reality,  . . .  if one accepts the principle that the object of judicial interpretation is to 
determine the intent of the legislature, being bound by genuine but unexpressed 
legislative intent rather than the law is only the theoretical threat.  The practical threat is 
that, under the guise of or even the self-delusion of pursuing unexpressed legislative 
intents, common-law judges will in fact pursue their own objectives and desires, 
extending their lawmaking proclivities from the common law to the statutory field.  
When you are told to decide, not on the basis of what the legislature said, but on what the 
legislature meant is to ask yourself what a wise and intelligent person should have meant; 
and that will surely bring you to the conclusion that the law means what you think it 
ought to mean – which is precisely how judges decide things under the common law.
313
 
     Scalia’s first book is much more general and was well received, which obviously reflects the 
nature of an essay based on a speech and the less rigid tone of a polemic.  The book also 
included chapters from Ronald Dworkin and Laurence Tribe, and was written earlier in Scalia’s 
career, which may explain its warm reception.  But it is his second book on statutory 
interpretation, Reading Law,
314
 which is much more pedantic, rigid, and doctrinaire.  In his 
critical book on Scalia, Scalia:  The Court of One, Bruce Allen Murphy addresses the importance 
of the book: 
This was the first book of legal commentary by a sitting Supreme Court justice since 
Joseph Story’s seminal two-volume Commentaries on the Constitution of the United 
States, published in 1833.  With this book, Scalia had put himself in the same category of 
legal theorists on the bench as two of the titans from the early nineteenth century, Story 
and the legendary Chief Justice John Marshall, as well as the great legal philosophers of 
the twentieth century, Oliver Wendell Holmes and Benjamin Cardozo.  In offering a 
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comprehensive theoretical contribution to the legal field, the book demonstrated Scalia’s 
brilliance as a scholar and summed up everything he had learned in his long career.  
Coming when it did, this volume represented the product of the alter ego of his 




     Murphy’s perspective is debatable, but what is clear is that the book does represent a supreme 
act of judicial entrepreneurship, equaled by few.  Critics and allies alike recognize the influence 
that Scalia has had on statutory interpretation.  The irony is that Scalia is answering the 
complaint that Posner had written in his 1983 article on the lack of literature addressing statutes.  
The book, which opens with a Foreword by then Chief Judge Frank Easterbrook, of the United 
States 7
th
 Circuit Court of Appeals, another textualist and a colleague of Posner, sets forth 
seventy canons of interpretation of legal instruments.  Scalia addresses what he sees as the root 
of “The Prevailing Confusion”: 
Is it an exaggeration to say that the field of interpretation is rife with confusion?  No.  
Although the problem of tendentiously variable readings is age-old, the cause is not:  the 
desire for freedom from the text, which enables judges to do what they want.
316
 
      Scalia was not the first to publish canons of construction; there had been a long history of 
such analysis, led most prominently by Karl Llewellyn’s “Remarks on the Theory of Appellate 
Decision and the Rules or Canons about How Statutes Are to be Construed,” in which he writes, 
“One does not progress far into legal life without learning that there is no single right or accurate 
way of reading one case, or of reading a bunch of cases.”
317
  But Reading Law is not simply a 
treatise on canons, but almost a manifesto against what Scalia finds wrong with judicial decision 
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making.  Although not the subject of this dissertation, Scalia’s formatting of the rules as canons 
give the impression that they’re part of a legal catechism that lawyers are expected to follow.   
     As in Making Your Case, Scalia is setting forth the principles on which he believes law 
should be practiced, not academically debating the merits of the respective approaches to 
statutory interpretation.  The first canon, under the heading “Fundamental Principles,” is the 
“Interpretation Principle,” which declares, “Every application of a text to particular 
circumstances entails interpretation.” If this seems obvious and uncontroversial, the same cannot 
be said for the second canon, “Supremacy-of-Text Principle”: “The words of a governing text are 
of paramount concern, and what they convey, in their context, is what the text means.”  With 
this, Scalia firmly establishes the textualist approach of the book.  He sets forth in his section, 
“Thirteen Falsities Exposed,” his critique of the positivist approach to statutory interpretation, 
which includes canon 58: “The false notion that the spirit of a statute should prevail over its 
letter;”
318
  Canon 59, “The False notion that the quest in statutory interpretation is to do 
justice;”
319
  Canon 60, “The False notion that when a situation is not quite covered by a statute, 
the court should reconstruct what the legislature would have done had it confronted the issue;”
320
  
Canon 66, “The false notion that committee reports and floor speeches are worthwhile aids in 
statutory construction.”
321
  As might be expected, Canon 66 generates one of the longest 
discussions, with twenty-two pages of explanation and commentary critiquing the use of 
statutory interpretation.  This is followed by Canon 67, “The False notion that the purpose of 
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interpretation is to discover intent.”
322
  The first set of falsities listed is directed at the positivists, 
but Scalia shamelessly adds a few falsities to support his own textualism, which in some 
respects, contradict the very arguments he makes.  Canon 68, “The false notion that the plain 
language of a statute is the “best evidence” of legislative intent.”
323
  Canon 69, “The false notion 
that lawyers and judges, not being historians, are unqualified to do the historical research that 
originalism requires.”
324
  And Canon 70, “The false notion that the Living Constitution is an 
exception to the rule that legal texts must be given the meaning they bore when adopted.”
325
   
     In some respects, as a judicial entrepreneur, Reading Law is an attempt to establish textualist 
plain language as the primary rule of statutory interpretation, but at the same time it is a 
manifesto or jeremiad against proponents of a positivist approach to statutory interpretation.  
Having established textualism and diminished the use of legislative history in Supreme Court 
opinions years ago, it would seem that such a book may not have been necessary and may turn 
out to be counterproductive to his efforts in the long run.  Unfortunately, even though a 
successful judicial entrepreneur in this area, Scalia may not know when to stop, and opened 
himself up to scathing criticism for the book, particularly by Posner. 
     Yet, as a judicial entrepreneur, Scalia has been successful in getting his ideas of statutory 
interpretation incorporated into judicial decision making and changing the existing paradigm, 
particularly on the Supreme Court.  In 1999 Michael Koby assessed Scalia’s impact in his article, 
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“The Supreme Court’s Declining Reliance on Legislative History:  The Impact of Justice 
Scalia’s Critique.”
326
  In his research, relying on prior studies, Koby demonstrates that there had 
been an increase in the use of legislative history in opinions from 1938 to 1979, and that Scalia’s 
appointment to the Court represented a watershed for traditional legislative history: 
Scalia has demonstrated himself to be the most consistent and acerbic critic of legislative 
history.  He complains that when judges deviate from a steadfast approach to the "plain 
meaning" rule they ascribe extra-textual meanings to legislation and thereby dilute the 
efficacy of laws.  Scalia's attack on the Court's excessive reliance on legislative history 
has been so successful that William Eskridge has referred to the establishment of a "new 
textualism" that the Court has at least partially adopted.
327
 
Koby further demonstrates the decline in the use of statutory interpretation on the Supreme Court 
in the following table.  (Table #1 Legislative History Citations By Year, See page 161). 
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TABLE I: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY CITATIONS BY YEAR
328
 
Year Legislative Total Cases 
 History Cases Interpreting 
 Citations Heard Statutes 
1980 479 156 89 
1981 499 154 80 
1982 444 184 77 
1983 776 183 75 
1984 784 184 65 
1985 796 175 88 
1986 415 172 72 
1987 380 175 79 
1988 402 167 79 
1989 411 170 83 
1990 253 146 70 
1991 266 125 55 
1992 152 127 54 
1993 178 116 67 
1994 169 99 52 
1995 110 94 51 
1996 217 90 50 
1997 103 90 59 
1998 79 94 49 
The author concedes that there may be a number of reasons for the decline in the use of 
legislative history, such as a shrinking docket, but even taking other possibilities into 
consideration, but the decline is attributable to Scalia.   
When all factors are taken into consideration, the figures in Table I indicate that Scalia 
and the critique he represents have had a significant impact on the Court's use of 
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legislative history. Scalia's criticism has not only blunted the growth of use of legislative 
history, but has led to its substantial decline.
329
 
Koby further recognizes the direct influence on individual justices, particularly Chief Justice 
Rehnquist: 
Justice Rehnquist presents a good example of this influence. From 1980 to 1986, 
Rehnquist wrote an average of 35.6 opinions per year, and cited legislative history in an 
average of 15.4 opinions per year. In the period following Scalia's appointment, from 
1987 to 1998, he authored an average of 19.6 opinions per year and cited legislative 
history in only 4.8 opinions per year. Justice Stevens also followed this declining pattern. 
From 1980 to 1986, Stevens authored an average of 57.7 opinions per term and cited 
legislative history in an average of 29 opinions per year. From 1987 to 1998, he authored 





Their conclusions are important, but limited due to the time covered: 
In their 1938 to 1979 study, Carro and Brann were able to "detect a firm evolution that 
[went] from the almost absolute rejection of the use of legislative history in statutory 
interpretation to an almost absolute acceptance." From 1980 to the present, however, 
there has emerged a clear and unmistakable pattern of decline in the use of legislative 
history by the Supreme Court.  While the pattern is most acute in the decisions of more 
conservative justices, moderate and liberal justices are also citing to legislative history 
less often.  Clearly, the critique of Justice Scalia has made a large contribution to this 
trend.  While it is premature to conclude that legislative history will cease to be a tool of 
statutory interpretation, Justice Scalia's criticism has, at a minimum, caused his fellow 
justices to give pause before they rely on, and cite to, legislative history.
331
 
     Unfortunately, their analysis ends in 1998.  Analyzing the data since the 1998 term, using 
slightly different research parameters, the following chart demonstrates a continued decline in 
the use of legislative history.  (Table #2: Legislative History Citations By Year, See page 163). 
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TABLE II:  LEGISLATIVE HISTORY CITATIONS BY YEAR332 
 
    
Term Total Cases Heard Cases Interpreting Statutes 
Legislative History 
Cited 
    1999 83 38 28 
    2000 86 33 22 
    2001 88 36 24 
    2002 84 34 16 
    2003 91 32 21 
    2004 87 39 23 
    2005 90 35 19 
    2006 78 36 15 
    2007 75 41 18 
    2008 87 41 21 
    2009 82 38 24 
    2010 86 42 19 
    2011 79 31 16 
    2012 77 29 10 
    2013 79 34 13 
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     Other scholars have come to agree with Kolby’s assessment.  David Law and David Zaring’s 
research published in their article, “Law Versus Ideology:  The Supreme Court and the use of 
Legislative History,”
333
 published in 2010, demonstrates that the justices’ use of legislative 
history has declined in Supreme Court opinions, but also that those justices, including Scalia, 
who claim a textualist approach to statutory interpretation, do utilize legislative history, but to a 
less significant extent than the liberal justices.  Using a sampling of opinions from 1953 to 
2006
334
 in their research, they found that of 151 opinions that Scalia wrote that addressed 
statutory interpretation, he used legislative history in twenty-eight opinions, or 18.5% of the 
time; and he utilized legislative history in the analysis only in thirteen opinions, or 8.6% of the 
total opinions criticizing the use of legislative history.
335
  They noticed some surprising results: 
It is much easier to discern a pattern among the Justices in terms of their propensity to 
cite legislative history.  Overall, the Justices cited legislative history in just under half, or 
47.9%, of their statutory interpretation opinions.  As expected, more liberal Justices were, 
on the whole, more frequent users of legislative history than conservative ones.  [S]ome 
criticism of the practice . . . turns out, on the whole, to be very rare.  Only 1.1% of all the 
opinions in our data contained any language that could be deemed critical of legislative 
history usage, either in general or in the context of a specific case.  It thus appears that 
such criticism is no more common on the Supreme Court than on the federal courts of 
appeals.  The majority of the Justices in our data-eighteen out of thirty-one, to be precise-
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As the chart below indicates from their research, Scalia has been the most critical of the use of 
legislative history, but has used it as well in some of his opinions.  Scalia’s entrepreneurial 
activities have had an impact on the Court’s decline in the use of legislative history.   
Graph #3:  Use of Legislative History By Supreme Court Justices. 
337
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     Though Scalia has been successful in raising colleagues’ awareness about the problems 
inherent in using legislative history and though there has been a general decline in the use of that 
history, the justices continue to remain divided.  A particularly fascinating case that highlights 
the division on the Court is Samantar v. Yousuf
338
 decided in 2010, in which a unanimous Court 
held that under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, officials from foreign governments are 
not immune from legal action and can be sued.  All nine justices agreed with the decision, but the 
conservative members took issue with the use of legislative history by the majority, and for 
reasons that are not clear, issued their own brief exceptions to the use of legislative history.  
Justice Samuel Alito concurred with the decision with a brief one sentence opinion:  “I join the 
opinion of the Court, although I think that the citations to legislative history are of little if any 
value here.”
339
  Justice Clarence Thomas concurred with a brief statement, too:  “I join the 
Court's opinion except for those parts relying on the legislative history of the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act of 1976…  In my view, the Court's textual analysis is sufficient to resolve this 
case.”
340
  But it is Scalia who not only spends several pages discounting the Court’s use of 
legislative history in the particular case as unnecessary, but underlines the continuing division on 
the Court of the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation when he writes: 
The Court's introduction of legislative history serves no purpose except needlessly to 
inject into the opinion a mode of analysis that not all of the Justices consider valid.  And 
it does so, to boot, in a fashion that does not isolate the superfluous legislative history in a 
section that those of us who disagree categorically with its use, or at least disagree with 
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its superfluous use, can decline to join.  I therefore do not join the opinion, and concur 
only in the result.
341
   
     Scalia’s opinion recognizes the division in the Court, but also concedes, under certain 
circumstance, that legislative history is an acceptable tool for statutory interpretation for Scalia, 
supporting Law and Zaring’s research that even the textualists on the Court will utilize 
legislative history in their opinions when necessary, but to a significantly lesser degree than the 
liberal members of the Court. 
Justice Scalia, who has been outspoken in his views about the illegitimacy of certain 
interpretative tools, namely, legislative history, purpose, and intent, has influenced the 
other conservative Justices to adopt his interpretive approach. But if so, his influence has 
been incomplete - he has not, for example, convinced Justices Kennedy or Alito to avoid 
referencing statutory purpose or legislative intent.
342
 
     Scalia third book, on advocacy, Making Your Case, also addresses statutory interpretation, but 
from the viewpoint of the practitioner before the court, and offers an interesting perspective on 
Scalia’s pragmatic understanding of statutory interpretation.  Rule 25 is titled, “Be prepared to 
defend your interpretation by resort to legislative history.”  Scalia writes: 
One of your authors has described legislative history as the last surviving fiction in 
American law.  The notion that the members of a house or Congress were even aware of, 
much less voted in reliance on, the assorted floor statements and staff-prepared 
committee reports that are the staple off legislative-history analysis is – not to put too fine 
a point on it – absurd.  Here again, however, we’re advising not judges but the lawyers 
who appear before them.  Since most judges use legislative history, unless you know 
what the judge or panel before which you are appearing does not do so, you must use 
legislative history as well.  That is so, alas, even when the text of the statute seems 
entirely clear.  You cannot rely on judicial statements that legislative history should never 
be consulted when the text is clear – not even when those statements come from opinions 
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Scalia’s statement in the last sentence that “clarity too often turns out to be in the eye of the 
judicial beholder” raises the rhetorical questions:  Is Scalia also guilty of using, or not using, 
legislative history to his advantage?  Or, more accurately, is it even possible not to avoid the 
inherent bias in the judicial decision making process that is statutory interpretation?  This point, 
raised by his critics, remains unsettled. 
D. The Critics:  Posner and Breyer 
The traditional approach to statutory interpretation does continue, and Scalia is not without 
his critics.  It would be remiss not to note that even though both are considered conservatives, 
Posner and Scalia have had a long running feud and disagree on a variety of legal issues, one of 
which is statutory interpretation.  Posner in his most recent book, Reflections on Judging, attacks 
Scalia and Garner’s Reading Law and Scalia’s brand of judicial decision making, in particular.  
As Posner notes: 
Justice Scalia is one of the most politically conservative Supreme Court Justices of the 
modern era...  Yet he claims that his judicial votes are generated by an objective interpretive 
methodology (the only objective methodology, he claims) and that because it is objective, 
ideology, including his own fervent ideology, plays no role.  Obviously, statutory text itself is 
not inherently liberal or conservative.  But textualism is conservative.  A legislature is 
thwarted when a judge refuses to apply its handiwork to an unforeseen situation that is 
encompassed by the statute’s aim but does not make a smooth fit with its text.  Ignoring the 
limitations of foresight, and also that a statute is a collective product that may leave many 
questions of interpretation to be answered by the courts because the enacting legislators 
didn’t agree on the answers, the textual originalist demands that the legislature think through 
myriad hypothetical scenarios and provide for all of them explicitly rather than rely on courts 
to be sensible.  Textualism originalism is “gotcha” jurisprudence. 
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     On the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia’s strongest critic, and a judicial entrepreneur for a more 
active use of legislative history and other ancillary documents is Justice Steven Breyer.  Breyer 
has argued against the rigidity of Scalia’s textualist approach.  In his book, Active Liberty:  
Interpreting our Democratic Constitution, Breyer presents his arguments against textualism: 
It contrasts a literal text-based approach with an approach that places more emphasis on 
statutory purpose and congressional intent.  It illustrates why judges should pay primary 
attention to a statute’s purpose in difficult cases of interpretation in which language is not 
clear.  It shows how overemphasis on text can lead courts astray, divorcing law from life 
– indeed, creating law that harms those whom Congress meant to help.  And it explains 
why a purposive approach is more consistent with the framework for a “delegated 
democracy” that the Constitution creates.
344
 
     Breyer’s “purposive approach” is in stark contrast with Scalia’s textualist approach, and may 
be said to represent the competing view of statutory interpretation on the Supreme Court. 
Some judges, lawyers, and law teachers believe that judges, when answering this kind of 
question, should strongly emphasize . . .  text, history, tradition, and precedent.  
Following this text-oriented approach, they try not to use purpose, consequences, or the 
legislative debates that compose the history of the statute’s enactment in Congress.  In 
my view, however, a primarily text-oriented system cannot work very well.
345
 
But even Breyer came to recognize Scalia’s influence, quite early, when he said in a lecture in 
1991:  
These and other criticisms are taking their toll.  Judge Wald has pointed out that the 
Supreme Court relied on legislative history in almost every statutory case it decided in 
1981.  And although Justice White has recently commented that "the Court's practice of 
utilizing legislative history reaches well into its past, [and we] suspect that the practice 
will likewise reach well into the future, the Supreme Court's actual use of legislative 
history is in decline.  By 1989, the Court decided a significant number of statutory cases 
(ten out of about sixty-five) without any reference to legislative history at all;  and, in the 
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1990 Term, the Court decided nineteen out of about fifty-five such statutory cases 
without its use.  Referring to legislative history to resolve even difficult cases may soon 
be the exception rather than the rule.
346
 
Although I recognize the possible "rearguard" nature of my task, I should like to defend 
the classical practice and convince you that those who attack it ought to claim victory 
once they have made judges more sensitive to problems of the abuse of legislative 
history; they ought not to condemn its use altogether.  They should confine their attack to 
the outskirts and leave the citadel at peace.
347
 
     There are numerous critics of Scalia, on both the left and the right of the jurisprudential scale, 
but regardless of any analytical, legal, or intellectual disagreement, Scalia has been successful in 
achieving his goals, not all of them, but in terms of statutory interpretation, he is the rock against 
which they must crash for the time being.   
E. Frankfurter:  An Unsuccessful Judicial Entrepreneur 
 
“If all this sounds to you professorial, please remember that I am a professor 
unashamed.”
348
 Associate Justice, Felix Frankfurter 
“All Felix does is talk, talk, talk.  He drives you crazy!”
349
  Chief Justice, Earl Warren 
     In contrast to the success of Posner and Scalia as judicial entrepreneurs, it is necessary to 
contrast a less than successful judicial entrepreneur, Supreme Court justice Felix Frankfurter.  
There are few justices appointed to the Supreme Court for whom expectations were so high and 
disappointment so widely felt.  Frankfurter’s stellar academic record, professional credentials, 
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knowledge of the Supreme Court, and deep relationships with some of the leading jurists of the 
early 20
th
 century, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Benjamin Cardozo, Louis Brandeis, and Learned 
Hand, to name a few, were thought to have prepared him to become one of the most important 
and influential justices in Supreme Court history.  Moreover, as an advisor to President 
Roosevelt and a longstanding political activist, Frankfurter brought a level of practical 
experience to the Court that has rarely been equaled.  Also, Frankfurter had a well-developed 
judicial philosophy that he held with evangelical fervor.  Smart, experienced, ambitious, 
Frankfurter would seem to have the qualities required to be a successful judicial entrepreneur.  
Yet in this his tenure proved an unambiguous failure.   
     The dramatic inconsistency between the high expectations set for Frankfurter, and his 
disappointing tenure, raises three fundamental questions about Frankfurter’s role as a judicial 
entrepreneur on the Court:  Was he an unsuccessful judicial entrepreneur because of his 
personality and inability to successfully garner the support of other justices to join him to adopt 
his interpretation of judicial restraint?  Was the judicial decision making principle of judicial 
restraint, for which he is best known, difficult to market once the New Deal controversy 
concerning the Court was safely past?  Was it that he faced a collection of strong minded men, 
who were hard to shape?  How much of his failure, in other words, may be attributed to him and 
how much to the context within which he found himself? 
     In the working model of a judicial entrepreneur created in the dissertation, there are two 
elements that are necessary for a judicial entrepreneur:  characteristics and strategies.  
Frankfurter meets the criteria of having the characteristics of a judicial entrepreneur in his 
persistent advocacy of a specific legal idea, judicial restraint, and he assumes the risks, and rests 
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his professional credentials, reputation, and stature on the idea.  Strategically, he utilized and 
advocated for the use of judicial restraint in his opinions.  But it may be argued that Frankfurter’s 
failures were not a matter of garnering support for his idea or his difficult condescending 
personality, but rather the advocacy of rigid interpretation of judicial restraint, during a period of 
tremendous change on the Court, reflected poor timing, but more importantly, he exhibited a tin 
ear to the changes in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence and an inability to create a more flexible 
definition of judicial restraint.  Unlike Posner, who listens to his critics and modifies his views 
accordingly, Frankfurter became hostile and defensive.  The remainder of this section of the 
dissertation will look at the three questions separately. 
Personality 
     Personality is important for a judicial entrepreneur, particularly because he sits as a member 
of a body of only nine members, with whom he must interact regularly.  A successful 
entrepreneur need not be beloved, but at the minimum he must be able to avoid alienating those 
he would choose to influence, particularly in the area of law they intend their entrepreneurial 
influence.  The entrepreneurial literature is filled with entrepreneurs who were extremely 
difficult people, but nonetheless, successful.  Unlike entrepreneurs in the marketplace, a judicial 
entrepreneur on the Supreme Court is one of nine with an equal voice and vote, so personality 
may play a more important role in the success or failure of a judicial entrepreneur; he is not a 
boss ruling subordinates he can hire and fire like Steve Jobs or Bill Gates.   
     From the literature, Frankfurter’s personality clearly was not helpful in developing support 
from other justices for his ideas, particularly with those liberal justices who would seem to be his 
natural allies, and he seems to have squandered whatever professional reputation he had rather 
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quickly amongst his brethren.  Perhaps the best known effort to evaluate Frankfurter’s 
personality is H.N. Hirsch’s The Enigma of Felix Frankfurter, “an interpretive biography of a 
much-studied and highly complex man”
350
 in which the author notes: 
The central hypothesis of this study is that Frankfurter can only be understood politically 
if we understand him psychologically, and that we can understand him psychologically as 
representing a textbook case of a neurotic personality:  someone whose self-image is 
overblown and yet, at the same time, essential to his sense of well-being.
351
 
     The author uses the neurotic personality to explain the problems Frankfurter faced on the 
Supreme Court, a much different environment than Frankfurter had experienced before in 
government service or academia: 
The key aspect of Frankfurter’s personality as it affected his public behavior was his 
attitude toward political opposition.  Because his self-image was inflated, and because his 
psychological peace rested upon that self-image, Frankfurter could not accept serious, 
sustained opposition in fields he considered his domain of expertise; he reacted to his 




     Whether one believes in the psychological interpretation of Frankfurter or not, his reputation 
for being overly ingratiating at first, and then condescending and pedantic to his colleagues if 
they did not agree with him, is well documented.  
Frankfurter had long ago earned a reputation for wooing every new justice with great 
vigor.  He smothered them with flattering notes and copies of articles, books, and 
opinions he had written.  He lavished attention on clerks, whom he viewed as his entrée 
into the other justices’ chambers, focusing particularly on those who had attended 
Harvard Law School…  It was all part of Frankfurter’s never-ending campaign to win 
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over potential allies or acolytes who would vote with him rather than with Black, his 
main antagonist on the Court.
353
 
One biographer summarized Frankfurter’s personality: 
At heart Frankfurter remained a law professor, an emotional intellectual gadfly who 
preferred to question endlessly rather than to answer.  His ploys toward his ends-flattery 
and ridicule, cajoling, twitting and teasing colleagues, being a master of the vertical 
pronoun in a collegial institution and reminding his colleagues of his expertise – were 
self-defeating.  Once he said to Black’s clerks, with Hugo in earshot, “If I could just be 
Justice Black’s law clerk for just one year, how the law would be greatly improved.”  
Frankfurter had always personalized differences of opinion, and had transformed 




The antagonism between Frankfurter and Black was legendary almost rising to the point of 
physical altercation: 
At one conference Frankfurter’s words got too much for Black, and he started to go after 
Felix physically.  Tom Clark, who sat next to Frankfurter, intervened to break up any 
possible altercation.  Black walked out of at least three Court conferences because of 
Frankfurter…  “Felix kept on talking and talking.”
355
 
Frankfurter’s antagonistic personality contrasted sharply with that of Justice William Brennan, a 
former student of Frankfurter’s at Harvard Law School. 
Brennan consciously set out to avoid being anything like him [Frankfurter].  A keen 
workplace politician, Brennan already knew better than to treat colleagues with the kind 
of disdain Frankfurter displayed.  But he had learned one final lesson from his professor:  
the dangers of coming on too strong, particularly with new colleagues.
356
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Hirsch continues with his psychological analysis, which has become the accepted narrative of 
Frankfurter’s personality and problems: 
Until his appointment to the Supreme Court, Frankfurter had been able to beat his 
opponents and to dominate every personal and professional situation in which he found 
himself – the various government bureaus, in which he worked, the organizations to 
which he belonged, the Harvard Law School, the circle of Advisors in the Roosevelt 
White House.  When he was appointed to the Court, Frankfurter quite naturally expected 
to dominate yet another situation.  This expectation was buttressed by his many years as a 
scholar of the law and by the intimate knowledge of the Court he had acquired through 
two of his mentors, Holmes and Brandeis. 
The Supreme Court, however, was an environment unlike the ones in which Frankfurter 
had triumphed; he was formally committed to sharing power with strong-willed 
individuals who had ideas of their own.  Frankfurter could not lead the Court and, much 
to his surprise, found himself faced with an opposing “bloc.”  He was thus confronted, 
late in life, with a serious challenge to his self-image; he reacted in a manner affecting 
both his relations with his colleagues and the content of his jurisprudence.
357
 
The deference he expected and enjoyed was altered once he joined the Court:  
For 30 years, however, Frankfurter had been either an acolyte to men he recognized as 
great figures-Holmes, Brandeis, Stimson, and Roosevelt-or a precept or mentor to those 
he considered his intellectual inferiors; the master-disciple relationship was not going to 
work with men who saw themselves as his equals and were not beholden to him for their 
positions on the nation’s highest court.  One of the great tragedies of Frankfurter’s career 
is that a man renowned for his talents in personal relations, who knew so well the high 
value the justices place on careful collegiality could so terrible misread the situation and 
the characters of those with whom he served.
358
 
     A judicial entrepreneur’s personality is important and helpful in promoting a particular idea or 
developing relationships with other justices.  Another justice with a rough and condescending 
personality, and proudly so, is best exemplified by Justice Scalia, whose dissents and scathing 
personal critiques of his colleagues are notorious in the legal community and the public at large.  
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The attacks by Scalia on Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and Anthony Kennedy came early and 
hard, particularly over the issue of whether to overturn Roe v. Wade (1973) in the case of 
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services (1989), and O’Connor and Kennedy’s unwillingness 
follow his lead to overrule Roe, but also other cases not related to the issue of abortion.
359
  But it 
must not be forgotten, like Frankfurter’s attacks on his colleagues who shared similar legal and 
political tendencies, Scalia lost on the issue of abortion, too.  His goal has been to overturn Roe 
v. Wade, and when provided with the opportunity and votes, his conservative colleagues, did not 
follow the course of action he wished.  This, too, happened to Frankfurter.  So, what is the 
difference between Frankfurter and Scalia?  Perhaps, in the long run, there will be no real 
difference between the two.  Both attacked their colleagues personally, and where Frankfurter 
confined himself to doing so privately, Scalia has gone so far as to attack his colleagues publicly 
in his opinions.  Even though Scalia was successful in promoting a reevaluation of the use of 
statutory interpretation, many of the conservative causes he championed have only shown mixed 
results, and many of the successes cannot even be directly attributable to him, but more to a 
general change in the make-up of the Court.  
     It could also be argued that perhaps Frankfurter’s pedantic slicing style was less tolerable than 
Scalia’s verbal cudgels that defined their differences, particularly over emotionally charged 
issues such as abortion.  As one author has noted about Frankfurter: 
Frankfurter’s intellectual arrogance, combined with a nastiness some of his students had 
seen years earlier, led him to alienate nearly all his colleagues at one time or another.  He 
would flatter them so long as they agreed with him, but at the first sign of independent 
                                                          
359
 Murphy, Scalia: A Court of One, 177-184. 
177 
 
thought he would explode.  During his tenure on the bench, no one – with the possible 
exception of Robert Jackson – escaped his scorn.
360
 
     The history of the Court is filled with stories of justices with diametrically opposing judicial 
philosophies, who maintain cordial relationships.  Scalia, for example, is known for his fondness 
for the Court’s leading liberal, Ruth Bader Ginsberg.  Biskupic writes of the time Ginsburg was 
introduced to Scalia in the 1970s and their enduring friendship: 
“I was fascinated by him because he was so intelligent and amusing,” Ginsburg said.  
“You could still resist his position, but you had to like him.”  Ginsburg, a former 
women’s rights advocate, was an unlikely chum to Scalia.  Yet a deep friendship 
developed.  Once he was appointed to the D.C. Circuit, two years after her 1980 
appointment, Ginsburg and Scalia began celebrating New Year’s Eve together with a 
formal dinner for themselves and their spouses.  Scalia attributed the friendship with 
Ginsburg to their shared backgrounds as law professors.  They read each other’s opinions 
with a scholarly eye and offered writing suggestions.  Scalia treated Ginsburg like a 
faculty colleague and years later described her as “an intelligent woman and a nice 
woman and a considerate woman – all the qualities you like in a person.
361
 
But unlike Scalia, it would seem that Frankfurter’s personality was a little more difficult and 
went beyond the philosophical differences in interpreting the law: 
Frankfurter, for all that he could be charming, solicitous, witty, and outgoing, was also 
duplicitous and conniving, and these characteristics triggered confrontation.
362
 
     Frankfurter probably did know more about the Court than anyone, but his condescension to 
colleagues who did not share his views and arrogance alienated almost all the justice on the 
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Court at one point or another.
363
  A biographer of Black, noting on the issues between Jackson 
and Black, and in turn, the rest of the Court: 
Behind Jackson’s provocations, as behind most intrigue on the Court, was Frankfurter.  
By 1943-44 he had run out justices to convert.  His manner had deeply repulsed Douglas 
and Murphy, much more than their substantive disagreements.  Rutledge, the newest 
justice, was already meeting with them and Black to plot strategy.  Stone and Reed went 
their own ways, the former always trying to persuade someone on the merits, the latter 
always available, smiling and annoying no one.  Only Jackson and Roberts, were left, and 
Frankfurter never passed up an opportunity to tell them the worst about Black.  No one 
else on the Court went out of his way to make trouble with colleagues…  But Frankfurter 
always had been a divisive force.  No group that he joined would be happy, Judge 
Learned hand once told Douglas.  When an interviewer said how good Felix was at 
making friends, Hand replied.  “Yes, and enemies.”
364
 
     More importantly, except for his attacks on O’Connor and Kennedy, Scalia has directed most 
of his wrath against the liberals on the bench, not his conservative colleagues.  Scalia’s attacks 
on the conservatives have been that they have not gone far enough in the direction he would like 
to go.  Frankfurter, on the other hand, was attempting to rein in many of his liberal colleagues 
and was out of step with the movements on the Court, where Scalia has been riding a 
conservative wave on the Court, but more importantly, Frankfurter had disdain for his 
colleagues.  It may be splitting hairs attempting to make such personality distinctions, but 
whereas Scalia is difficult, as expressed in his opinions, Frankfurter, it would seem from the 
literature, was insufferable.  
     Another element of the judicial entrepreneurs’ characteristics and strategies, are their public 
persona and their efforts to persuade the general public as to their ideas.  Successful judicial 
entrepreneurs leverages their reputation and stature as judges to promote their ideas.  Addressing 
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the general public increases the stature of the judicial entrepreneur and their views find a more 
general audience.  And some might argue, Posner and Scalia both play to their respective 
audiences in their opinions, writings, and speeches.  American culture is unique in that it is a 
legal culture and citizens are not only amenable to, but also interested in the law.  Our televisions 
are filed with reality shows on judges and crime.  The Supreme Court's decisions make headline 
news.  Most people probably could only name a few Supreme Court justices, but Scalia is one of 
them.  And Posner stands apart for being one of the few judges who has not sat on the Supreme 
Court with public name recognition.  Scalia and Posner’s public recognition is not accidental 
because judicial entrepreneurs burnish their public reputation, too.   
     This, too, may explain part of Frankfurter failure as a judicial entrepreneur.  He was well 
known for his time because of his government service but unlike Scalia or Posner, he did not 
leverage his public persona to the degree that they have done.  In some respects, his public 
persona is more akin to justice Stephen Breyer; he too publishes books on the law for the general 
public, but remains much less well known to the general public than his colleague Scalia, and 
perhaps even, Posner.  It might be argued that there are more opportunities for contemporary 
judicial entrepreneurs to reach the general reading public.  As well, Posner and Scalia may view 
themselves more than just judicial entrepreneurs, but also as public intellectuals.  The law 
changes society and society changes the law.  Appealing to the general public is another strategy 
of the judicial entrepreneur to promote their ideas on the law.  
Judicial Restraint and Apportionment 
      Even though Frankfurter and Scalia may have shared similar tendencies to denigrate their 
fellow justices, they both came to be associated with the advocacy of major legal themes during 
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their tenure on the bench.  Where Scalia has been most associated with refining and limiting 
statutory interpretation in judicial decision making, Frankfurter is known for deferring to 
legislative decisions through the judicial decision making process of judicial restraint.  
Frankfurter was particularly influenced by James Bradley Thayer’s 1893 Harvard Law Review 
article, “The Origins and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law,”
365
 in which he 
sets forth his views as to when it is appropriate for a court to exercise judicial review of acts of 
the legislature.  For Thayer, and subsequently Frankfurter, the acts of the legislature should 
always stand unless there was a clear constitutional mistake by the legislature, not simply a 
probable mistake, in order for the court to review and overturn a legislative act.  Thayer writes: 
It can only disregard the Act when those who have the right to make laws have not 
merely made a mistake, but have made a very clear one, - so clear that it is not open to 
rational question.  This is the standard of duty which the courts bring legislative Acts; 
that is the test which they apply, - not merely their own judgment as to constitutionality, 
but their conclusion as to what judgment is permissible to another department which the 
constitution has charged with the duty of making it.
366
 
 Underlying Thayer’s arguments is the counter-majoritarian difficulty of an unelected court 
reviewing the acts of the legislature.  The legislative body should be preeminent, and the courts 
should defer to the act of the legislature. 
The judiciary may well reflect that if they had been regarded by the people as the chief 
protection against legislative violation of the constitution, they would not have been 
allowed merely this incidental and postponed control.  They would have been let in, as it 
was sometimes endeavored in the conventions to let them in, to a revision of the laws 
before they began to operate.
367
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     Frankfurter’s embrace of Thayer’s judicial restraint was consistent and over time inflexible.  
Frankfurter failed to recognize the changes on the Court and the jurisprudential questions the 
Court had to address.  Posner, writing on judicial restraint noted, summed up Frankfurter’s 
fundamental problem:  
Frankfurter advocated Thayerism with a noisy passion unequaled by any other Thayerian. 
His emotionality caused him difficulties in getting along with his fellow Justices and 
overcoming his visceral reactions in many cases.
368
 
 There were other justices who followed Thayer, too, such as Brandeis and Holmes, but they did 
not follow his idea as literally as Frankfurter.
369
  In some respects, as compared to law and 
economics, which is a relatively novel legal concept, judicial restraint and statutory interpretation 
are rather perennial legal issues that are quite similar in nature because they both address the role 
of the legislature vis-a-vis the Court.  Both are perennial legal issues which play a similar role in 
judicial decision making.  Statutory interpretation plays a significant role, and Scalia has had 
some modicum of success, as a judicial entrepreneur getting the Court to reevaluate its use of 
statutory interpretation, and judicial restraint, particularly the variant espoused by Frankfurter, 
goes to the fundamental nature of being a judge. 
     It may be argued that Frankfurter’s failure as a judicial entrepreneur largely rests on his 
record as advocate of the theory of judicial restraint, his refusal to modify his ideas to reflect 
evolving legal jurisprudence, and the changing role of the Court and its members.  The Court 
Frankfurter joined was different, and a theory of judicial self-restraint applicable to economic 
legislation that had come before the Court during the Roosevelt administration, seemed to some 
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justices problematic for issues concerning civil liberties and interpreting the Bill of Rights that 
would arise during and after the war.  Frankfurter ignored Justice Harlan Fiske Stone’s famous 
footnote number 4 in US v. Carolene Products (1938)
370
 that there should be a differentiation 
between legislative review for economic issues and those that fall within the Bill of Rights, 
refusing to acknowledge the direction the Court was moving.   
     To further add to Frankfurter’s alienation from the liberal bloc’s jurisprudence on the Court, 
his antagonism of his colleagues was famous and ultimately counter-productive: 
Frankfurter had an unfortunate habit of personalizing disagreements on the Court in a 
melodramatic fashion.  He viewed Black and Douglas – and any new justices who might 
agree with them – as members of an enemy camp.  During most of the 1940s, Black and 
Douglas could rely on two allies – Frank Murphy and Wiley Rutledge – as they pressed 
to apply the Bill of Rights to the states and took liberal positions in civil liberties cases.  
But the bloc shrank when Murphy and Rutledge died unexpectedly within two months of 
each other in 1949.  Their more conservative successors, Minton and Clark, shifted the 
Court’s balance toward Frankfurter’s camp. 




     The conflict and inflexibility of Frankfurter’s idea of judicial restraint are best exemplified in 
two famous flag salute cases, Minersville School District v. Gobitis (1940)
372
 and West Virginia 
State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943).
373
  Frankfurter wrote the majority opinion in 
Gobitis, but three years later, would have to write the dissenting opinion in essentially the same 
case.  The overturning of Gobitis so soon after its decision is one of the most significant and high 
profile rejections of Frankfurter’s theory on judicial restraint and must have come as a 
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tremendous blow to his ego.  The transition over those three years are a watershed for 
Frankfurter on the Court, but also his opinions in those cases, particularly his dissent, are the 
most succinct expression of his idea of judicial restraint, a theme that he would continue to 
advocate throughout his time on the Court.  The two cases also reflect a changing sentiment 
regarding civil liberties on the Court that clashed with Frankfurter’s ideas of judicial restraint. 
     Minersville School District v. Gobitis concerned a child from a despised religious sect, the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, who on religious grounds refused to salute the flag in school as required by 
state law.  The Court decided, eight to one, against Gobitis, with Frankfurter, newly appointed to 
the Court, writing for the majority.  Frankfurter believed with Thayer that if a state could offer a 
rational basis for a law – an admittedly low hurdle – the Court should uphold the law. 
Democratically elected lawmakers were entitled to the benefit of the doubt.  Here, Frankfurter 
decided that the state’s interest in fostering good citizenship constituted a rational basis for the 
requirement.   
The ultimate foundation of a free society is the binding tie of cohesive sentiment. Such a 
sentiment is fostered by all those agencies of the mind and spirit which may serve to 
gather up the traditions of a people, transmit them from generation to generation, and 
thereby create that continuity of a treasured common life which constitutes a civilization. 
"We live by symbols." The flag is the symbol of our national unity, transcending all 
internal differences, however large, within the framework of the Constitution.  This Court 
has had occasion to say that ". . . the flag is the symbol of the Nation's power, the emblem 
of freedom in its truest, best sense. . . . it signifies government resting on the consent of 
the governed; liberty regulated by law; the protection of the weak against the strong; 




Frankfurter argues for judicial restraint and deference to the legislature, when he writes in the 
Minersville opinion: 
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Judicial review, itself a limitation on popular government, is a fundamental part of our 
constitutional scheme.  But to the legislature no less than to courts is committed the 
guardianship of deeply-cherished liberties.  Where all the effective means of inducing 
political changes are left free from interference, education in the abandonment of foolish 
legislation is itself a training in liberty.  To fight out the wise use of legislative authority 
in the forum of public opinion and before legislative assemblies rather than to transfer 





     However, within three years and during the depths of a world war, the Court would reverse 
course on Gobitis, one of the quickest and most famous reversals by the Court in its history.  
There were a number of reasons for the Court’s reversal, including changes in the Court’s 
composition and changing views on civil liberties in light of war time atrocities, both foreign and 
domestic, although, the Court would uphold the internment of Americans of Japanese descent a 
year later.
376
   
     The Court overturned Gobitis in the Barnette ruling in 1943.  Barnette’s facts are 
fundamentally the same as Gobitis.  Writing for the majority, Justice Robert Jackson, normally 
Frankfurter’s ally, distinguishes between judicial deference owed ordinary laws and deference 
owed laws that appear to conflict with the First Amendment. 
Much of the vagueness of the due process clause disappears when the specific 
prohibitions of the First become its standard. The right of a State to regulate, for example, 
a public utility may well include, so far as the due process test is concerned, power to 
impose all of the restrictions which a legislature may have a "rational basis" for adopting. 
But freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship may not be infringed 
on such slender grounds. They are susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and 
immediate danger to interests which the State may lawfully protect.  It is important to 
note that while it is the Fourteenth Amendment which bears directly upon the State it is 
the more specific limiting principles of the First Amendment that finally govern this 
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Jackson then rebuts Frankfurter’s argument head on, when he writes: 
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or 
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other 
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.  If there 
are any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.
378
 
Frankfurter wrote the dissent, but rather than a practiced recital of the arguments supporting 
judicial restraint that he had written in Gobitis, it is much more direct and comprehensive and 
personal.  The question before Frankfurter is not the First Amendment rights of the Jehovah 
Witnesses; it is the proper role of the Court in reviewing acts of the legislature.  He begins with a 
personal plea that is a departure from his normal dispassionate academic tone: 
One who belongs to the most vilified and persecuted minority in history is not likely to be 
insensible to the freedoms guaranteed by our Constitution.  Were my purely personal 
attitude relevant I should wholeheartedly associate myself with the general libertarian 
views in the Court's opinion, representing as they do the thought and action of a lifetime. 
But as judges we are neither Jew nor Gentile, neither Catholic nor agnostic.  We owe 
equal attachment to the Constitution and are equally bound by our judicial obligations 
whether we derive our citizenship from the earliest or the latest immigrants to these 
shores.  As a member of this Court I am not justified in writing my private notions of 
policy into the Constitution, no matter how deeply I may cherish them or how 
mischievous I may deem their disregard.  The duty of a judge who must decide which of 
two claims before the Court shall prevail, that of a State to enact and enforce laws within 
its general competence or that of an individual to refuse obedience because of the 
demands of his conscience, is not that of the ordinary person.  It can never be emphasized 
too much that one's own opinion about the wisdom or evil of a law should be excluded 
altogether when one is doing one's duty on the bench.  The only opinion of our own even 
looking in that direction that is material is our opinion whether legislators could in reason 
have enacted such a law.  In the light of all the circumstances, including the history of 
this question in this Court, it would require more daring than I possess to deny that 
reasonable legislators could have taken the action which is before us for review.  Most 
unwillingly, therefore, I must differ from my brethren with regard to legislation like this. 
I cannot bring my mind to believe that the "liberty" secured by the Due Process Clause 
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gives this Court authority to deny to the State of West Virginia the attainment of that 
which we all recognize as a legitimate legislative end, namely, the promotion of good 
citizenship, by employment of the means here chosen.
379
 
He continues with his disquisition on the subject of judicial restraint: 
Not so long ago we were admonished that "the only check upon our own exercise of 
power is our own sense of self-restraint.  For the removal of unwise laws from the statute 




When Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for this Court, wrote that "it must be remembered 
that legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite 
as great a degree as the courts," he went to the very essence of our constitutional system 
and the democratic conception of our society.  He did not mean that for only some phases 
of civil government this Court was not to supplant legislatures and sit in judgment upon 
the right or wrong of a challenged measure.  He was stating the comprehensive judicial 
duty and role of this Court in our constitutional scheme whenever legislation is sought to 
be nullified on any ground, namely, that responsibility for legislation lies with 
legislatures, answerable as they are directly to the people, and this Court's only and very 
narrow function is to determine whether within the broad grant of authority vested in 





The reason why from the beginning even the narrow judicial authority to nullify 
legislation has been viewed with a jealous eye is that it serves to prevent the full play of 
the democratic process.  The fact that it may be an undemocratic aspect of our scheme of 
government does not call for its rejection or its disuse.  But it is the best of reasons, as 




Tact, respect, and generosity toward variant views will always commend themselves to 
those charged with the duties of legislation so as to achieve a maximum of good will and 
to require a minimum of unwilling submission to a general law.  But the real question is, 




This is no dry, technical matter.  It cuts deep into one's conception of the democratic 
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process -- it concerns no less the practical differences between the means for making 
these accommodations that are open to courts and to legislatures…  If the function of this 
Court is to be essentially no different from that of a legislature, if the considerations 
governing constitutional construction are to be substantially those that underlie 
legislation, then indeed judges should not have life tenure and they should be made 




Conscientious scruples, all would admit, cannot stand against every legislative 
compulsion to do positive acts in conflict with such scruples.  We have been told that 
such compulsions override religious scruples only as to major concerns of the state.  But 
the determination of what is major and what is minor itself raises questions of policy.  
For the way in which men equally guided by reason appraise importance goes to the very 
heart of policy.  Judges should be very diffident in setting their judgment against that of a 
state in determining what is and what is not a major concern, what means are appropriate 




     Frankfurter never says why it is rational to force a student to say something she does not 
believe, but rather focuses almost exclusively on the principle of judicial restraint.  The above 
are just excerpts from his dissent, but it provides an interesting contrast to his minimal reference 
to judicial restraint in the majority opinion in Gobitis and demonstrates his exasperated efforts to 
instruct his colleagues on his principles of judicial restraint.  Judicial restraint goes to the 
fundamental role of judges, and as the Court became more activist in respect to civil liberties in 
overturning laws promulgated by the legislature, Frankfurter’s ideas were less timely and not 
well received. 
     The great irony is that, had the timing of Gobitis been slightly different, the outcome in the 
decision may have been different.  Stone’s dissent in Gobitis would have been the majority 
opinion. 
                                                          
384
 Ibid., 651-652. 
385
 Ibid., 654. 
188 
 
Stone circulated a powerful dissent on the day before the conference at which 
Frankfurter’s opinion was approved.  Black did not know about Stone’s plans.  A 
majority of the Court, he later said, might have bolted from Frankfurter’s opinion after 
reading Stone’s dissent – as the rush of work at the term’s close prevented the justices’ 
looking at the dissent until after the opinion came down – but Black, Douglas, and 
Murphy found Frankfurter’s argument so moving they had assured him they would 
support him and were loath to break their word.  Immediately, “we knew we were 
wrong,” Black told an obituary writer in 1967, “but we didn’t have time to change our 
opinions.  We met around the swimming pool at Murphy’s hotel and decided to do so as 




Support for the Frankfurter opinion in Gobitis may also be explained in terms of the context in 
which it was written, impending war, and explain why it could be so quickly overturned. 
The war also may explain things.  Remember that Gobitis was handed down just months 
after the Fall of France in World War II, perhaps unduly sensitizing the Court to the 
patriotism that likely would be called up soon to sustain America’s entry into the war.  
Indeed, within the Court, Frankfurter’s opinion was called the “Fall of France” opinion.  
In a letter to Justice Stone on May 27, 1940, Frankfurter suggested that the war had 
affected his position.  Wartime circumstances, Frankfurter wrote, required the Court to 
make the delicate “adjustment between legislatively allowable pursuit of national security 
and the right to stand on individual idiosyncrasies.”
387
 
     Another example of Frankfurter’s inability to appreciate timing and his entrepreneurial failure 
was in the area of legislative reapportionment, or more appropriately, malapportionment.  Prior 
to Baker v. Carr (1961)
388
 and Reynolds v. Sims (1964),
389
 the Court had refrained from 
addressing the legal question of malapportionment of legislative districts because such issues 
were considered political questions best left to the respective legislatures to address, not the 
Court.  In the case of Colegrove v. Green (1946), Frankfurter warned about courts venturing into 
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the political thicket by taking on political questions of apportionment.  Writing for the majority 
in Colegrove, Frankfurter noted in his opinion: 
We are of opinion that the appellants ask of this Court what is beyond its competence to 
grant. This is one of those demands on judicial power which cannot be met by verbal 
fencing about "jurisdiction."  It must be resolved by considerations on the basis of which 
this Court, from time to time, has refused to intervene in controversies.  It has refused to 
do so because due regard for the effective working of our Government revealed this issue 
to be of a peculiarly political nature and therefore not meet for judicial determination.
390
 
     Black wrote for a dissent in Colegrove, but Frankfurter’s majority opinion would stand for 
fifteen years, until it was overruled, although not directly in Baker v. Carr and put to rest in 
Reynolds v. Sims.  Once again, Frankfurter, chose judicial restraint, but this would be one of his 
last major dissents; having suffered a stroke in 1962, he was forced to resign from the Court that 
year.
391
  The fundamental problem of malapportionment is that redress cannot be effectuated 
through the legislative process, because it is the malapportioned legislature that is required to 
change itself, and with a vested interest in maintaining the status quo, it is unlikely to ever do so.  
Frankfurter’s unwillingness to appreciate the inability of the democratic process to resolve 
legislative malapportionment issues necessitated the Court’s intervention into what had formerly 
been considered political questions, but the political question had become a legal issue to those 
given standing.   
     As in Barnette, Frankfurter was willing to adhere to a theory of judicial restraint at the price 
of ignoring the practical implications of the Court’s decisions.  But there is another element to 
the cases addressed above:  Frankfurter’s unwillingness to admit that he simply may have been 
wrong in a prior decision.  Gobitis and Cosgrove were significant opinions for Frankfurter, and 
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to admit that they had been wrongly decided would be a confession of fallibility; for someone 
who considered himself to be intellectually infallible in their understanding of the law, it may 
have been easier psychologically to attack his detractors’ intellectual rigor, rather than admit 
error. 
     Frankfurter’s timing was off – he was the right Supreme Court justice, but on the Court at the 
wrong period in its history.  In response to the reactionary temperament of the Supreme Court in 
the early part of the Roosevelt administration, it is understandable that Frankfurter would be an 
advocate for judicial restraint because the Court had overturned a number of New Deal economic 
statutes.  Frankfurter’s judicial restraint advocated for deference to the federal and state 
legislatures, but now economic regulation was superseded by civil liberties, and he remained 
unwilling to change or temper his views on judicial restraint:  
The tragedy of Mr. Justice Frankfurter is that he became a prisoner of an idea – judicial 
restraint – and failed to distinguish between the regulation of economic and property 
rights and limitations upon individual liberties.
392
   
     The changes on the Court were reflected in the ever increasing division among the justices in 
their opinions.  C. Herman Pritchett, a scholar of the Roosevelt Court, noted the divisions over 
civil liberties on the Court at the time: 
Civil liberties problems have given the Roosevelt Court one of its most controversial 
group of cases.  Some 34 nonunanimous decisions have been recorded in the field 
between 1939 and 1947, with 12 of them yielding 5 to 4 or 4 to 3 splits.
393
  
Justice Frankfurter’s own explanation of his votes has been almost entirely in terms of the 
respect which he believes that courts must give to legislative judgments.
394
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Frankfurter failed to recognize these changes: 
The Roosevelt Court has accepted this philosophy so far as general economic and social 
regulations are concerned, but in Bill of Rights cases it has contended that the Court must 
subject legislative action to more rigorous tests, or, as Chief Justice Stone put it, to a 
“more searching judicial inquiry.”
395
 
     With an already divided Court, the chance of garnering a consensus on the principle of 
judicial restraint was unlikely to be successful.  Frankfurter’s interpretation of Thayer’s judicial 
restraint is not a radical, nor an obscure, legal idea.  Judicial restraint is a perennial topic of 
judicial decision making, but Frankfurter’s advocacy and timing were historically off.  The shift 
from Gobitis to Barnette reflects a profound change in the Court’s role in deciding legislative 
questions, which continue to impact civil liberties to this day.  
Contemporary history focuses on Frankfurter’s personality, which may reflect the success of 
Hirsch’s book, The Enigma of Felix Frankfurter, and personality may have a significant impact 
on a judicial entrepreneur’s success, but it is not a determinative quality.  It would seem that the 
reason that Frankfurter’s failed as a judicial entrepreneur in the advocacy of judicial restraint is 
probably more attributable to the timing of the idea, and his inability to adjust his principle of 
judicial restraint to the needs of the evolving civil liberties revolution that was taking place on 
the Court.  Regarding the malapportionment cases, they demonstrate his rigidity and 
unwillingness to change.  The subject matter of the cases did not require the absolutist approach 
that he took, particularly since the other justices were willing to consider the matter a justiciable 
issue.  Even had Frankfurter had a more pleasant disposition, his interpretation of judicial 
restraint would not have found a receptive audience on a changing Court. 
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Frankfurter was clearly an unsuccessful judicial entrepreneur in advocating for judicial 
restraint and deference to the legislative process.  Has Scalia been a successful judicial 
entrepreneur in getting the Court to rein in the expansive use of statutory interpretation?  The 
answer would have to be a qualified, yes.  Regardless of what one may feel or think about Justice 
Scalia personally or his jurisprudential philosophy, in terms of changing judges’ perceptions and 
attitudes towards using legislative history in statutory interpretation, he has been quite 
successful.  John Manning, a professor at Harvard, commented: 
One could not properly take stock of Justice Scalia’s judicial career thus far without 
considering how deeply his approach to statutory analysis has affected the way in which 
we, as lawyers, talk and think about the problem of statutory construction.
396
 
     At a minimum, judges must give lip service to textualism when reading statutes and 
regulations, and should they choose to use legislative history or ancillary documents to support 
their interpretations, they may have to qualify such use.  Scalia may have been less successful in 
fostering legal changes in abortion, affirmative action, or other substantive legal issues important 
to conservatives, but his impact on statutory interpretation, an issue that potentially affects all 
substantive concerns, is beyond dispute.  It could be argued that a judicial entrepreneur, to be 
successful, must limit his advocacy to one or two issues that he can focus his attention on.  In 
Scalia’s case, he chose statutory interpretation, but in some respects, it chose him, too, and that 
choice was only reaffirmed with the passage of time, as he became more and more associated 
with the issue.  He picked an opportunity, seized it, and persistently advocated for it, with the 
understanding that it would give him the most traction professionally. 
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X.  Dissertation Conclusion  
     At present, popular literature abounds with books applying economic principles to social, 
political, and legal questions.  The best seller, Freakonomics, for example, which offers 
economic perspectives to questions that most would not consider related to economics; Nudge 
and Sway expound on the advances in behavioral economics, disposing of the notion of a rational 
decision maker and replacing it with models that are much more complex and sometimes not at 
all rational.  This budding literature did not appear ex nihilo from the firmament, but reflects the 
influence of scholars over the last sixty years, going back to Gary Becker in the social sciences 
and Richard Posner in the law, who radically approached social and legal issues and questions 
utilizing the tools of economics to better understand traditionally non-market area problems and 
possible solutions.  Where their work at first may have been considered part of a conservative, 
neo-liberal movement, its influence has become much broader than this suggests; and in the law, 
Posner not only made economic analysis of law respectable, but elevated it to part of the legal 
canon as a necessary tool for addressing legal questions in American jurisprudence.   
     The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the role of Posner as a judicial entrepreneur and 
to assess his influence and success in persuading the legal academy and judiciary to incorporate 
economic principles into the judicial decision making process in market and non-market areas of 
the law.  More broadly, the dissertation aims to reveal aspects of judicial entrepreneurship that 
have so far escaped scholarly notice.  The research indicates that, yes, Posner has been influential 
in persuading others in both the legal academy and the courts of the importance and utility of 
using economic tools when assessing the law, with the caveat that his influence still remains 
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stronger in traditional market-oriented areas of the law, such as antitrust, and less so in 
traditionally non-market areas of the law, such as criminal.   
     Through the research methods of qualitative case law analysis and the new quantitative 
research methods of citation analysis, the dissertation makes claims about his influence that are 
not merely anecdotal.  These tools are not without their bias and limitations, but they do provide 
a good starting point for further research, and offer inferential evidence of influence.  The 
dissertation contributes to the research in the area of judicial politics and judicial-decision 
making in two respects: it provides a new comprehensive model for a judicial entrepreneur, and 
it provides evidence of the influence of the legal movement, law and economics, on American 
jurisprudence.  The dissertation also provides scholarly opportunity for further research, for the 
framework of the dissertation can be applied to other judicial entrepreneurs and legal movements 
to evaluate their influence.  
     After reviewing the market and non-market literature on entrepreneurialism, a new 
comprehensive model of a judicial entrepreneur was created in order to evaluate Posner as a 
judicial entrepreneur.  To evaluate his efficacy as a judicial entrepreneur, a multi-stage research 
approach was taken, utilizing qualitative, quantitative, and comparative case study research 
methods.  First, a quantitative research method analyzed the legal publication and case law 
citations, which demonstrated influence upon not only the scholarly literature, but also judicial 
opinions in which Posner has been cited.  By empirically analyzing the citations to Posner’s law 
review articles and his federal case law opinions with the use of computer programs, his 
substantial impact on the scholarly literature and judicial-decision making could be quantified 
and measured.  To further test the influence of his ideas on economic analysis and the law in 
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particular legal subject matter areas, and to compare and contrast traditionally non-market areas 
of the law to traditionally market areas of the law, a qualitative case law analysis was conducted 
of Posner’s opinions as a federal judge.  Analyzing his opinions in respect to the economic 
concept of efficiency, as applied to the exclusionary rule in criminal law, suggest that they have 
exerted modest influence.  On the other hand, a qualitative case law analysis of his antitrust 
opinions, suggests substantial influence.  Both of these results were expected.   
     To further evaluate Posner as a judicial entrepreneur, and to shed light on some of the 
characteristics that contributed to this success, the dissertation examines two other justices 
through comparative case studies who embraced the role of entrepreneur, Antonin Scalia and 
Felix Frankfurter.  In the area of statutory interpretation, Scalia has been a successful judicial 
entrepreneur, especially in his opposition to the use of legislative history.  Frankfurter, however, 
who came to the Court with considerable practical political and legal experience, had little 
success in pressing for the adoption of judicial restraint. 
Case Study Analysis – Comparative Cases of Judicial Entrepreneurs  
     The use of comparative case studies to compare and contrast similarly situated subjects has its 
strengths and weaknesses, but overall it remains helpful in evaluating the new model for a 
judicial entrepreneur and lends insight into ways in which the model might be improved, and to 
raise additional questions for further research.  Having developed a more comprehensive model 
of the judicial entrepreneur to better understand and evaluate the activities of judges.  There also 
are a number of lessons that may be drawn from the individual case studies of Posner, Scalia, 
and Frankfurter that can be extrapolated to generate a broader understanding of judicial 
entrepreneurs in general and for future analysis.  As discussed, the model for the judicial 
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entrepreneur may be broken down into two major areas:  The characteristics of the judicial 
entrepreneur and the strategies utilized by the judicial entrepreneur to advocate for his or her 
legal idea.   
     The dissertation sets forth a model of the characteristics of the judicial entrepreneurs in which 
they possesses an entrepreneurial spirit, or as Schumpeter termed it, the Unternehmergeist, in 
which the judicial entrepreneur persistently advocated for specific legal ideas and principles not 
utilized or underutilized.  The entrepreneur is a knowledge-based innovator, who actively and 
persistently promotes his ideas over time.  He is persistent and driven, in order to withstand 
criticism and continue to advocate for his ideas, and is willing to utilize his professional stature, 
reputation, and interpersonal relationships to see that the legal idea he advocates come to 
fruition.  One of the findings is that, to some degree, the characteristics of the judicial 
entrepreneur and the strategies they use in their advocacy go hand in hand.  The entrepreneurial 
spirit of the judicial entrepreneur finds expression in the written strategic advocacy of the judge, 
on and off the court.  
     The case studies demonstrate that Posner, Scalia, and Frankfurter were all judicial 
entrepreneurs, to varying degrees, with Posner being the most successful judicial entrepreneur, 
Scalia a little less successful, and Frankfurter, a failure as a judicial entrepreneur.  The case study 
analysis of all three judicial entrepreneurs found that both Posner and Scalia both exhibited the 
requisite characteristics of the judicial entrepreneur by not only advocating for their ideas in their 
legal opinions, which is expected of all judges, but also strategically through the publication of 
extra-judicial articles and treatises, over a long period of time, advocating for changes to the 
existing jurisprudential status quo in specific legal areas.  For the two judges, their commitment 
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to extra-judicial writings were not limited to the occasional article or book, but instead 
constituted a continuously concerted and dogged effort, over many years, expounding and 
advocating for their ideas on law and economics and statutory interpretation, respectively, in 
extra-judicial publications.  This is a fundamental quality of a judicial entrepreneur, which 
differentiates a regular judge from a judicial entrepreneur.  Unlike a judge, who could be 
considered a mere advocate of legal idea who justifies their legal reasoning in legal opinions, for 
Posner and Scalia, the forum of opinion writing was insufficient to their goals and they used their 
status as judges to advocate for changes through extra-judicial writings – they worked to reach a 
larger audience.  Each possessed the characteristics of being knowledge based innovators, who 
seized on legal ideas, and persistently advocated for, engaged with critics, and challenged the 
jurisprudential status quo.   
     In contrast to the case studies of Posner and Scalia, the case study of Frankfurter revealed 
some interesting contrasts; in particular, Frankfurter did not take the steps that Posner and Scalia 
did to reach a wider audience or to advocate for his ideas on judicial restraint.  He limited his 
advocacy to the context of his opinions.  He did not utilize his legal stature and status as a 
Supreme Court justice to persuade a larger audience of his legal theory of judicial restraint.  He 
did have extra-judicial writings, but his publications were more general and historical and were 
not written for the purpose of advocating for his interpretation of judicial restraint.  It would 
seem from the research, which may reflect his personality and a character flaw he possessed, that 
he may have felt his opinions should simply speak for themselves.  A successful judicial 
entrepreneur does not simply rely upon his opinions.  Rather than continuing to develop a theory 
of judicial restraint through extra-judicial writings, he relied upon the status quo of a theory of 
198 
 
judicial restraint that had existed for over fifty years, but a theory which did not evolve with the 
changing needs of the time.   
     This is an important distinguishing quality between simply being a judge, who in the normal 
course of his duties writes opinions, and that of a judicial entrepreneur, who chooses to use his 
position as a platform for extra-judicial writings and advocacy.  The opinion is designed to 
persuade other judges as to the legal reasoning behind the judgment, and can persuade other 
judges immediately and over time, but due to tradition, factual, and jurisdictional constraints, a 
legal opinion has inherent limitations.  The extra-judicial writings are not limited by these 
constraints.  A key finding is that a judicial entrepreneur, as a knowledge-based innovator, must 
go beyond simply writing opinions to reach a larger audience.  The extra-judicial writings are the 
strategic tool which a judicial entrepreneur uses to persuade a larger audience.  Both Posner and 
Scalia utilized their professional stature and reputation to advocate for changes to the status quo 
over a long period of time, and in contrast, Frankfurter did not.  This finding raises some 
interesting questions.  All three judges had been legal academics at one point, raising questions 
for future research:   What role does a history of academic involvement play in the development 
of judicial entrepreneurs?  Is the judicial entrepreneur a contemporary phenomenon reflecting the 
changes to the legal academy and discourse?  Are judges being motivated by primary law, legal 
opinions, or by secondary sources more frequently today? 
     Another finding of the dissertation lends evidence to the idea that the judicial entrepreneurs 
need not be well liked to be successful.  They must have stature and status within the legal 
community and must be persistent advocates for a special legal idea or principle traditionally not 
utilized or underutilized, but more importantly, for the success of the judicial entrepreneur, the 
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legal idea they are espousing must be timely and salient.  This finding was best exemplified in 
the case studies of Scalia and Frankfurter.  Both of them had or have well recognized difficult 
personalities, and at varying times alienated members of the Court with their less than disguised 
disdain for their colleagues’ intellectual qualities, but one has been a relatively successful 
entrepreneur, Scalia, in the area of statutory interpretation, and Frankfurter, was not.  Both 
attempted to change their colleagues’ views on judicial decision making practices, but Scalia was 
more successful.  This may lend support to the idea that the messenger’s personality, in terms of 
likability, may be less important than the message they are trying to convey.  This may seem 
trivial, but it bolsters the claim that the legal idea being advocated must have a receptive 
audience and that ideas matter.   
     Of the three primary legal ideas discuss in the dissertation, economic analysis of the law, 
statutory interpretation, and judicial restraint, economic analysis of the law may be considered 
the least developed of the three, but due to Posner’s advocacy, the most successful legal idea of 
the last forty years.  Ideas matter, but to bring economic analysis of the law to the forefront, a 
skilled judicial entrepreneur was required.  Scalia has received a more receptive audience to his 
advocacy of reining in the use of legislative history, but Frankfurter’s interpretation of judicial 
restraint was no longer timely, and therefore he lacked a receptive audience; and he was rigid, 
and attempted to maintain the status quo while the Court was changing direction. 
Quantitative Analysis – Citation Analysis 
     The development and use of quantitative citation analysis through computer programs to 
measure influence is a relatively recently developed analytical tools.  It, too, is not without its 
strengths and weaknesses, but it is useful for analyzing large amounts of citation data to evaluate 
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trends and measure influence.  It is a good inferential tool that is gaining more traction.  
Particularly in our common law system, citations are fundamental to support legal arguments in 
legal opinions, law review articles, and treatises, so the measure of their frequency is important 
to measure trends and infer influence.  The citation analysis conducted in the dissertation for law 
review articles supports the argument that Posner’s advocacy for the use of economic analysis of 
law, in the legal academy has been very influential.  As a judicial entrepreneur, his extra-judicial 
writings exceed any and all judges sitting on the federal courts today.  This was expected, but the 
level of influence was surprising.  Further research will be required to determine the long term 
trends of citations to Posner’s extra-judicial writings, but for the purposes of the dissertation, the 
influence that Posner exerted at the early stages of the economic analysis of law movement is 
clear. 
     In respects to the legal opinions citing to Posner’s federal case law opinions, influence upon 
the jurisprudence may be inferred, but not to the same degree of accuracy that can be evidenced 
in the citation analysis through law reviews, treatises, and other extra-judicial publications.  This 
is one of the weaknesses of quantitative case law analysis when applied to opinions:  influence 
may be inferred, but without as clear a connection as the secondary sources.  To compensate for 
the deficiencies in this methodology for case law opinions, an additional qualitative case law 
analysis methodology was required to be conducted to assist in determining possible influence.  
There is evidence of Posner’s influence on case law opinions through both his extra-judicial 
writings and legal opinions, but the influence is much more nuanced and subjective.  As 
expected, he has been cited for numerous extra-judicial publications and opinions that address 
the use of economic analysis of law in the case law, but primarily in the traditional market 
oriented areas of law, such as antitrust, and less so in non-market areas of the law.  
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Qualitative Analysis – Case Law Analysis 
     Case law opinions are complex and are not easily evaluated by quantitative case law analysis, 
except in term frequency analysis, in which the substance of an opinion is analyzed by the 
frequency of relevant terms appearing in the opinion.  Due to the nuanced structure of case law 
opinions, it was necessary to conduct a qualitative case law analysis to infer influence.  The cases 
had to be read and analyzed to appreciate trends, connections, and infer influence.  The analysis 
of Posner’s opinions that utilize the economic concepts of efficiency in criminal procedure cases 
that address the exclusionary rule, demonstrate that Posner’s use and influence of economic 
analysis in non-market areas of the law, particularly criminal, was underutilized.  This is an 
important finding because one of the hallmarks of Posner’s advocacy for economic analysis of 
law has been the incorporation of economics in traditionally considered non-market areas of the 
law, such as criminal law.  This was expected.   
     In contrast, the qualitative case law analysis of Posner’s opinions addressing economic 
principles in antitrust law, in respect to tacit collusion as an antitrust violation, demonstrated 
significant influence.  This, too, was expected.  As a judicial entrepreneur, one of Posner’s goals 
has been the application of economic principles to both traditionally market and non-market 
areas of the law, particularly the common law, and the qualitative case law analysis demonstrates 
that even though there has been an incorporation of economic principles of efficiency, Posner 
has been less successful in incorporating economic principles into criminal law than in antitrust. 
     Through the research methods utilized in the dissertation, it may be inferred that Posner has 
been a successful judicial entrepreneur, who has had a significant impact on the dissemination of 
economic principles in the analysis of legal issues in both the legal academy and in the federal 
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judiciary.  The empirical quantitative, qualitative, and comparative case study methods utilized 
in this dissertation are not without their faults, but combined they do provide a comprehensive 
portrait in which influence may be inferred.  The development of a new comprehensive model 
for the judicial entrepreneur, combined with the empirical tool of citation analysis, qualitative 
analysis of case law opinions, and comparative case study analysis of other justices, provides the 
foundational framework for future research in helping to better understand judicial entrepreneurs 
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